




















A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
 
requirements for the degree of 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in Civil Engineering 
 
at the University of Canterbury 
 
by Sonia T. McManus 
 











Organisations maintain our economy; they provide jobs, goods, services and a sense of community.  The 
increasingly globalised nature of the modern world has lead to organisations facing threats that often are not 
recognise until the threat becomes a crisis.  It is impossible for organisations, regardless of size, location or financial 
strength, to identify all possible hazards and their consequences; let alone plan for them.  Therefore, the concept of 
increasing organisational resilience is gaining momentum.  
However, the term resilience has been used with abandon across a wide range of academic disciplines and in a great 
many situations.  There is little consensus regarding what resilience is, what it means for organisations and, more 
importantly, how they may achieve greater resilience in the face of increasing threats.  
This study investigates 10 organisations from a range of industry sectors, sizes, localities and types within the New 
Zealand context to discover what are the common issues that foster or create barriers to increased resilience.  
Organisational resilience is defined in this study as a function of the overall situation awareness, keystone 
vulnerabilities and adaptive capacity of an organisation in a complex, dynamic and interrelated environment.  A 
multiple case-study method has been used, and a facilitated 5-Step process for assessing and increasing resilience 
has been developed in conjunction with these organisations.  Data was collected in the form of interviews, survey 
and participant observations in workshop environments.  A set of 15 resilience indicators have been identified, and 
the organisations have been ranked according to their overall resilience relative to the other organisations in this 
study.  
Future work is likely to include further quantification of the methodology and the resilience indicators, resilience 
maturity models and work on understanding resilient leadership, communication of resilience concepts and 







This research has been made possible by the kind and generous assistance of the case-study organisations.  Their 
enthusiastic participation has been gratefully appreciated.  
Thanks are also given to the Resilient Organisations team, in particular Dr Erica Seville, Dr John Vargo and Mr 
David Brunsdon.  Their support, intellect and humour have made this a very smooth path, and a thoroughly 
enjoyable one.  The funding assistance made possible by the Foundation for Research, Science and Technology is 
also gratefully acknowledged together with the scholarship offered by the University of Canterbury.  These 
contributions have made this research possible.  
I would also like to humbly thank my mother.  She has spent many many hours looking after my son so that I can 
chase, and catch this endeavour.  Without her, none of this would have been possible.  
Finally, I would like to dedicate this work to my son, Toby.  Thank you Toby for your laughter, tantrums and love 
that kept me grounded, and made me see the bigger picture in all of this.  I hope that you learn that no matter what 
life throws at you, you can achieve your hearts desire if you really want to. 
 






TABLE OF CONTENTS 
      
Abstract    i 
Acknowledgements   iii 
Table of Contents   v 
Table of Figures   ix 
Table of Tables   xi 
      
1 INTRODUCTION  1 
1.1 Overview  1 
1.2 Context of this Research  1 
1.3 Ethical Considerations  2 
1.4 Thesis Layout  2 
      
2 LITERATURE REVIEW  5 
2.1 Introduction  5 
2.2 The Organisational System  5 
2.3 Organisational Learning in Complex Systems  9 
 2.3.1 Adaptivity  9 
 2.3.2 Situation Awareness  13 
2.4 The Vulnerable Organisation  16 
2.5 Organisations and Risk  18 
2.6 The New Zealand Context  21 
      
3 THESIS METHODOLOGY  23 
3.1 Introduction  23 
 3.1.1 Definitions  23 
 3.1.2 Aims and Objectives  23 
 3.1.3 Case Study Methodology  23 
3.2 Justification of the Case-Study Methodology  24 
 3.2.1 Research Questions and Propositions  24 
3.3 Execution of the Case-Study Methodology  28 
 3.3.1 Selection of Case-Study Organisations  28 
 3.3.2 Data Collection  30 
 3.3.2.1 Interview Phase  31 
 3.3.2.2 Workshop Phase  35 
 3.3.3 Data Analysis using Grounded Theory Methods  35 
 3.3.3.1 Grounded Theory: a critical review  35 
 3.3.3.2 Grounded Theory in this study  37 
3.4 Modification of the Case-Study Methodology  38 
 3.4.1 Feedback Loop 1: Case-Study Selection Issues  39 
 3.4.1.1 Organisation Selection and Access  39 
 3.4.1.2 Organisation Size  40 
 3.4.2 Feedback Loop 2: Data Collection Issues  40 
 3.4.2.1 Order of Interviewees  40 
 3.4.2.2 Recording of Interviews  41 
 3.4.2.3 Multiple Participant Interviews  41 
 3.4.2.4 External Interviewees and Organisational Interconnectedness  41 
 3.4.2.5 Observers  42 
 3.4.2.6 Technology and Presentation of Data  42 
 3.4.2.7 Size of the Workshops  42 
 3.4.2.8 Timing of the Workshops  43 
 3.4.2.9 Contextual Issues and the Order of the Workshop  43 
 3.4.3 Feedback Loop 3: Linking Data with Propositions  44 
3.5 Amalgamation of the Case-Study Methodology  45 
3.6 The Reduction of Bias in the Study  45 
 3.6.1 Organisation Selection  45 
 3.6.2 Data Collection  46 
 3.6.3 Data Analysis  46 
3.7 Qualitative versus Quantitative Data  46 
vi 
 
3.8 Summary  47 
     
4 
METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING AND 
IMPROVING ORGANISATIONAL RESILIENCE 
  
51 
4.1 Introduction   51 
4.2 Objectives of the 5-Step Process  52 
4.3 Theoretical Basis of the 5-Step Process  53 
 4.3.1 The Grounded Theory Methodology  53 
 4.3.2 Organisational Learning  54 
 4.3.3 The Risk Management and Business Continuity Approach  54 
4.4 The 5-Step Process  55 
 4.4.1 Step 1: Building an Awareness of Resilience Issues  55 
 4.4.1.1 Interviews, Surveys and Reporting  55 
 4.4.1.2 Consequence Scenarios  56 
 4.4.2 Step 2: Determination of Essential Organisational Components  57 
 4.4.2.1 Component Mapping  57 
 4.4.3 Step 3: Self Assessment of Vulnerability  59 
 4.4.3.1 Selecting the Scale of Assessment  59 
 4.4.3.2 Criticality  60 
 4.4.3.3 Preparedness  60 
 4.4.3.4 Susceptibility  60 
 4.4.4 Step 4: Identification and Prioritisation of Keystone Vulnerabilities  61 
 4.4.4.1 The Vulnerability Matrix  61 
 4.4.4.2 Keystone Vulnerability Prioritisation  62 
 4.4.5 Step 5: Increasing Adaptive Capacity  64 
 4.4.5.1 Readiness Exercises and Disaster Simulations  64 
4.5 Synthesis  66 
4.6 The Resilience Profile  67 
4.7 Summary  70 
     
5 RESILIENCE INDICATORS FOR ORGANISATIONS  71 
5.1 Introduction  71 
 5.1.1 Maintaining Case-Study Integrity  71 
 5.1.2 Reports and Confidentiality  71 
 5.1.3 Keystone Vulnerability Analysis  71 
 5.1.4 Composite Awareness of Resilience Indicators  72 
5.2 Principal Resilience Issues  72 
 5.2.1 Situation Awareness  72 
 5.2.1.1 Roles and responsibilities (SA
1
)  72 
 5.2.1.2 Hazard and Consequence Awareness (SA
2
)  75 
 5.2.1.3 Connectivity Awareness (SA
3
)  76 
 5.2.1.4 Insurance Awareness (SA
4
)  76 
 5.2.1.5 Recovery Priorities (SA
5
)  77 
 5.2.2 Keystone Vulnerabilities: Identification and Management  78 
 5.2.2.1 Planning Strategies (KV
1
)  78 
 5.2.2.2 Exercises (KV
2
)  79 
 5.2.2.3 Capability and Capacity of Internal Resources (KV
3
)  80 
 5.2.2.4 Capability and Capacity of External Resources (KV
4
)  84 
 5.2.2.5 Organisational Connectivity (KV
5
)  86 
 5.2.3 Adaptive Capacity  87 
 5.2.3.1 Silo Mentality (AC
1
)  87 
 5.2.3.2 Communications and Relationships (AC
2
)  89 
 5.2.3.3 Strategic Vision and Outcome Expectancy (AC
3
)  92 
 5.2.3.4 Information and Knowledge (AC
4
)  93 
 5.2.3.5 Leadership, Management and Governance Structures (AC
5
)  95 
5.3 Synthesis  97 
5.4 Summary and Conclusions  98 
vii 
 
     
6 THE CASE-STUDY ORGANISATIONS  101 
6.1 Introduction  101 
6.2 CS1 – Private Manufacturer  101 
6.3 CS2 – Local Authority  103 
6.4 CS3 – Private Contractor  104 
6.5 CS4 – Public Utility Provider  107 
6.6 CS5 – Education Provider  108 
6.7 CS6 – Private Wholesale Distributor  109 
6.8 CS7 – Private Utility Provider  110 
6.9 CS8 – Private Retailer  112 
6.10 CS9 – Private Primary Producer  113 
6.11 CS10 – Private Technology Provider  115 
6.12 Results of the Case-Study Organisations  116 
6.13 Summary and Conclusions  117 
     
7 IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES AND FUTURE WORK  119 
7.1 Introduction  119 
7.2 Strategies for Improving the Management of Organisational Resilience  120 
 7.2.1 Communications Strategy  120 
 7.2.1.1 What Do Others Here Do?  120 
 7.2.1.2 Leadership and Governance  120 
 7.2.1.3 Keep in Mind the Bigger Picture  121 
 7.2.1.4 Stakeholder Welfare  121 
 7.2.2 Business Resources Strategy  121 
 7.2.2.1 What could hit us and how bad could it be?  122 
 7.2.2.2 What are we all about?  122 
 7.2.2.3 What do we have at our disposal?  122 
 7.2.3 Emergency Planning Strategy  123 
 7.2.3.1 Response to Crises  123 
 7.2.3.2 Recovery from Crises  123 
 7.2.3.3 Exercises  123 
7.3 The 5-Step Process as an Implementation Tool  124 
 7.3.1 Consequence Scenarios  124 
 7.3.2 Keystone Vulnerabilities and Matrices  124 
 7.3.3 Readiness Exercises and Disaster Simulations (REDS)  125 
7.4 Future Work  125 
 7.4.1 Quantification of Resilience Measures  125 
 7.4.1.1 Benchmarking of Resilience Indicators  125 
 7.4.1.2 Quantification of Keystone Vulnerabilities  126 
 7.4.2 Resilience Maturity Models  126 
 7.4.3 Communication of Resilience  126 
 7.4.4 Resilient Sectors  126 
 7.4.5 Resilient Leadership  127 
7.5 Summary and Conclusions  127 
     
8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  129 
8.1 Overview  129 
8.2 Definitions  129 
8.3 Methodology  130 
8.4 Resilience Indicators  133 
8.5 The Case-Study Organisations  135 
8.6 Strategies for Resilience Management  135 
 8.6.1 Resilient Communications Strategy  135 
 8.6.2 Business Resources Strategy  136 
 8.6.3 Emergency Planning Strategy  136 
8.7 Implementation Issues  136 
8.8 Future Work  137 
8.9 Synthesis  137 
     
viii 
 
9 REFERENCES  139 
     
APPENDIX A   A1 
APPENDIX B   B1 
APPENDIX C   C1 
APPENDIX D   D1 
APPENDIX E   E1 
APPENDIX F   F1 






Table of Figures 
  
Figure 1:  Illustration of a random and scale free network (adapted from Dalziell and McManus, 2004).  a) 
A random network is one where the nodes have a relatively even distribution of links to each other.  b) 
scale-free network is characterised by ‘hubs’ where a small number of nodes attract the majority of links  8 
   
Figure 2:  The Bell Curve versus the Power Law (after Buchanan, 2004) 19 
   
Figure 3:  Risk Transference (after Etkin, 1999). 20 
   
Figure 4:  Diagrammatic representation of the case study methodology followed in this research (modified 
from Yin, 2003, Figure 2.2).  The methodology is divided into four phases of investigation; justification, 
execution, modification and amalgamation.  Feedback loops are also illustrated which represent the 
iterative nature of the methodology and the changes in approach where new data emerged or where existing 
strategies were inconsistent with the current situation.  This diagram also shows how each case study was 







   
Figure 5:  The Grounded Theory approach to data management and the generation of theory from 
qualitative analysis of information (after Pidgeon and Harwood, 1996) 
 
38 
   
Figure 6: A schematic flow diagram illustrating the iterative nature of the 5-Step process and the 
connectivity between steps to achieve improved resilience for organisations. 
 
56 
   
Figure 7: Sample vulnerability matrices showing (a) an all-hazards approach and (b) a context specific 
approach to determine keystone vulnerabilities for organisational resilience. 
 
63 
   
Figure 8: The Resilience Profile.  For an organisation with very high resilience (a) the resilience envelope 
(black and white hashed area on the diagram) will plot close to the apex of each axis of the triangle, in the 
very high zone.  For an organisation with very low resilience (b) the resilience envelope will plot much 





   
Figure 9:  The resilience profile for CS1, the Private Manufacturer. 102 
   
Figure 10: The resilience profile for CS2, the Local Authority. 103 
   
Figure 11: The resilience profile for CS3, the private contractor. 105 
   
Figure 12: The resilience profile for CS4, the Public Utility. 106 
   
Figure 13: The resilience profile for CS5, Educational Organisation 108 
   
Figure 14: The resilience profile for CS6 - Private Wholesale Distributor. 110 
   
Figure 15: The resilience profile for CS7, Private Utility Provider 111 
   
Figure 16: The resilience profile for CS8, Private Retailer 113 
   
Figure 17: The resilience profile for CS9, the Primary Producer. 114 
   
Figure 18: The resilience profile for CS10, the Private Technology Provider. 116 
   
Figure 19: Resilience profiles highlighting the difference between an organisation that is very highly 
resilient overall (a) and one which displays a very low overall resilience (b). 
 
132 













Table 1: New organisational learning tools. 9 
   
Table 2:  A matrix that shows the criteria for selecting the organisations to take part in this study. 32 
   
Table 3:  Scoring system for both individual resilience indicators and for collated resilience scores. 
48 
   
Table 4:  Summary table showing the individual and collated resilience scores for each case-study 
organisation.  For key to scoring system, refer to Table 3 
 
49 
   
Table 5: A table showing the connectivity of the steps in the 5-Step process and how the steps relate to the 
attributes of resilience. 
 
52 
   
Table 6:  Details of the consequence scenarios used to improve an organisation's situation awareness. 58 
   
Table 7: An example of the types of internal and external organisational components mapped for 
organisations in this study. 
 
59 
   
Table 8:  The relative ratings of case study organisation for each resilience indicator identified. 99 
   
Table 9:  A summary table showing the relative rankings and associated scores for each organisation in this 
study, together with a composite ranking of total resilience. 
 
117 
   
Table 10:  A matrix showing the relationships between each of the resilience indicators. 119 
   




   
Table 12:  Details of the 5-Step process and the attributes of resilience that are addressed by each step. 131 
   




   
Table 14:  A summary of the resilience indicators representing key issues for all organisations in this study. 134 


















New Zealand is a small country in terms of its geographic size, population and economy.  However New Zealand's 
physical environment is highly dynamic and its geographic isolation means that organisations here must maintain a 
high degree of connection with the global organisational community.  Organisations manage, maintain and operate 
our infrastructure, create our economy and contribute to our society.  The ability of organisations to respond and 
recover effectively following a hazard event has a large influence on the length of time that essential services are 
unavailable.  Therefore, enhancing organisational resilience is a critical step towards creating more resilient 
communities.  
It is important for organisations that resilience becomes an operational construct that has tangible and measurable 
outcomes and not just a theoretical concept.  Additionally resilience is often seen as a crisis or emergency 
management issue; the link between creating resilient day-to-day operations and having a resilient crisis 
response/recovery is typically not well understood by organisations.  This research attempts to bridge the gap 
between the concept of resilience and the creation of a more resilient organisation.  
The benefits of becoming a more resilient organisation cannot be overstated.  Resilience will increase an 
organisation's awareness of its entire operating environment, both internally and externally, and provide the capacity 
to recognise and act upon the threats (and opportunities) of any situation.  Increased resilience will also allow an 
organisation to better identify its keystone vulnerabilities and be able to set priorities when implementing business 
continuity and emergency management planning.  Finally, improving resilience also encourages a more adaptive 
enterprise; one that can make decisions in both a timely and appropriate manner, engage in effective and empathic 
leadership and ensure the creation of a culture of resilience in an organisation.  Ultimately understanding and 
building resilient organisations will help to improve resilience throughout the community, both in New Zealand and 
on the global stage. 
1.2 Context of this Research 
This research project is an intrinsic component of 'Resilient Organisations: Organisational Systems for Readiness, 
Response and Recovery'; an innovative and ambitious research project investigating how New Zealand organisations 
may improve their resilience to hazard events.  Resilient Organisations is funded by the Foundation for Research 
Science and Technology.  Over a six year period Resilient Organisations is investigating the planning, prioritisation 
and deployment, and legal issues faced by New Zealand organisations in relation to hazard events.  The project has 
three separate but interconnected objectives. The work contained in this study contributes to the first objective.  
Objective One explores how and why organisations plan for hazard events, and examines how investment is 
prioritised, both within organisations and from a wider perspective, by identifying critical industries.  Additionally, 
Objective One also explores ways to improve internal strategies for organisational planning and link resilience for 
crises with day-to-day operations.  Finally, Objective One looks at ways to provide a platform for inter- 
organisational hazard planning both within and across industry boundaries.  
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Objective Two looks at the prioritisation and deployment of physical and human resources for recovery after a 
hazard event.  This objective looks at clusters of organisations that will have to work together following a crisis to 
meet their individual and collective objectives.  
Objective Three investigates the legal and contractual environment in New Zealand with a view to establishing a 
comprehensive procurement framework and programme management plan for reconstruction in the event of a 
national disaster.  
1.3 Ethical Considerations 
This study follows the guidelines provided by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee (August 
2001).  Because this study is an investigation of a business organisation or institution, the researchers are not 
required to gain approval from the Human Ethics Committee.  However, in accordance with the Committee’s 
principles and guidelines, this study adhered to the following primary principles:  
1. Informed and voluntary consent. All participants were either telephoned or emailed by the researcher to ask 
for their participation in the study.  The selection of participants was facilitated initially by the primary 
contact in the organisation after initial discussions with the researcher about the nature of the study, and 
consideration of which staff members would be most suitable to interview.  
2. Respect for rights of privacy and confidentiality.  All participants were asked if they were comfortable with 
their interview being recorded and were all assured that their privacy, confidentiality and anonymity would 
be strictly respected.  No participants were directly identified by their comments in any reports to the 
organisation, or in this thesis.  
3. Limitation of deception.  Each organisation was presented with a 'draft discussion' report which was 
designed as a way for the organisation to review the results of the interviews.  The participants were invited 
to comment on this report in each organisation and given the opportunity for discussion during a workshop 
session.  All transcriptions of interviews were available to respective participants for review if required.  
4. Minimisation of risk.  Two-way confidentiality agreements were signed by both the organisation and the 
University of Canterbury.  This was designed to minimise risk to both parties.  
5. Obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi.  This study did not investigate cultural issues specifically.  
1.4 Thesis Layout 
This thesis is divided into the following chapters:  
Chapter 2 - Review of Related Literature.  In order to begin to address resilience issues for organisations it is crucial 
to gain a detailed understanding of what existing research and knowledge is available in this area.  This chapter 
outlines the key concepts in modern thinking about resilience, vulnerability, adaptive capacity, situation awareness, 
complexity and organisations.  
Chapter 3 - Thesis Methodology.  The approach used in this research follows that of a multiple case study approach 
and is entirely qualitative in nature.  The case study methodology is complimented during the information gathering 
and analysis phases by adopting the Grounded Theory method.  This chapter details both the case study and the 
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Grounded Theory methodologies and their application to the research questions for this study including presentation 
of the research questions and supporting propositions.  Also included in Chapter 3 is the presentation of essential 
definitions of organisational resilience, situation awareness, keystone vulnerabilities and adaptive capacity.  
Chapter 4 - Methodology for Assessing and Improving Resilience.  Chapter 4 details the 5-Step process; a 
methodology developed with the case-study organisations and used primarily to gather information but also to assess 
and manage organisational resilience.  The 5-Step process has formed the backbone of this research and each of the 
five steps are detailed in Chapter 4.  Additionally, the resilience profile is introduced and the methodology for 
creating profiles and interpreting them is explored.  
Chapter 5 - Resilience Indicators for Organisations.  Collation of the information from each of the case study 
organisation is presented in Chapter 5 as a set of generic resilience indicators.  There are 15 indicators in total; five 
each representing situation awareness, keystone vulnerability and adaptive capacity.  These indicators are explored 
and the discussion considers the original research questions and propositions.  The discussion also investigated as 
well as the inter-relationships between them and assessed for each organisation relative to the others in the study; 
composite scores are presented.  These scores are the data from which the resilience profiles in Chapter 6 were 
generated.  
Chapter 6 - The Case-Study Organisations.  A total of 10 organisations were investigated in this study and a 
summary of the resilience issues that are pertinent to each is presented in Chapter 6.  The discussion for each 
organisation is subdivided into situation awareness, the management and identification of keystone vulnerabilities 
and adaptive capacity.  A resilience profile is also presented for each organisation.  These are composite profiles and 
represent the overall resilience of the organisation compared to the other organisations in this study.  The 
information used to generate these profiles is presented in Chapter 5.  
Chapter 7 - Resilience Management Strategies, Implementation and Future Work.  As a result of the identification of 
the generic resilience indicators for organisations in Chapter 6, three resilience management strategies are proposed.  
These strategies address each of the indicators at least once, and some indicators are addressed multiple times.  The 
inter-relationships between resilience indicators are highlighted.  The 5-Step process is introduced as an 
implementation tool for organisations seeking to improve their resilience.  Chapter 7 also looks at the questions and 
issues raised by this research but which are outside of the scope of this current study.  There are comments on the 
reasons why these are important to gain a more complete understanding of organisational resilience.  
Chapter 8 - Summary and Conclusions.  This chapter integrates the information presented in this thesis into a short 






2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a broad overview of the current literature related to the development of resilience from an 
organisational perspective.  The chapter forms the basis of the working definition of organisational resilience used in 
this study; where… 
Resilience is a function of an organisation’s situation awareness, identification and management of keystone 
vulnerabilities and adaptive capacity in a complex, dynamic and interconnected environment. 
Traditionally, resilience is viewed as those qualities that enable an individual, community or organisation to cope 
with, adapt to and recover from a disaster event (Buckle et al, 2000; Horne, 1997; Mallak, 1998; Pelling and Uitto, 
2001; Riolli and Savicki, 2003).  It is the capacity of a system to absorb change (generally conceptualised in the 
form of sudden shocks) and still retain its essential functionality (Walker et al, 2006).  The concept of resilience has 
evolved through its application to numerous scientific disciplines.  Resilience has been discussed in relation to; 
climate change and linked to vulnerability (Timmerman, 1981); in terms of proactive and reactive resilience of 
society as a whole (Dovers and Handmer, 1992); as it relates to both ecological and social systems (Adger, 2000); 
and natural hazards (Blaikie et al, 1994) to name but a few.  Resilience is not a static condition of an organisation 
and may vary over time and depending on the nature and consequences of a particular crisis.  Therefore, 
organisational resilience is thought by some authors to have different, but related meanings; resilience is the ability 
to prevent the negative consequences of an event occurring; resilience is the ability to prevent something with 
negative consequences worsening over time, and; resilience is the ability to engage in recovery following the 
negative consequences of an event (Westrum, 2006). 
Several excellent reviews of the literature are available by Folke, (2006), Hollnagel et al (2006) and Klein et al 
(2003), and the reader is directed towards these for a detailed discussion.  However, as pointed out by Klein et al 
(2003), resilience remains a theoretical concept and methods for achieving improved resilience at an operational 
level still challenge both the academic and the practitioner. 
2.2 The organisational system 
A general systems approach to looking at organisations has been suggested by a number of authors as a way to 
assess and measure resilience at an organisational scale (Dalziell and McManus, 2004; Horne, 1997; Marais et al, 
2004; Riolli and Saviki, 2003; Starr et al, 2004).  A general theory of systems has been applied to many disciplines 
including ecology, physics, sociology to name only a few.  Systems theory has also been applied in an 
organisational sense and often used as a bridge for interdisciplinary research.  Generally speaking, systems thinking 
is marked by its focus on a holistic viewpoint; a viewpoint where the relationships between the agents in a system 
are more important than the agents themselves.  As the number of agents in the system increases and the behaviour 
of the system becomes non linear (namely, system behaviour cannot be predicted by the behaviour of individual 
agents), then the system becomes complex.  When the agents in a complex system exhibit learning-type behaviours, 
then it becomes a complex adaptive system.  Leading researchers in complex adaptive systems (CAS) include Gell-
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Mann (1994) and Holland (1995).  Dooley (1996, 1997) provides guidance regarding the essential components of 
CAS whereby: 
• A CAS is composed of agents each acting semi-autonomously and which evolve over time. 
• Agents scan their environments and develop mental models, or schema, of that environment. 
• Agents can increase their fitness by acting to change the schema to fit the observation, or act to change the 
observation to fit the schema. 
• The schema define how agents interact with other agents in the environment around them. 
Further, CAS typically exhibit the following characteristics (after Vogelsang, 2002): 
• individual agents interacting and re/constructing their relationships at the local level 
• development of global patterns and the emergence of self-organisation 
• constant creation of variety; the ability to develop new methods for action that build on the successes of the past.  
Knowledge that the system can only be influenced, not directed.   
It could be argued that all organisations are complex because of the complexity of their most common agent, 
humans (Schein, 1980).  However, it is more typically the internal or external environment which contributes the 
most to complexity in organisations (Dooley, 2002).  The internal environment reflects the organisational processes 
and supportive technologies within the organisation while the external environment consists of suppliers, 
competitors, markets and so on.  
The complexity that arises in internal environments for organisations is often attributed to increases in technology.  
Charles Perrow (1984) introduced the concept that some technological systems have what are termed as ‘normal’ or 
unavoidable accidents and incidents based on two inter-related dimensions; interactive complexity and loose/tight 
coupling.  Interactive complexity is the phenomenon of a unforeseen and unplanned sequences of events that are not 
visible in a system.  Loose and tight coupling refers to the degree to which parts of a system are tied to one another.  
In a tightly coupled system, the composite parts are linked very closely so that any changes in one part of the system 
have immediate implications and effects on all others.  This can lead to disastrous results.  Loosely coupled systems, 
on the other hand, have links, but the performance of one element of the system is not dependent on another.  
Typically these loosely coupled systems are able to absorb disruptions and perturbations without destabilisation of 
the entire system (Marias et al, 2004).  The premise of Perrow’s approach is that these tightly coupled systems, 
which also exhibit interactive complexity, are likely to experience ‘system accidents’ that are entirely unpredictable 
and also potentially cascading in nature.  Many examples of these types of system failures have been documented.  
Examples include the chemical disaster at Bhopal (Shrivastava, 1992), Chernobyl nuclear power plant (Kennedy and 
Kirwan, 1998; Pidgeon, 1998; Pidgeon and O’Leary, 2000), the Exxon Valdez oil spill (Grabowski and Roberts, 
1996) and the Mann Gulch disaster (Weick, 1993) to name but a few. 
Additionally, researchers have noted that some types of organisations which exhibit the interactive complexity and 
tightly coupled systems identified by Perrow seem to experience remarkably few ‘system accidents’.  These 
organisations have been labelled as High Reliability Organisations (HRO’s) (see La porte, 1996; La porte and 
Consolini, 1991; Roberts and G, 1989; Roberts, Stout and Halpern, 1994; Rochlin, La Porte and Roberts, 1987 and 
Weick, 1989).  One of the principal elements of HRO’s is the concept of mindfulness (Roberts, Stout and Halpern, 
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1994; Vogus and Welborne, 2003; Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001; Weick et al, 1999; Wildavsky, 1988).  This 
mindfulness includes: 
• a preoccupation with failure:   recognition that the identification of near misses and any failures are an indicator 
of the entire system reliability and health;  recognition and reward for the reporting of errors. 
• a reluctance to simplify interpretations: a commitment to finding and maintaining divergent viewpoints about a 
situation in order to ensure that key variables of the system and environment are not overlooked. 
• a sensitivity to operations:  looking at the big picture on a constant basis from the viewpoint of real-time 
information. 
• a commitment to resilience:  a belief that the existing body of information is not complete and faith that the 
organisation has the ability to bounce back from failures, and handle any surprises that either the system or the 
environment momentarily produce. 
• an under-specification of structures:  the deferment of decision making to individuals with the greatest 
experience and expertise in the organisation regardless of the structured hierarchy, and recognition of more 
‘fluid’ decision making processes. 
Several examples are available in the literature, which detail case studies of HRO’s.  These include nuclear 
submarines and nuclear powered aircraft (Bierly and Spender, 1995; Roberts, Rousseau and La Porte, 1994; 
Rochlin, La Porte and Roberts, 1987), nuclear power plants (Bourrier, 1996; La Porte, 1982; La Porte and Thomas, 
1995; Schulman, 1993), the Challenger Space Shuttle disaster (Heimann, 1993), military systems (Roberts, Stout 
and Halpern, 1994; Zohar and Luria, 2003) and air traffic control towers (La Porte and Consolini, 1991). 
A criticism of both NRT and HRO theory is that few organisations have the extremely complex technology that is 
evident in these organisations; therefore the lessons to be learned from NRT and HRO’s are limited and not 
necessarily applicable to mainstream organisations (Luo Carlo et al, 2004; van den Eede and van den Walle, 2005).  
Another criticism is that both theories oversimplify the causes of accidents by underestimating the problems of 
dealing with uncertainty (HRO research) or underestimate and oversimplify the ways in which to cope with 
uncertainty (Marais et al, 2004).  However, some researchers have tried to integrate these theories to uncover 
techniques that are more relevant for those organisations that exhibit a complex relationship between technological 
and social elements; socio-technical systems.  The study of socio-techincial systems theory is traditionally attributed 
to Eric Trist and Ken Bamforth (1951).  In a case study of long-wall coal mining as a ‘production system’ they 
observed that in spite of improved technology the organisation’s productivity was decreasing.  Similarly, despite 
improvements in pay and conditions, the workforce was still dogged with increasing absenteeism.  Therefore, it was 
theorised that greater emphasis needed to be placed on group dynamics rather than that of just the individual.  The 
theory of socio-technical systems is based on the concept of joint optimisation.  That is, the link between the social 
networks in any organisation and the interaction with the technical networks; there is an almost symbiotic 
relationship that develops.  Development and optimisation of the social network without development and 
optimisation of the technical system can lead to potentially disastrous relationships and, in come instances, 
considerable damage to the organisation as a whole.  In Barry Turner’s study into man made disasters (Turner, 
1978) he hypothesised that instead of disasters in technological systems being defined by the impacts on the 
technology, they should be defined by the impacts on the social and cultural aspects of the organisation (Pidgeon 
and O’Leary, 2000; Turner, 1978; Turner and Pidgeon, 1997).   
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‘The man-made disasters model proposes that the build-up of latent errors and events, at odds with the culturally 
taken for granted, is accompanied by a collective failure of organizational cognition and ‘intelligence’, as the 
developing system vulnerability to failure remains concealed by social processes which attenuate evaluations of 
risk.’ (Pidgeon and O’Leary, 2000) 
Therefore, from a systems perspective, individual organisations may be viewed as systems themselves, and also as 
agents within a larger system.  The interdependencies can be remarkably complex.  Further to the concept of 
organisations themselves existing as components in complex networks, Barabasi (2003) has identified two types of 
network, which may have significant implications for developing resilience strategies for organisations (Figure 1).  
Firstly is the ‘random network’; defined by the ability of nodes to be connected by a number of independent links, 
much like a road network in a city.  While initially the random network is resistant to random failure of the links or 
nodes, rapid collapse of the network can occur once a critical threshold is reached and exceeded.  Secondly is the 
scale-free network, which is defined by hubs; nodes within the network that have a majority of the links.  The 
Internet typifies the scale-free network, where hubs may be represented by websites such as Google and Amazon.  
Similarly to the random network, the scale-free network is remarkably resistant to the failure of random links and 
nodes.   However, targeted removal of hubs can quickly break down the network and disable the service. 
 
Figure 1:  Illustration of a random and scale free network (adapted from Dalziell and McManus, 2004).  a) A 
random network is one where the nodes have a relatively even distribution of links to each other.  b) scale-free 
network is characterised by ‘hubs’ where a small number of nodes attract the majority of links. 
As highlighted by Dalziell and McManus (2004), the failure vulnerabilities of these two types of networks have 
significant implications for designing resilient organisational systems.  While random events, typically defined by 
natural hazards, will always be held in high regard by risk managers, it is the emerging hazards of the information 
technology age, terrorism and pandemic for example that may have the greatest implications for developing resilient 
organisational networks.  Given the global economic imperative of recent years and the development of key 
organisations as hubs within the widespread organisational network, systematic removal of key hubs could 
potentially lead to a global economic catastrophe.   
2.3 Organisational learning in complex systems 
Organisations as complex adaptive systems display, to varying degree, a capacity to learn.  Schein (1996) describes 
four factors that are intrinsic in an organisation’s learning ability and its overall systemic health.  These include: 
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• A sense of identity, purpose or mission 
• A capacity on the part of the system to adapt and maintain itself in the face of internal and external changes. 
• A capacity to perceive and test reality; and 
• Some degree of internal integration or alignment of the sub-systems that make up the total system (after Schein, 
1996). 
There are several elements that contribute to an organisation’s learning ability.  These include the recognition of an 
essential interconnectedness (the systems view of the world), the ability to change how the world is viewed 
(generative learning) and the ability to adapt to changed environments (adaptive learning) (Murray, 2002; Schein, 
1996; Senge, 1990).  It is the ability of the organisational culture to ensure that learning is not entirely based on 
adaptive learning but becomes accommodating of both adaptive and generative learning types.  New learning tools 
are also required to achieve this, however as this is unlikely to be achieved through cognitive changes alone 
(Murray, 2002).  Examples of these tools may be found in Table 1 below (in Murray, 2002 and modified from 
Senge, 1990).  The following discussion introduces the theories and concepts behind adaptive and generative 
learning in terms of adaptivity and situation awareness for organisations. 
Table 1.  New organisational learning tools. 
Building shared vision Surfacing and testing mental 
models 
Systems thinking 
• Encouraging personal vision. 
• Communicating and asking 
for support. 
• Visioning as an ongoing 
process. 
• Blending extrinsic and 
intrinsic visions. 
• Distinguishing positive from 
negative visions. 
• Seeing leaps of abstraction. 
• Balancing enquiry and 
advocacy. 
• Distinguishing espoused 
theory from theory in use. 
• Recognising and defusing 
defensive routines. 
• Seeing interrelationships, not 
things and processes, not 
snapshots. 
• Moving beyond blame. 
• Distinguishing detail 
complexity from dynamic 
complexity. 
• Focusing on areas of high 
leverage. 
• Avoiding symptomatic 
solutions. 
2.3.1 Adaptivity 
Adaptive learning centres on the ability of an organisation to cope; to learn and change simultaneously and align 
itself with its environment (Daft and Weick, 1984; Murray, 2002).  Organisations that are successful in adaptive 
learning are proficient in: 
• Sensing the change in the environment, both internally and externally, 
• Acquiring information and make sure it is disseminated to where is can be processed and acted upon. 
• Interpreting the information and formulate correct or appropriate conclusions 
• Making internal transformation to address the changes in the environment without drawing adverse side effects. 
• Development of new actions based on the information at hand; and 
• Obtaining feedback on the appropriateness of the new actions (the Adaptive Coping Cycle, after Schein, 1980) 
The literature in relation to adaptivity is divided into two rather distinct categories; socio-environmental systems and 
organisational systems.  There is a huge body of research on adaptive capacity as it relates to socio-environmental 
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systems, particularly in relation to climate change research.  This field is matched by a plethora of research into 
organisational adaptive capacity and learning.  Although the discussion here focuses on the organisational research 
domain, a short introduction on the socio-environmental system approach is warranted.  However, this discussion of 
the socio-environmental system approach doesn’t aim to provide the reader with any great depth in this regard; 
rather the reader is referred to some of the excellent summaries of this work for more detail (Brooks, 2003; 
Gallopin, 2006; Klein et al, 2003; Smit and Wandel, 2006). 
Typically researchers in socio-environmental adaption consider that these systems are investigated at the scale of a 
community; a ‘definable aggregation of households, interconnected in some way and with a limited spatial extent’ 
(Coombs et al, 1988; Smit and Wandel, 2006).  Adaption may be synonymous with survival and success of the 
system and those that are successful at adapting have a high adaptive capacity; they are able to cope with change and 
respond to it quickly and effectively (Denevan, 1983).  From the perspective of political ecology the focus of 
adaptive capacity changes to investigating the forces that impact on an individual’s adaptive capacity when their 
community is faced with change (Kasperson and Kasperson, 2005; Smit and Wandel, 2006).  Within this research 
into socio-environmental systems and climate change, the link between vulnerability and adaptive capacity is 
considered intrinsic.  In some schools of thought adaptive capacity is one of the components of vulnerability, or 
even that they are opposite ends of the same spectrum (Smit and Wandel, 2006).  These studies seek to identify and 
evaluate the criteria that determine the vulnerability of a system (typically countries, regions or communities) and 
that from these vulnerabilities can be reduced by increasing adaptive capacities or reducing exposure (Adger et al 
2004; Brooks et al, 2005; Kelly and Adger, 2000).  Luers and Lobell (2003), for example, incorporate the concept of 
adaptive capacity into their vulnerability assessment of agricultural systems in Mexico.  Adaptive capacity, the 
author’s argue, is a significant factor in characterising vulnerability and may be defined as ‘the extent to which a 
system can modify its circumstances to move to a less vulnerable condition’ (p 259). 
It is important to realise that adaptive capacity is not a static feature of any system.  There are a number of studies 
(Folke et al, 2002; deVries, 1985) that look at how these components change over time and in response to 
environmental changes (economic, social, political and institutional) (Smit and Wandel, 2006).  Furthermore, 
researchers have considered the inter-relationships between determinants of adaptive capacity, recognizing that 
strengths or weaknesses in one aspect, for example managerial ability, may influence other determinants such as the 
reduction of psychological stress among workers (Smit and Wandel, 2006). 
The concept of adaptive capacity is at the core of current organisational resilience methodology.  Adaptive capacity 
is defined as the ability of an enterprise to alter its ‘strategy, operations, management systems, governance structure 
and decision-support capabilities’ to withstand perturbations and disruptions (Starr et al, 2004).  Organisations that 
focus on their resilience in the face of disruption generally adopt adaptive qualities and proactive responses.  
Furthermore, they emphasise positive behaviour within the enterprise and within employees and look at disruptions 
as being opportunities for advancement (Folke et al, 2002; Mallak, 1998). 
The study of adaptive capacity in relation to organisational systems has resulted in considerable advances in recent 
years particularly regarding the cultural capital of an organisation and the effects this may have on its ability to 
withstand crises.  The idea is not new and may be linked to Perrow’s work on normal accidents (1979) and various 
studies into High Reliability Organisations (HRO’s).  Several different organisational cultures have been identified 
in terms of both adaptivity and learning abilty (see in particular the work by Schein, 1996).   Some examples of 
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organisations have been shown to exhibit favourable workplace cultures that help them to adapt to changes in their 
operating environment, even when these changes are unforeseen and unexpected.  Examples include Nokia, Toyota 
(Sheffi, 2006a), Dell (Sheffi, 2005), UPS (Coutu, 2002) and Coca-Cola (Seaman and Williams, 2005).  While 
terminology differs regarding what attributes actually make up such effective organisational cultures, there are some 
widely accepted qualities that organisations can encourage (these attributes are discussed below). 
Additionally, employees that are conditioned to expect the unexpected contribute significantly to an organisation 
with a high adaptive capacity.  The ability for an organisation to combine the development and testing of a plan with 
enhancing the capacity of its staff to cope with the unexpected is a critical balance.  No organisation can plan for 
every possible circumstance and therefore the organisational culture becomes vital (Sheffi, 2005).  This is very 
apparent in high reliability and reliability seeking organisations where the culture of safety becomes more important 
to operational efficiency than controlling or mitigating unforeseen and unexpected events (Rochlin, 1999).  Schein 
(1996) has identified three specific ‘cultures’ that are relevant to understanding the learning organisation and how 
adapitivity develops.  These organisational cultures include: 
• The operator culture:  various ‘sub-systems’ of the organisation whose role it is to deliver the products and 
services that are derived from the organisation’s primary objective or task.  Subcultures often develop and these 
are typically the parts of the organisational system that are targeted for wholesale changes when the organisation 
experiences transformations.  This culture is extremely people oriented. 
• The engineering culture:  the people who inhabit this organisational culture are those who are responsible for 
designing the systems and processes upon which the organisation ‘delivers its products and services and by 
which it maintains itself’.  These people believe in the simplicity and efficiency of technical solutions and that 
humans are the source of all errors. 
• The CEO culture:  the individuals in the CEO culture are dominated by a financial focus and view of the 
organisation.  They are typically distrustful of information from a bottom-up direction, and see people in an 
organisation as a cost, not an asset.   
The ability of both leaders and general staff to view crises from a positive and opportunistic perspective is important 
in the adaptive organisation (for example Borneman, 2005; Hagevik, 1998; Norman et al., 2005; Pearson and 
Mitroff, 1993; Penrose, 2000; Sheffi, 2005; Starr et al., 2004).  Additionally, the quality of leadership and the degree 
of empowerment through to lower levels in an organisation is increasingly seen as a critical facet of an adaptive 
organisation’s culture (for example Coutu, 2002; Hagevik, 1998; Kerfoot, 2005; Norman et al, 2005; Sheffi, 2006a; 
2006b; 2005).  Empowerment, for instance, has been identified as a key part of the successful response by the US 
Coast Guard during Hurricane Katrina and the saving of over 24,000 lives (Sheffi, 2006b).  Leadership during times 
of crisis and non-crisis is vital to developing an enhanced adaptive capacity in an organisation.  This may be 
achieved by the development and communication of mutual value systems between the leadership and workforce in 
an organisation (Sheffi, 2005; Senge, 2006). 
The interest in creating an increased adaptive capacity during and immediately following a disaster has lead some 
researchers to propose a set of adaptive features to enhance organisational and societal resilience (Kendra and 
Wachtendorf, 2003; Mallak, 1998; Weick, 1993). 
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• Bricolage:  This is the capacity to adapt known information and apply it to the current situation in a creative 
manner.  People and organisations that engage in bricolage on a regular basis are adept at using limited resources 
in a chaotic situation to create order and solve problems.  
• Virtual Role Systems:  This is the ability of sub-sets of an organisation to take on the role and responsibility of 
absent members.  Additionally, Virtual Role Systems require that all elements of the system have a common 
vision of the risk they face, the goals that they are aiming for, and the possible actions that they may engage in to 
achieve their collective goals.  This is true for individuals within an organisation and for groups of organisations 
serving a community or society.  Comfort (1999) points out the importance of information technology for 
development of Virtual Role Systems.  She supports the critical appearance of linkages between and within 
organisations/communities and the subsequent creation of a ‘sociotechnical system in which the ability to 
exchange timely, accurate information among multiple participant facilitates a more open, responsive, creative 
approach to solving shared problems.’ (Comfort, 1999; 5).  
• Wisdom:  The capacity to know the limits of the information at hand, and the ability to seek out additional 
information is termed by Weick (1993) as wisdom.  This may be also viewed as the ability of a system to self-
organise (Kendra and Wachtendorf, 2003).  Mallak (1998) further subdivides ‘wisdom’ into: 
o Ensure Adequate External Resources:  access to further resources over and above those required for 
everyday decisions will enable a positive adaptive response for situations that are outside the ordinary. 
o Expand Decision-Making Boundaries:  this is the ability of employees within an organisation to make 
decisions within their experience and knowledge base without having to continually refer to upper 
management levels.  Expansion of decision-making boundaries can significantly enhance the adaptive 
capacity of an organisation in times of crisis. 
• Respectful Interaction.  The respectful interaction of all levels within an organisation, and between organisations 
is closely related to Mallak’s ‘Expand Decision-Making Boundaries’ above.  Respect for the reports and 
decisions of others, the respect for ones own perceptions and decisions, and the ability to act upon these 
decisions honestly and openly is a key feature in the adaptive capacity of organisations during and following 
disaster events. 
• Positive Adaptive Behaviour.  Together with the ability to perceive experiences in a constructive manner, 
developing positive adaptive behaviour is critical if change is to be viewed as opportunities, not just negatively.  
The development of these strategies is important in allowing decisions and actions based on the situations at 
hand, rather than a pre-programmed response to a crisis. 
• Develop tolerance for uncertainty.  No individual or organisation can accurately map out all the risks that could 
be faced now or in the future.  Therefore it is vital that a tolerance for uncertainty is created as part of an 
organisational (and perhaps societal and global) culture.  This is related to bricolage in that the ability to cope 
with a crisis will require using the information that is at hand, and accepting that one will never have all the 
required information about a situation. 
Dalziell and McManus (2004) introduce the concept that systems (specifically organisational systems) can adapt to 
changes in different ways.  Firstly they may use existing responses and apply them to the problems at hand, which 
may involve up-scaling this response.  Secondly, existing responses may be utilised in a new context for a crisis 
situation.  Thirdly, an organisation may develop novel responses and apply them to a problem.  The problems may 
be new and unforeseen or those that the organisation has been able to see coming.  Typically organisations enlist 
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either a command and control type structure to deal with crisis or a more organic and innovative approach (Dalziell 
and McManus, 2004). 
2.3.2 Situation Awareness 
Generative learning for organisations is distinct from adaptive learning which is more focused on coping.  
Generative learning is, in essence, the process of creation and expands on, and moves beyond adaptive learning; it 
allows organisations to be less reactive in their approach.  A key aspect in developing generative learning is an 
organisations ability to generate creative tension.  
Creative tension comes from seeing clearly where we want to be, our ‘vision’, and telling the truth about where we 
are, our ‘current reality’.(Senge, 1994). 
The ability of the organisation to continually be aware of itself and its environment is known as its situation 
awareness.  Originally coined in relation to military pilots the modern concept of situation awareness is traditionally 
attributed to Endsley (1995) and originally described the situation awareness of an individual or agent within 
system; situation awareness is: 
‘the perception of the elements within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the 
projection of their status into the near future’. 
However, as recognition of teamwork increased, so did the necessity to look at situation awareness from a different, 
more complex perspective.  Even those decisions ultimately made by one individual are often based on information 
from a much wider team.  Furthermore, the sum of individual knowledge or awareness does not represent the overall 
situation awareness of the system (Salas et al, 1995).  While team or shared situation awareness is rapidly becoming 
a significant field of research there is no common definition agreed upon (Salmon et al, 2006).  The terminology is 
diverse (Roth et al, 2006) and includes ‘shared contextual knowledge’ (Rognin, 2000), ‘shared mental models’ 
(Cannon-Bowers et al, 1993),  ‘team cognition’ (Espinosa et al, 2004) and ‘shared workspace awareness’ (Gutwin 
and Greenberg, 2004) among numerous others.  Oomes (2004) suggests the concept of organisational awareness, 
particularly in relation to the effective management of crisis situations as: 
‘an understanding of the multiple parties that make up the organisation and how they relate to each other’.   
Events such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA, Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the Boxing Day Tsunami in 
2005 have highlighted how poor communications, limited situation awareness and a lack of multi-
agency/organisation interoperability has contributed to major deficiencies in the emergency response (Bahora et al, 
2003; Ntuen, 2006; Runyan, 2006; Titan Systems Corporation, 2002).  Researchers and practitioners are therefore 
becoming increasingly concerned with developing improved situation awareness among teams.  Specifically this is 
in relation to the response and recovery for individual organisations as well as from a multi-organisational approach, 
particularly in terms of inherently dynamic and complex situations.  
The temporal aspect of situation awareness is also an important consideration.  Endsley et al (2003) describe three 
time-related impacts on situation awareness.   
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• Firstly is the understanding of the available time until a specific action or event occurs.   
• Secondly is an understanding of the time until actions and events have specific consequences.   
• Thirdly, situation awareness requires an understanding of the rate of information change in dynamic real-world 
situations.   
These temporal aspects of situation awareness apply to individuals within an organisation engaging in decision 
making activities.  But they also apply to the organisation as a whole; operating within a network of other 
organisations and within its community of stakeholders.   Essentially, situation awareness is ‘the engine that drives 
the decision making and performance in complex, dynamic systems’ (Endsley et al, 2003).  Some of the barriers to 
effective situation awareness are particularly relevant for organisations dealing with large scale crisis situations; 
namely workload-anxiety-fatigue-other stressors (WAFOS), data overload and complexity creep (Endsley et al, 
2003), workload (Gregoriades and Sutcliffe, 2006) or taskload (Grootjen et al, 2006), macro versus micro scale of 
situation awareness (Stanton et al, 2006) and decentralized control that creates ‘roadblocks (Gorman et al, 2006). 
Recent research is pointing to the increased ability of organisations to respond effectively using a more creative and 
flexible decision making structure.  This appears to be because automation and rigour (more associated with 
command and control decision making) may actually hinder adaptive capacity by reducing situation awareness 
(Endsley et al, 2003) and ultimately performance; systems must be more flexible or they risk becoming redundant 
(Stanton and Baber, 2006).  An excellent case study is presented by Paraskevas (2006) that identifies the need for a 
flexible decision making structure resulting from high adaptive capacity for a major food poisoning outbreak in a 
hotel chain.  This case study is an excellent example of the importance of complex adaptive systems in developing 
resilient organisations. 
A fundamental approach to increasing an organisation’s situation awareness is by encouraging some experience of 
pseudo-crisis situations through the use of scenario exercises.  Coates (2006) suggests that organisations have a 
‘severely limited psychological capacity’ to look at incidents in other corporations and apply the lessons learned to 
themselves.  Therefore, scenario exercises offer significant value for the networked organisation, specifically if they 
involve participants from across a number of internal divisions and/or external interconnected organisations.  The 
benefits include: increased awareness of value systems and the development of shared mental models (Starr et al, 
2004); appreciation of a team environment and integration of diverse information (Coutu, 2002; Flin, 1996; Paton, 
1996; Paton and Jackson, 2002; Quanjel et al, 1998, Salas et al 1999);  the identification of solutions that may not 
have been overtly apparent (Starr et al, 2004); the opportunity to learn from emergency experiences and apply that 
knowledge in novel situations (Paton and Jackson, 2002); the fostering and encouragement of self efficacy (Jex and 
Bliese, 1999), and; improving the persistence of individuals and groups to achieve predefined goals in an emergency 
situation (Klimoski and Brickner, 1987; Paton and Jackson, 2002). 
Improving organisational awareness about crises also involves learning about the types of emergency situations that 
may occur.  Many organisations have engaged in some sort of risk identification process but few take this process 
one step further and combine risks of similar nature or expected response.  In an emergency often the same types of 
issues will be faced and actions will be common across crisis types (Pearson and Mitroff, 1993).  Furthermore, while 
there is debate on the validity and usefulness of emergency plans (Seaman and Williams, 2005), for those 
organisations that do create emergency plans, these must be tested, practiced and exercised to be useful in a real 
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emergency (Coates, 2006; Coutu, 2002).  It is also vital that organisations do not just focus on those events that they 
can foresee or those that they have already experienced. 
Recent research into the interconnectedness of organisations has allowed researchers to identify the critical links and 
hubs of their relationships with other organisations and their participating communities.  This recognition has lead to 
a greatly increased understanding and appreciation of their vulnerabilities; economically, politically, socially and 
environmentally.  The advent of the information age, and the increasing reliance on computerised networks and 
communications has reduced the size of the world for organisations while at the same time dramatically increasing 
the potential for abuse of the systems. Much of the risk that organisations face is tied up in their intrinsic 
interconnectedness; the organisational network.  Barabasi (2003) suggests that traditional organisational networks 
are trees and originate from the CEO upwards in a bifurcated branching fashion.  These organisations are dominated 
by vertically integrated management structures (Buchanan, 2003).  One principal weaknesses of this style of 
organisation in relation to hazards, is over-organisation, which may create a completely inflexible enterprise that 
cannot respond dynamically to changing environments.  Marais et al (2004) also discuss this concept in looking 
critically at normal accident theory and HRO theory; that complex systems are defined by ‘indirect, non-linear and 
feedback relationship’ rather than traditional chain of events models.  These simply do not account for the 
complexity in organisational systems and that the focus needs to change to a more holistic and integrated approach 
recognising both socio and technical aspects.  Weick (2006) talks about the loss of imagination and the potential 
implications on decision making processes in crises and some authors even go so far as to define resilience in 
organisations as the ability to ‘self-renew over time’ through the process of innovation (Reinmoeller and van 
Baardwijk, 2005).   
The key, therefore, to successful adaptation in this new, changing environment, according to Barabasi (2003) is to 
move from a tree-based organisational structure, to a web or network organisation that effectively utilises many 
inter- and intra-organisational links.  It is critical that organisations understand that they do not work alone if they 
are to successfully navigate a crisis.  They must recognize themselves as parts of a wider network, and indeed as 
networks themselves.  As a result there is an increasing need for decision makers, and organisations generally, to 
have common and shared cognition.  As described by Schein (1996): 
‘…complex organizations (that) are systems composed of many sub-systems, each of which is composed of many 
individuals, one can see that the total organization’s capacity to maintain itself and grow, to continue to act 
effectively in the face of changing circumstances, depends upon the creation of a set of shared assumptions that cut 
across the subsystems and survive in spite of changes in the individual membership of the subsystems, i.e. the 
culture’ (p 4). 
The ability to increase the resilience of self organising systems in a context whereby they are not at the mercy of 
random events is supported by an increasing focus on organisational strategic planning.  In conjunction with 
organisational learning, strategic planning is being used as a methodology for increasing an organisations capacity to 
cope with crisis. (Stacey, 1996, Vogelsang, 2002).  In a case study completed by Paraskevas (2006) the difficulties 
of creating crisis responses in complex adaptive systems was clearly highlighted.  A hotel chain suffered a large 
scale food poisoning incident throughout its individual hotels; however the effects of the crisis were not felt equally 
at each location.  While the organisation had invested a considerable amount of resources in developing a crisis 
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management plan, it had failed to allow the individual hotel operators flexibility in using this planning to address the 
situation they were facing.  The organisation had not developed a ‘crisis culture’.  As Paraskevas notes:  
‘…the behaviour of the system is determined by its agent’s interaction at a local level and this is the reason why the 
control of the crisis response system has to be distributed among its agents’ (p 900). 
2.4 The Vulnerable Organisation 
The term vulnerability is one which has many different definitions and applications depending on the objectives of 
the researchers/practitioners and the situation within which it is applied.  As such there is considerable confusion 
over the use of vulnerability and assessing and modelling vulnerability in the real world.  The concept of 
vulnerability originated in natural hazard research but has since expanded considerably into other disciplines.  There 
are many authors who have sought to summarise the thinking about vulnerability, however this is an extremely 
difficult task as the literature on the topic is large.  For this research, vulnerability is considered specifically as it 
relates to organisations.  Therefore, the following discussion focuses on this aspect of vulnerability and makes no 
attempt to provide a detailed account of vulnerability in other areas of enquiry.  Good summaries are given by Klein 
et al (2003), Füssel (2005) and Villagrán De León (2006) and highlight some of the difficulties associated with 
determining what vulnerability is as well as how to measure and assess vulnerability to provide meaningful results.  
The reader is directed to these summaries for a detailed account of how vulnerability has evolved as a term since the 
1970’s. 
A number of studies of organisational vulnerability have highlighted some of the strongest influences on post crisis 
survival, particularly for small businesses.  The degree of structural damage to the physical location of an 
organisation and its degree of disaster preparedness has been shown to have some influence on survival rates 
(Alesch and Holly, 1998; Alesch et al, 2001; Chang and Falit-Baiamonte, 2002; Tierney, 1997; Webb et al, 2000).  
However, much stronger indicators of organisational failure following a crisis include: interruptions to 
infrastructure, experiencing financial difficulties prior to an event; operational difficulties, problems with 
interdependencies and problems with the supply chain (Alesch and Holly, 1998; Alesch et al, 2001; Chang, 2001a; 
Chang, 2001b; Chang and Falit-Baiamonte, 2002; Durkin, 1984; Tierney, 1997; Webb et al, 2000).  Additionally, 
Paton (1996) identified that, in an organisational context, the vulnerability of key groups that contribute to an 
organisation must be considered from a business continuity perspective.  Another aspect of organisational 
vulnerability is the concept of latent pathogens (Reason, 1990) or failure preconditions (Turner, 1978; 1994).  These 
failure preconditions may be linked to different organisational cultures ranging along a spectrum from pathological 
to bureaucratic to generative (Bier et al, 2004; Westrum, 2004).    They are also influenced by what is known as a 
disaster incubation period; the timeframe over which the build up of failure preconditions occurs and disaster is 
‘triggered’ (Turner, 1994).  One of the most important outcomes of this networked economy is the potential for 
small changes at one scale to become significant, even devastating, at another.  While broken links generally affect 
only the immediate organisations involved, the failure of some links will lead to a ripple effect throughout the entire 
system (Barabasi, 2003; Comfort, 1999; WBCSD, 2004) and this has spawned a new kind of risk – interdependence 
risk (Buchanan, 2003).  Examples are numerous and include, among others, the 1997 East Asia economic crisis and 
the 1996 Power blackout in the USA and Canada.  Watts (2003) quotes Perrow (1984) with regard to systemic 
failures or ‘accidents’ as the result of standard or regular errors that compound in unanticipated ways and result in 
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consequences that unexpected.  Furthermore, Watts (2003) goes on to discuss the weak points of a complex system; 
the components that, if struck in the right way at the right time, have the potential to bring down the entire system. 
The advantages of a vulnerability based risk assessment over a traditional crisis or recovery based risk assessment 
are being increasingly adopted by the computing world.  Keanini (2003) identifies that for network security to be 
effective in the future, a significant philosophical shift is required away from what he terms ‘attack management’ 
towards a vulnerability management approach.  Many of the vulnerability management issues already identified in 
the computing world can be readily applied to disaster management in other fields, including organisational 
vulnerability, such as qualitative loss assessments ( Buckle et al. 2000; Keanini, 2003; McEntire 2001; 
Weichselgartner, 2001). 
The scale at which vulnerability is assessed is critical and the global and interconnected nature of organisations 
highlights this fact.   Wisner (2005; After Villagrán De León, 2006) considers vulnerability to be fractal in nature, 
lending itself more to chaos theory than a more traditional world view.  He makes the observation that vulnerability 
manifests itself very differently at a household level compared to a national level even for the same event.  Adger et 
al (2004) similarly state that vulnerability should not be assessed across scales because processes causing the 
vulnerability are different at each scale.   This is also true of organisations where what is highly vulnerable to a 
small firm of 1-2 employees may be vastly different to what is vulnerable to a multi-national organisation.  Hence, 
the assessment of vulnerability should be conducted separately at different scales (Villagrán De León, 2006).  Also 
important to any vulnerability research is awareness of the spatial-temporal element (Watts and Bolhe, 1993).  The 
inclusion of a special-temporal element allows different aspects of vulnerability to be important at different times 
and in different places.  Watts and Bolhe suggest, therefore, that vulnerability is not a static entity, but rather it is a 
dynamic and complex condition that cannot and should not be reduced to simplistic terms.  From this perspective a 
more holistic and systemic approach to vulnerability may be more suitable for organisations.  Turner et al (2003) 
propose that vulnerability relates to the degree of harm or negative exposure experienced by a system, sub-system or 
even a component of the system following an event.  Villagrán De León (2006) introduces the notion that a 
community or society be viewed as a set of interconnecting systems and networks.  The individual components of 
these systems must be assessed for their vulnerability together with the vulnerability of the relationships and 
interactions between these components; their interdependence. 
Interdependence between organisations in New Zealand was highlighted by a landmark study in 1991 looking at the 
performance of lifeline utility organisations in a large scale hypothetical earthquake scenario in Wellington, the 
nation’s capital (CAE, 1991).  The interface with co-ordinating organisations such as Civil Defence and Emergency 
Management was highlighted in this study as a critical facet to the successful response and recovery of lifeline 
utilities and the wider community that they serve.  Furthermore, this study identified that individual organisations 
must create their own emergency planning strategies and be involved with the strategies of those on whom they will 
depend in a crisis.  The Wellington Lifelines study and the others in New Zealand that followed this model clearly 
showed that interdependence of utilities is made more vulnerable by our increasingly sophisticated world and our 
reliance on advanced technology.  The vulnerability associated with interdependency is further enhanced by 
expectations of the general public for both private and public organisations to display more accountability in a crisis 
situation (WELG, 1994).  Therefore, the intrinsic connectedness of organisations, together with the 
interdependencies that arise as a result, have a significant impact on organisational vulnerability. 
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Further to the concept of interdependencies in a system and the assessment of their vulnerabilities is the notion of 
keystone vulnerabilities.  The term ‘keystone’ can be used to denote the presence of integral species in an 
ecosystem.  Typically, a keystone species is one which has an influence on its environment or ecosystem that is 
disproportionate to its size or abundance (Paine, 1995).  The loss of this species can cause a significant shift in the 
ecosystem; sometimes causing its eventual destruction.  Keystone can also have an architectural meaning and is 
described as either ‘the wedge-shaped piece at the highest point of an arch that locks the other pieces in place’ or 
‘something on which associated things depend for support’ (The New Penguin English Dictionary, 2000).  From an 
organisational perspective, keystone vulnerabilities represent both the architectural and the environmental meanings.  
These keystone vulnerabilities are components in the organisational system, which by their loss or impairment have 
the potential to cause exceptional effects throughout the system; associated components of the system depend on 
them for support.  This is most often observed in the supply chain of organisations.  Numerous examples exist of 
cascade type failures resulting from the loss of one supplier whose criticality to the entire system was not recognized 
until it was lost.  For example, the Toyota-Aisin crisis (Watts, 2003) that involved the loss of a single factory in 
Japan that was solely responsible for the production of a critical valve needed for all Toyota vehicles.  Keystone 
vulnerabilities may be either catastrophic (the immediate failure of a system due to the sudden loss of a critical 
component) or insidious (the failure of a system over time due to ongoing systematic or coincident loss of 
moderately critical components).    
An organisation may have a high level of resilience, and hence a lowered vulnerability, but its post-disaster 
condition may lead to a very different organisational structure than before the disaster event.  This is synonymous 
with the concept of ecological resilience outlined in the 1970’s work of Holling (1973).  Holling used the term 
resilience to describe how two different types of systems responded to stress; a stable system that exists in a 
perpetual state of equilibrium and seeks to return to that state following disturbance, and a dynamic system that is in 
a constant state of flux and how it moves in response to disturbance.  From an organisational perspective this shows 
that organisations are complex self-organising systems with multiple equilibrium states.  Many organisations that 
focus solely on their post disaster recovery, rather than focus on becoming more resilient, will often try to return to 
their pre-disaster condition (Tobin 1999).  However, recovery rarely addresses the causal problems leading to the 
disaster situation in the first place, and may in-fact increase the risk of the next disaster occurring (Comfort et al, 
1999; Tobin, 1999). 
The relationship between vulnerability and resilience is often debated in the literature.  As Villagrán De León (2006) 
observes, some believe that resilience is the ability of a system to resist the impact of a given event.  Others believe 
that resilience is a systems ability to absorb and cope with an event.  For many definitions of vulnerability, it 
becomes the reciprocal of resilience.  Therefore if a given system is highly resilient then it has a low vulnerability.  
Folke et al (2002) describe resilience as the ‘flip side’ of vulnerability, but also that resilience (together with 
sensitivity and exposure) is a determinant of vulnerability.  There is another emerging school of thought whereby 
vulnerability is a measure of the criticality, preparedness and susceptibility of the components of an organisational 
system and that vulnerability is but one of the components of resilience (Resilient Organisations, 2007). 
2.5 Organisations and Risk 
Risk and risk management have become essential concepts in organisational management and development.  
However, what actually constitutes effective risk identification and risk management is still a contentious issue.  
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Risk is commonly viewed as the intersection between two dimensions; the consequences/expected 
outcomes/impacts of an event and the likelihood of that event occurring with the given outcomes (El Sawah et al, 
2006).   Smallman (1996) identifies two types of risk management approach; the reactive (or homeostatic) and the 
proactive (or collibrational).   
• The reactive risk management approach may be defined by preset and predetermined risk tolerances applied as 
guidelines for organisational action.  The insurance industry is a good example of an organisational type that 
uses the reactive risk management approach.  Despite indications to the contrary, organisations successfully 
following this pathway towards effective risk management engage in practices that enhance risk avoidance, 
prevention and reduction. 
• The proactive approach to risk management recognises the inherent errors in predictive science and human 
behaviour and seeks to reduce, avoid and prevent risk.  This approach comes at risk management from a more 
holistic perspective, looking not just at the events that cause risks, but also the potential for risks. 
For organisations one of the key points to come out of complexity science and systems thinking, and its implications 
for risk management, is that while complexity and unpredictability is unavoidable, it does not have to spell disaster.  
The development of adaptable, flexible and innovative organisations can lead to greatly expanded opportunities. 
‘The result is an approach to risk which moves well beyond the mere use of controls to limit risk exposure.  Instead 
it creates risk optimisation and even risk leadership – the process by which an organisation is able to seize 
opportunities within defined risk parameters and capitalise on the rewards that follow.’ (WBCSD, 2004). 
Buchanan (2004) suggests that the importance of considering the application of power laws to data for risk analysis 
particularly highlighting the inadequacy of using the Bell Curve to estimate the occurrence of extreme events.  The 
difference between the two is relatively benign at the outset (Figure 2) but when the tail areas of the two curves are 
taken into consideration, the real differences become apparent.  But what do power laws mean for organisational 
structure and how to manage crisis events?  Power laws indicate that organisations are in-fact complex, self-
organising systems, which do not follow a random series of events. Rather they follow a predictable and ultimately 













As researchers begin to understand the laws that drive complex and dynamic systems, it becomes increasingly 
apparent that a paradigm shift in approach is required if risk management is to remain an effective tool for 
organisations.  Events that traditionally were considered well outside the lifetime of the average organisation, are 
realistically much more likely to occur, and are much more unpredictable in their nature.  One of the challenges for 
organisations is not to over prioritise those events they can foresee at the expense of building the capacity to cope 
with those they cannot.  The phenomenon of risk homeostasis is prevalent whereby people actively and 
subconsciously adapt their behaviour to adjust to a perceived acceptable level of risk (Etkin, 1999; Wilde, 1994).  
For example, as highlighted by Slovic (1986), people tend to disregard those events that they have not experiences 
as a potential risk.  In many instances, the issue of ‘risk transference’ significantly alters the perception of risk away 
from the high consequence, low probability events (Figure 3), (Etkin, 1999; Mileti, 1999; Tobin and Montz, 1997).  
Similarly, those events that have not been experienced in living memory, or even historically, are much less likely to 
be considered as worthwhile for realistic risk assessments (Etkin, 1999; Slovic, 1986).   
When development or mitigation strategies fail to correctly access the risk of rare high-consequence events, risk is 
transferred from the more common hazards to extreme events that exceed design criteria.  Long-term vulnerability 
can thereby be increased.  Risk transference, therefore, may be a significant obstacle to successful management of 
extreme events for organisations.  The consequences of smaller scale events are reduced to such a successful degree 
that organisations can no longer cope with the larger scale events that come along.  Potentially this could lead to 
large scale catastrophe (Holling et al, 1998).  This phenomenon also has implications on resilience according to 
Etkin (1999);  
‘A more resilient society cannot be achieved without some consideration of how risk is transferred from the more 










Figure 3.  Risk Transference (after Etkin, 1999). 
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2.6 The New Zealand Context 
In New Zealand there is an increasing emphasis on creating more resilient communities.  The changed focus from 
post-crisis response to pre-crisis planning originated in the early-mid 1990’s in New Zealand and reflects a global 
trend (Britton and Clark, 2000; Buckle et al, 2000; Keanini, 2003; Luers et al, 2003; McEntire, 2001; Pelling and 
Uitto, 2001; Weichselgartner, 2001).  Significant and widespread economic restructuring in the 1980’s in New 
Zealand highlighted the need to alter the way emergency management was addressed.  This resulted in legislative 
changes and the establishment of the Ministry of Emergency Management in 1999 (subsequently renamed Ministry 
of Civil Defence & Emergency Management).  The purpose of these changes was to ensure that broad risk 
management techniques become embedded in government, business and the community, thereby increasing overall 
resilience and continuity (Britton and Clark, 2000).  The current legislation in New Zealand for Civil Defence and 
Emergency Management (CDEM Act, 2002) reflects a need for greater levels of responsibility from organisations 
with a front-line response during and following a crisis (for example lifeline utility providers, emergency services 
such as police, fire and health organisations, and emergency co-ordination agencies).  However, it is becoming more 
apparent that a wide range of organisations also need to increase their resilience because of the vital role that they 
play in community resilience and recovery (Dalziell, 2005).  In addition, the move to more comprehensive 
emergency management in New Zealand has resulted in an ‘all-hazards’ approach.  While the traditional focus of 
emergency management has been on natural hazards, the current legislation requires the adoption of a risk 
management approach which addresses all hazards including emerging hazards such as pandemic and terrorism.  A 
new National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan and Guide were released in July 2006 (MCDEM, 2006).   
As New Zealand entered the 1980’s, economically it was facing huge national debt and a change of government in 
1984 saw the introduction of an extensive program of restructuring the economy.  This restructuring, operating over 
two decades, lead to the corporatisation of organisations in New Zealand and has had both positive and negative 
impacts.  As highlighted by Brundsdon and Dalziell (2005) the restructuring focused on both private and public 
sectors, demanding ‘economic accountability and independence’ and has produced smaller and more independent 
enterprises and business units resulting in greater economic efficiency in the short term.  However, this has reduced 








3 THESIS METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter details the research methodology used in this study.  Initially the discussion centres on the justification 
of using the case study methodology in this study.  The discussion then moves on to describe the execution of the 
methodology in this study and talks about case study selection, data collection and analysis.  The next part of this 
chapter examines how the methodology was modified during the study as difficulties in execution arose and as key 
issues emerged from the data.  This is followed by an examination of the final stages of the case-study methodology; 
amalgamation of information into theory. 
3.1.1 Definitions 
As explained in Chapter 2 previously, definitions of resilience are many and varied.  Typically definitions 
are generated that are scale and time specific, and suited to the particular research discipline that they 
originate from.  From an extensive review of relevant literature and in conjunction with the case-study 
organisations, the following definition of organisational resilience is that developed and used in this study: 
Organisational resilience is a function of an organisations overall 
 situation awareness, keystone vulnerability and adaptive capacity 
in a complex, dynamic and interdependent system. 
3.1.2 Aims and Objectives 
In this study, the research question posed was: 
‘What are the components of resilience that are common to all organisations  
in the New Zealand context’? 
The principal objective of this study, therefore, was to identify aspects of organisational resilience that may 
be generic; that is, aspects of the organisational system that contributes to resilience irrespective of the 
organisation’s size, nature, industry type or location.  As such, the case study organisations have been 
selected specifically to simulate as much variation in the organisational community as possible.   
3.1.3 Case Study Methodology 
The research methodology in this study is qualitative in nature and uses a multiple case-study approach.  To 
support the case-study methodology the Grounded Theory approach was used to analyse data.  The case 
study methodology followed in this research reflects that proposed by Yin (2003) for multiple case studies.  
Figure, modified from Yin (Figure 2.2, 2003), shows, diagrammatically, this multiple case study 
methodology and subdivides the process up into four stages; justification, execution, modification and 
amalgamation.  Each of these stages is described in the following sections and reflects the methodology for 
case study research suggested by Yin (2003). 
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3.2 Justification of the Case-Study Methodology 
The following discussion explores why the case study methodology was used in this research.  Overall this research 
is an exploratory study of organisations, asking the question ‘what are the components of resilience common to all 
organisations’?  In order to answer this question, the case study strategy was suitable for a number of reasons and 
supported the methodology suggested by Yin (2003).  Firstly the research has a contemporary focus and is looking 
at the present state of organisations in a current context, and how their past experiences contribute to this present 
reality.  Secondly, the researcher had no degree of behavioural control over the subjects.  As consistent with the 
ethical guidelines in Chapter 1, this research was designed to be an observation of the selected organisations and not 
involve experimentation of employees etc.  Finally, the research questions posed at the beginning of this research 
project all lent themselves to either ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions.  These research questions and the propositions 
supporting them are presented in Section 3.2.1. 
A multiple-case study has been favoured over a single-case study as the study integrates data from 10 individual 
organisations, each of which was studied in its own right.  The information from each organisation was then collated 
to explore the hypothesis that there are fundamental and underlying components of resilience that are common to all 
organisations.  This collation of information and correlation across organisations was an emergent feature of the 
research and will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5.  Details of the individual case study organisations are presented 
in Chapter 6 and the criteria for selecting appropriate case-study organisations are outlined in Section 3.3.1.  
However, broadly speaking organisations were selected to represent the greatest variability in organisation size, 
type, industry and locality.  The reason for this diversity was to explore the proposition that there would be common 
components of resilience observable across all organisations.  From this exploration of common resilience issues for 
organisations, the researcher proposed that a more systemic and holistic approach to resilience would provide added 
value for all organisations in their approach to crisis management and planning. 
3.2.1 Research Questions and Propositions 
 The development of a question or hypothesis, and questions that build on that field of enquiry do not 
necessarily point the researcher to how to answer these questions (Yin, 2003).  Therefore, it is important in 
the case study methodology to develop a set of propositions, supporting the research questions and 
assisting the research in the direction of enquiry.  The questions and propositions presented below detail 
the manner in which the primary research theory was examined.  These questions provide the basic outline 
of the research for the case studies and the propositions used help to maintain the direction of the enquiry.   
1. How does the organisation identify, assess and manage its vulnerability to hazards that have both 
a direct impact (physical, economic or otherwise) and an indirect impact (typically through linked 
organisations or the community within which it operates)? 
Once the organisation has identified vulnerabilities in its operations, what process does it employ to 
manage those vulnerabilities?  The notion is that constant review and updating of vulnerabilities in relation 
to internal and external changes is a key feature in reducing the vulnerability of an organisation to disaster 





















Figure 4.  Diagrammatic representation of the case study methodology followed in this research (modified from Yin, 
2003, Figure 2.2).  The methodology is divided into four phases of investigation; justification, execution, 
modification and amalgamation.  Feedback loops are also illustrated which represent the iterative nature of the 
methodology and the changes in approach where new data emerged or where existing strategies were inconsistent 
with the current situation.  This diagram also shows how each case study was conducted and then data was 
integrated to generate theory. 
Crisis mitigation techniques using vulnerability assessments within organisations are beginning to 
challenge traditional post-disaster risk management techniques.  This investigation seeks to ascertain how 
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principal strategies for assessing vulnerability is to look at the processes that may lead to a vulnerable 
organisation rather than the individual vulnerabilities themselves (Pelling 1999).  The premise here is that 
by decreasing the vulnerability of the process, you will in turn reduce the individual vulnerabilities 
associated with those processes.  This approach may help the researcher identify those vulnerabilities, 
systemic in nature, that are consistent across organisational boundaries. 
2. How does the organisation manage its vulnerability to high consequence/low probability events 
compared to low-moderate consequence/high probability events?  What can we learn from the 
organisational culture that contributes to the organisations approach to extreme events? 
For many organisations higher consequence events are not planned for.  The reasons are either the 
consequences are considered to be beyond the capacity of the organisation to cope with, or their low 
probability of occurrence makes them seem less important and other more pressing issues.  The global 
nature of the organisational network now means that emerging threats such as terrorism, biological hazards 
and ‘mega’ hazards associated with the failure of interconnected enterprises are becoming more critical.  
Investigation of this question will provide information about the organisational awareness of both hazard 
events that are relevant, as well as the interconnectedness of the organisation.  Further it is hoped that this 
question will lead the researcher to a better understanding of the organisational culture towards crises.  This 
question also forms the basis of investigating what are the principal keystone vulnerabilities for 
organisations and if these are common to all organisations.    
3. How adaptive does the organisation believe it is in the face of a potential crisis situation?  How 
does it achieve high adaptive capacity? 
Resilience is partially the ability of an organisation to approach crisis situations as a potentially positive 
experience, and to utilise an enhanced ability to change as the economic, physical, political and social 
situation demands.  A key concept in increasing organisational resilience, therefore, is thought to be 
building an organisation that focuses on positive strategies for coping with change.  Organisations that are 
more resilient have a positive, opportunistic workforce that is encouraged to utilise information from all 
sources, and to think outside the square.  This question focuses the research on these expected components 
of adaptive capacity, and allows the discovery of other aspects that may be relevant to all organisations. 
4. How strategic is the organisation in terms of crisis management? How does the organisation view 
its ability to control its business environment following a crisis?   Is this a conscious decision or does the 
organisation assume that the post-crisis phase will be out of its control? 
The ability of an organisation to maintain a strategic viewpoint is important in both crisis and non-crisis 
times.  In the period following a crisis those enterprises that focus on recovery often will not address the 
issues that made them susceptible to the disaster in the first place (Tobin 1999).  Hence the experience of 
the disaster, and implementation and success of the recovery strategy may lead to increased vulnerability 
and promote a cycle of vulnerability-disaster-damage-recovery-vulnerability.  Often recovery is entirely 
concerned with how the organisation returns to a state from which it can operate at a level similar to that 
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before the event.  However, it is becoming increasingly apparent that this approach, as the sole focus of 
crisis management, is limited.   
In times of crisis, an organisations ability to be strategic will depend on its overall awareness of the 
immediate situation and potential impacts in the future.  This is likely to be impacted by the degree of 
preparedness for crises that the organisation has engaged in.  Therefore, how organisations prepare for 
disaster events is at least as important as how they recover from them.  A change in focus from an entirely 
reactive, post-disaster recovery approach towards the integration of a pro-active, pre-disaster strategy for 
organisations is the basis of this question.  Foreseeably the success of such an approach to organisational 
resilience will depend on how much control the enterprise perceives it has over the crisis situation and its 
ability to respond effectively. 
5. How does the organisation identify, assess and manage any vulnerability associated with inter-
organisational relationships?  Is this an ongoing iterative process or a one-off exercise?  How aware is the 
organisation of its business environment and how this might change during and following a crisis? 
In the modern organisational world crises do not have to influence an organisation directly or physically to 
have a significant impact.  Many businesses do not adequately acknowledge the vulnerability of 
relationships between their organisation and the other organisations that they are linked to, nor do they 
fully appreciate the extent to which these relationships may impact them after a disaster event.  
Organisations may focus on some links, but others are left to chance, and a wider appreciation of just how 
important the management of inter-organisational links can be is often lacking.  Current thinking suggests 
that an iterative communication process is required within and between organisations for management of 
these vulnerabilities to be successful.  Further, the nature of the relationships between organisations is 
likely to change during a crisis, and organisations may find themselves dealing with business, agencies and 
individuals that they wouldn’t during business as normal conditions.  This research question seeks to 
investigate the organisational awareness of these links, what impact the organisational culture has on these 
relationships and the perceptions regarding inter-organisational planning strategies. 
6. How does the organisation see its role in the wider community both pre-disaster and during the 
post disaster phase?  What are the driving factors that influence the organisations perceptions of its social 
responsibility and how are these perceptions exercised in practice? 
It is impossible for any organisation to exist without some element of community interaction, whether it is 
in relation to staff members, customers, other organisations or shareholders.  The relationship that an 
organisation develops with its community of stakeholders may enhance overall resilience, and this process 
may be reciprocal.  Many organisations have mission statements and make bold claims about their 
relationship with the community; however what are the factors that influence the actual practical 
application of those commitments? 
7. Does the organisation have a contingency plan for ongoing operations with linked organisations 
if traditional links are broken for any reason?  If so, how does the organisation implement and manage this 
plan and what practices are in place to assess the quality of this information? 
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A critical component of this research is to investigate the levels of dependency on different types of 
organisations in a variety of crisis situations.  While the impact of poor resilience in some types of 
organisations is well known, for example electricity providers, others are much less obvious.  This question 
focuses the research on looking at these other ‘hubs’, which may be keystone vulnerabilities for the entire 
network.  Investigation into the degree and nature of planning for linked organisations is an important 
aspect of this research, together with the driving forces behind planning are equally important.   
Additionally, the intra-organisational links are related to how an enterprise adapts to a crisis situation.  It is 
widely accepted that intra-organisational communication is critical in the successful management of and 
recovery from disaster.  How organisations foster these internal links and how the continue to update and 
modify them is equally critical to the survival of an organisation as links between businesses. 
3.3 Execution of the Case-Study Methodology 
3.3.1 Selection of Case Study Organisations 
The basic proposition for this study is that there are likely to be resilience issues that are common to all 
organisations in the New Zealand context.  The selection of organisations in this study deliberately targeted 
a variety of organisations.  Therefore, the researcher approached public, private and co-operative 
organisations, a wide range of industries, small, medium and large sized organisations (relevant to the New 
Zealand context, not from an international perspective) and included lifeline organisations.  A matrix of 
key components was developed early on in the planning stage of the research to assist the researcher in 
deciding which organisations to approach to take part in this study so as to ensure the best variety of case 
study organisations possible.  Table 1 shows this matrix and the case studies that participated in this study.  
The selection criteria in order of relative importance are also described below.  It should be noted, however, 
that in some instances the organisations that best fitted the selection criteria were unavailable, unable or 
unwilling to participate in the study. 
Criterion 1:  Organisation Size.  This category referred to the total number of full time staff that an 
organisation has at its disposal.  Small organisations are those with less than 40 full time employees, 
medium organisations have between 40 and 150 employees while large organisations have greater than 150 
full time staff.  The size categories were developed specifically for the New Zealand context.  The use of 
organisational size as one of the main selection criterion was based in the perception that resilience issues 
may be different for large organisations compared to smaller organisations, due to differences in financial 
situation, availability of resources, geographic distribution, number of staff to manage, communications 
issues among others.   
Criterion 2:  Organisation Type.  At the outset of this study it was determined that there would be a 
minimum of 10 case study organisations including public and private business (www.resorgs.org.nz).  As 
with Criterion 1, it was assumed that resilience issues might be different for different types of 
organisations, therefore it was important to ensure that a variety of organisation types were represented in 
the study to uncover any resilience issues common across this criterion.  As a result, representatives of four 
different types of organisations were included in this study; private organisations, publicly listed 
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organisations, organisations providing lifeline services and government organisations (divided into local or 
central government organisations).  As the study progressed it became apparent that there were other types 
of organisations that might also provide important insight for the research, for example co-operative type 
organisations.  Some of these were able to be incorporated into the study, but others were not.   
Criterion 3:  Sector.  An additional criterion was based on the industry sector that the organisations 
represented.  The division was based on whether the organisation was in the primary (the process of 
changing natural resources into primary products), secondary (the manufacture of primary sector goods into 
finished products) tertiary (the provision of services the businesses) or quaternary sector (the provision of 
intellectual services) (Rosenberg, 1998).  As with Criteria 1 and 2, the principle reason for including this 
criterion was to see if different sectors would have similar resilience issues.  For example, there may be a 
perception that organisations in the primary sector would have a different set of resilience problems 
because they serviced a different part of the economy.  This perception may be prevalent in the 
organisations themselves (and within a particular sector) as well as within the research community.  
Further, the assistance that organisations within a sector may require to cope with adverse situations may 
be different if there are different resilience issues across sector types.  Because this study was not 
dependent on specific types of crises (where a particular crisis type may affect organisations in each sector 
differently), it was important to gather information on resilience from a different perspective.  Additionally, 
as the study progressed it became apparent that lifeline organisations may have been more appropriately 
represented under this criterion than under Criterion 2 above.  However, this was a retrospective 
observation and did not change the selection criteria in this study. 
Criterion 4:  Location.  Although from a logistics point of view, finding organisations close to the 
geographic location of the research program was desirable, it was important to select organisations on the 
basis of a wide geographic distribution.    The reason for this was twofold.  Firstly, the researcher wanted to 
study the effects of organisations that were exposed to different physical hazard regimes in an attempt to 
reduce the bias resulting from any focus on natural hazards in the study.  Secondly, the researcher wanted 
to uncover any common resilience issues that arose for organisations with a small geographic distribution 
(one or two localised offices/sites) and compare these to organisations that had a wider geographic 
distribution.  The selection of organisations, therefore, included those with local, national and international 
distributions of staff, sites and offices.  Table 1 shows the location of offices as local, national, international 
where local represents organisations with offices/sites based in a limited, localised geographic area (for 
example, within a single city or town and no additional offices/sites elsewhere).  National distribution 
refers to organisations that have offices/sites in localities in two or more places around New Zealand.  The 
‘international’ category represents those organisations that have offices/sites outside of New Zealand.  
Criterion 5:  Supply Distribution.  Another important consideration in the identification of organisations for 
participation in this study is the location of market/s for the distribution of goods and/or services.  This was  
initially only considered from one perspective which was the viewpoint of the organisation’s own 
distribution network; where it distributes it own products and services to.  Another perspective is 
potentially important; where the organisation purchases products and services for it’s own operations.  
However, selecting organisations on the basis of this second perspective required an in-depth knowledge of 
the organisations operations which the researcher was not privy to prior to interaction with the organisation.  
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Therefore, the focus of this criterion is solely on whether the organisation distributes its products and 
services locally, nationally and/or internationally.  In Table 1 the organisation’s primary market is 
identified by a double asterisk and additional markets by a single asterisk.  Again, local refers to localised 
market in a specific New Zealand centre, national represents New Zealand wide markets and international 
refers to markets outside of New Zealand. 
Criterion 6:  Dependence.  During the planning stage of the study, there was an expectation that some 
organisations were likely to have a primary dependence on human resources (staff, government, 
community etc) rather than physical, material resources (inventory, technology, agriculture etc), and vice 
versa.  It was thought to be important to select organisation to represent these two different dependencies to 
determine if there were common resilience issues.  It was impossible to select the organisations for 
participation in this study based solely on this criterion because this involved an in-depth prior knowledge 
of the organisation.  However, because this criterion was considered to be important to the study direction, 
an initial decision was made regarding the type of dependency each organisation may have.  As most 
organisations will have some dependence on both aspects, each organisation was rated as having high, 
moderate or low dependency for either human or physical resources. 
As previously mentioned, the organisations that eventually participated in this study were not always the 
ideal choices due to issues outside of the researchers control (for example, time limitations, organisational 
commitment, lack of key contacts etc) the researcher actively selected the widest possible variety of 
organisations. 
The selection of organisations occurred in a staggered fashion throughout the study.  Groups of 
organisations were approached in four phases to ensure that no one organisation would have to wait more 
than two months before they could participate in the study.  This staggered approach also allowed the 
researcher to refine the types of organisations that should be targeted by the study to maintain the required 
variability. 
3.3.2 Data Collection 
As part of this research, a methodology for improving organisational resilience was developed; the 5-step 
process for resilience management.  For all case study organisations data collection was split up into two 
distinct phases of investigation utilising the tools developed in the 5-Step process.  Data was collected via 
the interview phase and both collected and validated during the workshop phase.  From the perspective of 
this research, the primary objective of developing the 5-Step process was to gather information about 
organisational resilience in a structured manner that could be accurately repeated for all organisations and 
which reduced the chances of bias.  However, the 5-Step process had the dual role of also providing 
practical tools for organisations to actually improve their resilience.  Each the five steps focuses on one or 




• Step 1.  Improving awareness of resilience issues using a combination of interviews with key 
stakeholders, surveying of stakeholders about resilience issues and the introduction of consequence 
scenarios. 
• Step 2.  Increasing awareness of resilience issues by developing a program of organisational 
component mapping; identifying those aspects of the organisation both internally and externally that 
are likely to have the greatest impact on the organisation from a resilience perspective. 
• Step 3.  Investigating organisational vulnerability by engaging key stakeholders in a program of self 
assessment of the organisational components from Step 2; this involves assessing component 
criticality, preparedness and susceptibility in the face of different crisis contexts. 
• Step 4.  Analysing and identifying keystone vulnerabilities in an organisation using vulnerability 
assessment information from Step 3 and creating a powerful visualisation tool called a vulnerability 
matrix. 
• Step 5.  Enhancing adaptive capacity using Readiness Exercises and Disaster Simulations (REDS); 
effectively a disaster scenario based on events identified from the consequence scenarios (Step 1).   
The 5-step process as it relates to improving resilience for organisations is described in detail in Chapter 4.  
From the perspective of the data collection protocol in the case-study methodology the interview and 
workshop phases are examined below. 
3.3.2.1 Interview Phase 
The first phase of collecting information in the case studies was by interviewing staff in each organisation.  
Interviews were conducted in a semi structured and open manner.  The first interviewee was often the 
primary contact for the organisation and was often the most senior person interviewed.  Other interviewees 
were suggested by this person and subsequently approached by the research to gain their approval for 
participation.  All interviewees had access to a summary document about the aims and objectives of the 
research prior to the interview, and these were further explained at the beginning of the interviews.  
Interviews typically lasted 45-60 minutes in total.  In some instances, due principally to time and resource 







Table 1.  A matrix that shows the criteria for selecting the organisations to take part in this study. 
 
  Criteria 1 Criteria 2 Criteria 3 Criteria 4 Criteria 5 Criteria 6 
  Size Type Sector Location Supply Distn Dependence 
  S M L Priv Pub Life- Govt P S T Q Loc Nat Int Loc Nat Int People Resources
       Line (L/N)             
1 Manufacturer/exporter   * *     *   *  *  * * H H 
2 Local Authority *    * * L   *  *   *   H M 
3 Private Contractor   * *    * *    * * * *  H H 
4 Public Utility  *   * *     *  *   *  H L 
5 Education  *   *      * *   * * * H L 
6 Wholesale Distribution   * *      *   *  * *  H M 
7 Private Utility Lifeline   *  * *    *   * * * * * M H 
8 Retailer  *  *     * *  * *  *   H H 
9 Primary Producer   *  *   * *    * * * * * H H 
10 Technology Supplier *    *     * * *   * *  M H 
 
S=<40 full time staff H = Highly dependent Priv = private organisation P=primary * = location of 
offices/sites  
* = location 
of  markets  M=40-150 full time staff M = Mod. dependent Pub = public organisation S=secondary 
Loc = single centre L=150+ full time staff L = Not dependent L/Line=lifeline organisation T=tertiary 
Nat = New Zealand wide   Govt=Local or Central Q=quaternary 






organisation’s risk management team sat in on a portion of the interviews; this was primarily as an 
opportunity to learn more about the research methodology in practice.  One difficulty in the collection of 
data from the interview process is the issue of asking directed or loaded questions and leading the 
respondent in a direction that the researcher determines.  In all interviews the researcher sought to avoid 
asking loaded questions as much as reasonably possible; letting the interviewee lead the discussion in most 
instances.  However, this issue is a difficult one to address; loaded questions should not always be 
considered to be detrimental to the study.  Often this type of questioning can be useful when applied in a 
logical sequence, and when the researcher can identify that the interviewee is already heading down a 
particular line of questioning (Charmaz, 1990).  Also, as the researchers gain a more detailed understanding 
of the topic and the key issues emerge, it is possible to partially direct interviews to discover the validity of 
these observations. 
Generally speaking, the interviews followed the outline of the research questions posed in Section 3.2.1.  
Initially, information was sought on the organisation’s experience of disruptive events and the impacts and 
outcomes of these events.  As the study progressed, however, this information was to be found by seeking 
information about the organisational culture.  It became apparent in the first case-study that focusing on 
perceptions of previous and possible future events yielded more limited information than if interviewing 
focused on the organisational operation in day-to-day situation.  For example, the first interview in CS1, 
the pilot study, was with the head of the manufacturing department in the organisation.  As a result the 
initial line of questioning (looking at past disruptions) the focus of the interview turned to the physical 
effects of disruptive events on the organisation.   As interviewing progressed within this organisation it 
became quickly apparent that the physical impacts of risks the organisation faced only told part of the story.  
While the impact of physical hazards and risks in CS1 were seen by interviewees as significant, they all 
had differing opinions of which hazards were of most importance.  Also, interviewees identified other 
equally important factors over and above the physical hazard impacts including communications, 
leadership and strategy, organisational vision, supply chain vulnerabilities and failures in other linked 
organisations. 
During interviewing with CS1, the researcher tried a different approach to the interviewing which involved 
asking interviewees to comment on day-to-day operations and look at the strengths and weaknesses of 
these.  This line of questioning yielded information on both the physical hazards (uncovered in the initial 
interview approach) and also the additional issues mentioned above.  Looking at day-to-day operations, 
questions could then be posed inviting interviewees to comment on how they believed these issues would 
impact on the organisation during times of stress and disruption.   
This approach was successful in the case of CS2 which had recently experienced a severely disruptive 
event and the organisation was having difficulty in seeing past this.  Initial interviews in this organisation 
tended to focus on this event, particularly in an interviewee-led questioning approach.  Therefore, it became 
apparent that interviewing with this organisation, needed to focus less on the actual event, and more on the 
culture and structure of the organisation itself and how this influenced response and recover in relation to 
that event.  This line of questioning offered more information to the researcher and uncovered some 
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unexpected topics of discussion which had not been uncovered in previous interviews in the organisation.  
The researcher was then able to go back some of the key contacts in the organisation and gain their 
viewpoint on these new topics and issues.  This then became the focus of the interviewing technique with 
the remaining organisations in the study; inviting comment on the day-to-day operations of the organisation 
and encouraging the interviewee to examine how these would influence operations in a crisis.  A range of 
questions emerged that acted as a prompt for the researcher conducting the interviews.  Not all questions 
were appropriate for all interviewees, and they worked more as a guide for the researcher than as definitive 
questions in any interview.  A complete list of these questions is presented in Appendix A.  The basic 
outline of interviews was as follows: 
• All interviews began with the researcher outlining the objectives of the research project (as per the brief 
that all interviewees were provided with prior to interviewing).   
• All interviews outlined the confidentiality of the interviewee, and explained how their comments would 
be included, anonymously, in a discussion document presented to the organisation at the end of the 
interview process. 
• Each interviewee was asked if they were comfortable with the interview being recorded. 
• Each participant was asked their name, position in the organisation, areas of responsibility, and the 
length of time they had been in that position.   
• Each interviewee was asked to discuss briefly their history of employment and involvement with the 
organisation (particularly if they had worked with linked organisations, or previously had a position of 
different responsibility). 
• The interviewee was then asked to comment on their perceptions of the organisational strengths and in a 
day-to-day setting.  This discussion developed around the question prompts for the researcher as 
outlined in Appendix A, particularly if interviewees showed hesitation or uncertainty in how to proceed 
with this discussion. 
• The interviewing then went on to look at how the participant believed these strengths and weaknesses 
would serve the organisation in future crisis situations of varying type and degree, with the discussion 
again revolving around the questions in Appendix A.  This generally prompted the interviewee to talk 
of their experiences of past situations. 
• Where an organisation had experienced a major crisis or disruption, this was used to prompt the 
discussion of organisational strengths and weaknesses outside of day-to-day operations. 
• The close of the interviews involved the researcher introducing the workshop format, and an invitation 
to the interviewee to participate. 
• All interviewees were told that they could look at the transcription of the interview. 
During the interview process the data was generally collected using a digital voice recorder and then 
transcribed.  There were a handful of interviewees who were unwilling to be recorded.  For these 
individuals, notes were taken by the researcher during the interview.   The number of interviews for each 
organisation ranged depending on the size of the organisation, the availability of employees and the 
willingness of employees to take part in the study.  The minimum number of interviews was four (for an 
organisation with only eight full time employees) in one organisation and a maximum of 21 in another.  A 
total of 108 interviews were conducted across the 10 case study organisations.  A Draft Discussion report 
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was generated from the interview data and presented to each of the case study organisations.  This report 
presented the most important information to arise from the interviews and was designed to act as a mirror 
for the organisation that could be reflected upon later in the study. 
All interviews were transcribed for further analysis.  At the beginning of the research transcriptions were 
completed using voice recognition software; the researcher would listen to the interview and ‘speak’ to the 
computer creating the transcription.  However following hardware problems with the researcher’s 
computer, the original training for the voice recognition software was lost.  The researcher chose to 
transcribe the remaining interviews in a traditional manner, after time constraints made re-creating the 
training files untenable and the accuracy of the software prior to hardware failure could not be re-generated.  
All transcriptions were saved in .rtf format in Microsoft Word so that they could be easily incorporated into 
the coding software, NVivo2, described in Section 3.3.3. 
3.3.2.2 Workshop Phase 
The second source of data for each of the case study organisations was the resilience workshop.  The 
details of the how the 5-step process was used in the workshop are presented in Chapter 4.  With the pilot 
study (CS1) the workshop began as a way to present the information from the interviews to the case study 
organisation; this evolved in the remaining case studies as a way to collect and validate information as well 
as to observe the participants in a simulated crisis situation.  In order to validate the data from the 
interviews and that presented in the draft discussion report, a survey was produced and all workshop 
participants were asked to complete this prior to the end of the workshop.  The data from the survey was 
later collated and analysed as part of the final case study report.  In addition to the survey, the researcher 
gathered information in the form of a self assessment about the levels of vulnerability in the organisation.  
The workshop participants were asked to fill in a number of multi-choice forms which were collected from 
the organisation before the end of the workshop.   These forms were later used to assess the organisations 
preliminary vulnerabilities using a vulnerability matrix.  Finally, during the workshop the case study 
organisation was asked to participated in a simulated crisis scenario; a REDS (Readiness Exercise and 
Disaster Simulation).  This part of the workshop offered the researchers a way of directly observing the 
participants in a situation that was challenging to their expectations of crises, their assumptions of internal 
and external support and their leadership and decision making skills.  Information from the workshop was 
integrated with that from the interviews (and draft discussion document) to produce a final report for each 
organisation.  This report outlined the key resilience issues that had become apparent during the study, and 
offered the organisation a set of action plans; some preliminary strategies to assist the organisation in 
becoming more resilient. 
3.3.3 Data Analysis using Grounded Theory Methods 
This study used the Grounded Theory approach to analyse the data from the case study organisations.  The 
Grounded Theory approach supports the use of qualitative and semi-qualitative procedures to study 
subjects within the social context that they occur (Glasner and Strauss, 1967). 
3.3.3.1 Grounded Theory: a critical review 
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The Grounded Theory Method (GTM) was first proposed by Glasner and Strauss in 1967 as a qualitative 
research discipline and spread rapidly, particularly in fields such as health (Morse, 1994), education 
(Urquhart, 2002) and also organisational studies (Smallman, 2004).  Since it’s inception, the concept, 
execution and outcomes of GTM have been extensively debated including by its originators; so much so 
that Glasner and Strauss each developed individual approaches to the methodology (see Smit and Bryant, 
2000).  Several researchers have postulated over the reasons for this split between Glasner and Strauss, 
with their respective research backgrounds being the most cited explanation (for example, Bryant, 2002).  
Glasner’s research origins emphasised empirical methods while encouraging original approaches to 
integrating qualitative information.  Strauss on the other hand worked with the Chicago School of Social 
Research, known for its emphasis on qualitative research methods.  The background from which GMT 
originated has been well described by many authors; refer, for example, to Goulding (2005). 
The split between Glasner and Strauss over the issue of how to perform grounded theory has been the 
source of much academic debate.  There are some key points of discussion and discourse about grounded 
theory.  These include the generation of theory from the method (what is theory?), the concept of 
grounding the theory in the data, the classification of the data itself (the ‘all is data’ approach, for example) 
and the ‘tabula rasa’ concept (restricting the researcher’s exposure to relevant literature about the research 
topic).  Each of these arguments, although seemingly not placing a halt on the researchers engaging in 
GTM, are important to consider and are described briefly below.  Detailed arguments may be found in 
Thomas and James (2006), Haig (1995), Kelle (2005) and Selden (2005). 
• The generation of theory.  One of the key elements of GTM is that data is analysed as soon as it is 
collected, and analysis becomes an iterative process of continued interviewing and questioning based on 
the data already analysed.  As such, GTM is sometimes also termed ‘the constant comparative method’ 
because of the interplay of data analysis and collection (Strauss and Corbin, 1994).  The practicality of 
GTM is to organise and analyse a large quantity of unstructured qualitative data.  Figure shows a flow 
chart describing in general terms the steps along which generation of a Grounded Theory is developed.   
This concept of constant comparison and that of grounding theory in the data are sources of academic 
debate in the literature.  Some authors (for example Thomas and James, 2006) advocate that there is 
little difference between the inductive reasoning generated using GTM and use of deductive reasoning; 
theory generated from the data versus the generation of a hypothesis and gathering data to prove or 
disprove that hypothesis.  Urquhart (2002) on the other hand claims that the emergence of theory from 
the data, as Glasner has claimed, is not a magical property, but one which most researchers using GTM 
will recognise; seeing the data in a completely new light.  The argument continues in academia while 
other researchers propose new ways forward using GTM; a type of middle ground which in itself brings 
criticism from some academics (Thomas and James, 2006; Charmaz, 2000). 
• What is data?  There has been academic dispute about what constitutes data for a GTM approach.  Haig 
(1995) and subsequently Bryant (2002) distinguish between phenomena and data which as implications 
on the generation of theory as described above.  Both Glasner and Strauss emphasise that data may be 
derived from a number of sources and data are not restricted to observations (Strauss, 1987; Urquhart, 
2002).  In-fact Glasner claims that because GTM is not a qualitative method but a general method all 
37 
 
sources of data are equally relevant (Glasner, 2001).  Some, however, consider that GTM focuses on 
uncovering the data rather than looking at it (Thomas and James, 2006; Robrecht, 1995). 
• How much knowledge is appropriate?  There has been a lot of misconception over the notion of 
‘induction’ as introduced by Glasner and Strauss.  Many researchers have taken their original ideas 
about entering a research topic from an unbiased perspective to mean the researcher should adopt a 
‘tabula rasa’ approach; that there is no need to consult and review the literature on a topic before the 
study begins.  Taking this approach is claimed to reduce the likelihood that the literature ‘might 
contaminate, stifle or otherwise impede’ the researchers progress in generating theory from the data 
(Glasner, 1992, Urquhart, 2002).  Such avoidance of the literature will enhance theoretical sensitivity in 
the researcher.  However, despite commentary by many authors criticising this perspective (Haig, 1995, 
for example), Glasner himself qualifies this misconception relating to the literature; theoretical 
sensitivity is in-fact enhanced by the researcher becoming immersed in the relevant literature and 
associated ideas in order to understand theory (Glasner, 1978). 
3.3.3.2 Grounded Theory in this study 
For this study, the researcher used NVivo2 software to assist in coding the information from the case 
study organisations.  As identified by Ash and Smallman (2008) although there is some criticism of the 
use of specialist qualitative data analysis software packages it may be appropriate for studies where there 
are large volumes of qualitative data as well as additional supporting information (such as information 
from workshops and written information provided by case-study organisations).  In the initial stages of 
the research the coding system related specifically to the research questions presented in Section 3.2.1.  
Consistent with both the exploratory case study method and the grounded theory approach some of the 
most significant information arose from the raw data and not from the initial research questions and 
propositions.  As the study progressed, some resilience issues were apparent in several of the case study 
organisations, and there was ongoing integration of information across case studies throughout the 
project.    Additionally, with several of the organisations, the interview process extended out over several 
weeks and therefore the data collection and analysis was coincident.  Even for those organisations where 
interviewing was completed within one week, the ongoing nature of transcription, coding and analysis 
allowed for emergent issues specific to each organisation to become apparent and be further explored in 
additional interviewing.  This integration was supported by memo generation throughout the course of 
the study.  Memos are generated as a way of describing general trends observed by the researcher, and 
may be extended to include tentative summaries, theories and suggested directions for the study.  Memo 
writing is often a way of externalising the data analysis and a way of facilitating further theorising 
(Pidgeon and Harwood, 1996).  Because of the extended time frame of the case-study process, memo 
generation was a critical aspect of ensuring that the researcher did not loose the thread of the 
investigation for a specific organisation or across all of the case studies.  Memos also became a key part 
of the final stage in the case-study methodology, amalgamation, where information from all of the 
























Figure 5.  The Grounded Theory approach to data management and the generation of theory from qualitative 
analysis of information (after Pidgeon and Harwood, 1996) 
 
Typically, Grounded Theory produces a complex analysis of a complex world rather than providing 
generalisations, and it is intended to be used by the people who are in the observed situations.  Additionally 
Grounded Theory may be derived from a number of different qualitative sources.  Turner (1983) illustrates 
this by showing three organisational analyses by Grounded Theory using observations and interviews for 
two case study examples, and documentary materials (more specifically public enquiry reports) to study 
organisational behaviour.  Turner (1978) used Grounded Theory to generate theory involving large scale 
man-made disasters in the United Kingdom between 1965-1975.  The study is an example of how 
Grounded Theory may be used to investigate the “psychological, organisational and inter-organisational 
elements’ that contributed to the pre-conditions of a variety of technological disasters (Turner, 1983).  The 
generation of data sets from the interviews, surveys, vulnerability self-assessments and scenario 
observations support the Grounded Theory method of multiple data sources to produce a rich data set for 
analysis (Pidgeon and Harwood, 1996). 
The use of NVivo2 software package in this study was limited by its inability to incorporate quantitative or 
semi-qualitative data.  For example, the information from the surveys and the vulnerability matrices was 
not able to be included in the analysis using NVivo2.  The researcher had to address this in a more 
traditional manner with physical coding of the data, to integrate it with NVivo2. 
3.4 Modification of the Case-Study Methodology 
During the course of the study, the initial research methodology changed as the result of emergent issues, and as the 
result of different expectations of and from the case study organisations.  This section discusses the most important 
methodological issues to arise in this study, and what their flow-on effect was on the rest of the research.  Also 
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discussed is how the study changed to accommodate these issues, and the success (or otherwise) of various 
approaches to the methodology.  Figure 4 illustrates three feedback loops identified in the methodology during this 
study.  The first feedback loop pertains to the selection of case-study organisations.  As previously discussed, not all 
of the case study organisations were identified and approached at the beginning of the study; this was a process of 
discovery for the researchers.  Developments of the case-study selection process and the first feedback loop are 
presented in Section 3.4.1.  The second feedback loop identified (Figure 4) developed in relation to the changes 
required during the data collection phase; in relation to the interviews and workshops for each case-study 
organisation.  The third feedback loop as illustrated in Figure 1 is outlined in Section 3.4.3; however the details of 
this feedback loop are presented in the following chapters as the results form the basis of the results. 
3.4.1 Feedback Loop 1:  Case Study Selection Issues 
3.4.1.1 Organisation Selection and Access 
Following agreement on the types and sizes of organisations that would be appropriate to include in the 
study, the researcher then approached a number of organisations sequentially to enlist their support and 
participation in the research.  Organisations were selected and approached in a staggered format to ensure 
that no organisation had to wait more than 2-3 months until their involvement with the study commenced.  
In several instances organisations that initially expressed a strong desire to take part in the research were 
later unwilling to commit to the research process.  In several instances, after initial communications, face to 
face meetings proved impossible to organise and due to time constraints on the research, the researcher was 
forced to abandon following up with these organisations.  Therefore, some industries and sectors did not 
include organisations that were considered ideal for the research.  For example, the organisations targeted 
to represent the primary production sector were smaller wineries.  These organisations (for reasons outlined 
in Section 3.4.1.2 below) were unwilling to take part, and the research eventually secured the support of an 
organisation in a different industry sector as a primary producer.  Typically, access to organisations was 
most favourable when a member of the research team had a personal acquaintance in that organisation.  
This provided significant leverage and facilitated access to the key decision makers in the organisation.  
Furthermore, one organisation was suggested by another of the case-study organisations and these decision 
makers facilitated access in this instance. 
Another issue to arise from the case study selection process was ensuring ongoing support from the 
organisations in question to participate fully in the research.  CS4 was initially very supportive of the 
process and gaining access to the organisation for interviews was quickly facilitated.  Interviewing took 
place over a matter of weeks and the draft discussion report was issued accordingly.  However, after 
securing a date with this organisation to conduct the workshop (and gather the remaining data for the 
research), the organisation continually postponed workshop dates.  Despite the best efforts of the research 
team to further engage this organisation and encourage them to participate in the remainder of the study, a 
workshop was unable to be completed.  As a consolation, the researcher was able to observe this 
organisation in an externally organised disaster simulation, and gather valuable information.  A final report 
was generated for this organisation, however much of the information gathered during the interviews was 
not able to be validated as per the other organisations.  A similar problem arose with CS9.  Following 
agreement with the managing director, and after interviewing and the issuing of the draft discussion report, 
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the researcher sought to confirm a workshop date.  After the first date being postponed, and no additional 
date forthcoming, the researcher was informed that the executive committee would need to be convinced as 
to the merits of participating in a workshop.  Again, due to time constraints, and ongoing difficulties with 
the key decision makers in this organisation (including the retirement of a key individual for the research in 
this organisation shortly after the interviewing was completed) a workshop was not completed in time for 
the completion of this dissertation.  The researcher was allocated a short time slot with the Executive 
committee to present the merits of participating in a workshop.  However, at the time of writing discussions 
are continuing with this organisation to complete the research program.  This organisation had previously 
invited the researcher to observe an internally organised crisis exercise during the interviewing phase, and 
this was also incorporated into the analysis for CS9. 
In terms of full participation in the research, further complications were encountered with CS7.  The 
organisation was initially very uncomfortable with the confidentiality agreement, and several iterations of 
this agreement were produced before the researcher was permitted to enter the organisation.  During the 
workshop, and specifically the scenario exercise, there was some significant resistance by key members of 
this organisation.  This experience cemented the importance of selecting an appropriate crisis scenario for 
an organisation, as well as sub-dividing teams during the workshop to minimise this resistance within a 
team. 
3.4.1.2 Organisation Size 
At the beginning of the case-study selection process, the researchers expected that the most difficult 
organisations to gain support from would be the larger ones.  However this proved to be untrue.  The most 
difficult organisations to get representation from in the study were the smaller organisations.  The smallest 
case-study was one of 8 employees (CS10) and the next was 35 employees (CS2).  The smaller 
organisations that were approached to take part in this study cited the unavailability of staff, time 
constraints (staff could not afford to take time for interviews, let alone commit to a workshop) and 
expressed a perception that this sort of research was for larger organisations as reasons for not taking part.  
While the researcher would have liked a better representation of small business in this study, it was very 
difficult to gain their support. 
3.4.2 Feedback Loop 2:  Data Collection Issues 
3.4.2.1 Order of Interviewees 
In all of the organisations the initial interviews were conducted with senior decision makers; in some 
instances with the CEO or owner.  This was typically because this individual was the person who facilitated 
access into the organisation.  From the perspective of data collection and the research this was not the ideal 
situation.  Often the researcher needed background knowledge of the organisation and the central resilience 
issues before talking with senior decision makers.  Also, the availability of these individuals meant that 
interviews were often shorter than for others in the organisation.  Therefore, it would have been useful to 
either interview senior decision makers at the end of the interview process, or where this was not possible, 
re-interview at the end to gain a better understanding of the business.  This was conducted in CS1, CS2, 
CS3, CS7 and CS10. 
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3.4.2.2 Recording of Interviews 
The ability to record interviews greatly enhanced the interview process.  A small, unobtrusive digital 
recorder was used in all but two interviews.  Permission was sought from all interviewees prior to the start 
of the interview to record the discussion.  While some people expressed initial reservations, they were 
happy to allow the researcher to record the interview, and soon became unaware of the recorder.  Some 
interviewees asked for the recorder to be turned off during the interview to discuss sensitive information.  
In these instances the researcher took notes to fill in the gap in the recording.  Only once did the recorder 
fail during the interview due to batteries running out.  Again, the research took notes in the place of the 
recorder.  The use of the recorder enables a more accurate record of the interview following transcription, 
and also allowed the researcher to better engage with the interviewee.   
3.4.2.3 Multiple Participant Interviews 
As previously mentioned, due in part to time restrictions and the availability of interviewees, some 
interviews were conducted with more than one individual at a time.  Initially the researcher believed that 
this might compromise the flow of information in the interview due to people being potentially unwilling to 
disclose as much information as they would if interviewed alone.  However, largely this concern was 
unfounded.  In most of the multiple interviews, interviewees actually fed off one another and the ensuing 
discussion was richer than if they have been interviewed individually.  However, the relative position in the 
organisation of the interviewees was important for a successful multiple participant interview.  In one 
instance the key decision maker and his personal assistant were both interviewed together.  In this instance, 
the personal assistant offered little original comment, and their contribution to the interview was largely 
directed by the other participant.  In this instance, the researcher later met with the personal assistant on a 
more informal basis (prior to a crisis exercise) for approximately 20 minutes and gained further insight in 
this environment.  Therefore, when conducting multiple participant interviews, the relative position in the 
company of the participants is important to consider.  Super- and subordinate relationships should be 
avoided as much as possible. 
3.4.2.4 External Interviewees and Organisational Interconnectedness 
While not directly engineered as part of the case study methodology, for most organisations an external 
perspective was gained through interviews in other organisations.  Some organisations were selected on the 
basis of their relationships with each other (CS3 and CS4, CS6 and CS8); however the researcher was 
surprised at the level of interconnection between the organisations.  All case study organisations exhibited 
some degree of connection, either through existing relationships, past relationships or past 
employees/employers.  For CS2, CS4 and CS5 the researcher was able to interview one person who was 
not directly employed in the organisation but who had a strong knowledge of, and relationship with that 
organisation. 
 




CS5 was a study of a business unit within a larger organisation.  In this case study, two representatives 
from the parent organisation’s risk management division asked to observe some of the interviews.  They 
expressed a wish to learn more about the interview process and about the concept of resilience as presented 
in this research.  The researcher was concerned initially about the potential affect this might have on the 
willingness of interviewees to disclose sensitive information.  However, the level of disclosure in the 
interviews was very similar to those where multiple participants (of similar decision making levels) were 
involved (see Section 3.4.2.3).  This was surprising in the respect that in most instances, the observer was 
not personally known to the interviewee, and the observer did not participate in the interview.    
3.4.2.6 Technology and Presentation of Data 
Initially, with CS1, all presentations were complete on large sheets of paper.  Vulnerability matrices and 
collation of the vulnerability self assessment were all presented on A1 sheets of paper.  This was both 
laborious and time consuming (the workshop for CS1 involved 3 facilitators; the researcher and both 
supervisors).  The evolution of the workshop facilitated the use of electronic media (digital projectors and 
laptop computers) to present the information collected during the workshop, and also allowed some level of 
automation in analysis of quantitative data. 
Handouts were provided to all workshop participants from the beginning of the research.  Handouts 
included a workshop agenda, a sheet of definitions of resilience and its components, self assessment sheets, 
survey sheets, and summary crisis scenarios.  From CS6, the survey sheets were distributed to workshop 
participants prior to the day of the workshop and participants were asked to complete them before the 
session.  This was a successful advancement and resulted in participants feeling happier with the 
conclusion of the workshop, rather than rushing to complete the survey before being able to depart. 
3.4.2.7 Size of the Workshops 
Generally the workshops were limited to those who participated in the interviews.  In some instances, 
however, due to the large number of interviewees the workshops were also large.  The success of a large 
workshop was partially related to the size of the room where the workshop was being conducted.  In CS5, 
the workshop involved 12 people but the size of the room was large and participants had plenty of room to 
walk around and organise groups, especially during the scenario exercise.  In CS7, however, the total of 16 
participants and a small room meant that the workshop was not as successful as it could have been.  The 
size of the room was probably more critical than the number of participants.  In CS8, there were only 6 
people in the workshop but the room was very small and inadequately resourced and ventilated.  
Participants therefore had difficulty in engaging with the workshop due to the inadequacy of the location 
rather than the size of the workshop group.  Ideally the workshop groups should number no more than 10-
12 participants, and should be split into 2 groups for the scenario exercise.  The room used for the 




It is also important that the workshop structure be flexible and able to be adjusted to suit the organisation in 
question.  While the case-study methodology detailed in this chapter was strictly adhered to during this 
study, the 5-step process was designed with an inherent scalability so that it could be used with any 
organisation.  Sometimes this caused consternation for the researcher as the workshop structure had to be 
quickly adjusted as the needs of the organisation changed, however in all instances during this study, the 
flexibility of the data collection method (the 5-step process) was a significant advantage.  In CS10, the 
smallest organisation in the study, the duration of the workshop was halved at the request of the general 
manager due to time and staff constraints.  The total number of employees attending this workshop was 
only three, but relatively speaking represented 75% of interviewees and over 1/3 of all employees. 
3.4.2.8 Timing of the Workshops 
The duration of the workshop changed during the course of the study.  Originally the workshops 
incorporated a lunch break for participants.  The rationale for the break was to ensure that the workshop 
didn’t interfere with ongoing operations in the organisation; participants had time to leave the workshop 
session to check emails, respond to calls and attend to other urgent business.  Following the workshop for 
CS5, the researcher attempted to condense the workshop into a single 3.5hr session with a short coffee/tea 
break.  This was trialled for CS6 and was very successful.  Additionally, the time of the day for the 
workshop was influential.  For CS6 the 3.5hr workshop was conducted first thing in the morning.  With 
CS7 the same duration workshop was conducted in the afternoon, finished around 5.30pm.  Workshop 
participants at this session were tired and the researchers had to work hard to maintain the level of 
engagement that was present at the beginning of the workshop.  It was apparent, therefore, that workshops 
should be conducted, where possible, in a single 3.5hr session in the morning.  However, the workshop 
with CS10 was conducted in only 2 hours; 1.5hrs of which was comprised of the REDS.  This proved to be 
successful and is potentially a valuable way of conducting this research with smaller organisations to 
minimise disruption in terms of time and human resources while at the same time gaining valuable 
information. 
3.4.2.9 Contextual Issues and the Order of the Workshop 
The way that the workshop was structured changed over the course of the study.  Additionally, the time 
available for the workshop varied with each organisation and it became important to remain flexible to 
maintain organisational engagement.   
For the first four workshops the structure included a detailed discussion of the 5-step process, a 
brainstorming session about crisis events using the consequence scenarios, an assessment of the 
vulnerability (criticality and preparedness for both response and recovery periods), a simulated crisis 
exercise and finally, a debriefing session including questions and answers.  Initially the workshop was 
allocated a full half day with a lunch break before the scenario exercise began.  During the workshop with 
CS5 the facilitators were concerned that participants might not return to the workshop after this break.  
Therefore, a shorter time frame for the workshop was proposed.  With CS6 the workshop was conducted 
within 3.5 hours; a short refreshments break was included and approximately 50% of the workshop focused 
on the exercise.   
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At the conclusion of the workshop for CS7, participants commented on a perceived lack of context for the 
vulnerability assessments.  Consequently, this was addressed by changing the structure of the workshop.  
For CS8 the scenario exercise was conducted before the participants performed the vulnerability self-
assessment.  There have been various positive and negative aspects to this change.  Positive aspects 
include: 
• The changed order of the workshop provides a significantly increased perception of context for 
participants. 
• This has certainly made it easier for participants to conduct the vulnerability assessment. 
Negative aspects of this change include: 
• The vulnerability assessments tend to become more specific and there is a danger that assessments 
only consider the ‘event’ used in the scenario, rather than consider the entire range of events in a 
particular consequence scenario. 
• More vulnerability assessments may be needed to gain a broad understanding of vulnerabilities in 
the organisation, encompassing the four consequence scenarios 
Careful scenario construction can mitigate some of these negative aspects.  By selecting an event that 
brings in elements from two or more consequence scenarios, the organisation can gain both a context 
specific viewpoint as well as considering the vulnerability from a more broad perspective.  However, the 
most appropriate way to perform the vulnerability assessments was achieved with CS10; conducting the 
criticality and preparedness assessments from an all-hazards perspective prior to the REDS, and then 
conducting the susceptibility assessment following the REDS using this as an appropriate context. 
Another difficulty was encountered with the workshop for CS10.  With the workshop duration being 
reduced to just two hours, there was not enough time to conduct both the vulnerability assessment and the 
REDS during the workshop.  Therefore, after discussions with the organisation, the vulnerability 
assessment sheets were sent to CS10 and completed prior to the workshop.  The organisation was given 
detailed instructions about performing these assessments; preparedness and criticality assessments were to 
be completed considering the organisation as a whole and from an all-hazards perspective.  Then the 
participants were invited to read the first part of the REDS scenario (also provided in advance of the 
workshop) and finally to complete the susceptibility assessment.  These results were then either faxed or 
emailed back to the researcher.  A vulnerability matrix was able to be constructed prior to the workshop 
and the results discussed following the REDS.  The organisation CS10 expressed that they were very 
pleased with the structure and the outcomes of this workshop. 
3.4.3 Feedback Loop 3:  Linking Data with Propositions 
Information related to the third feedback loop makes up much of the results of this research.  This feedback 
loop enabled the researcher to look at the results from each of the case-study organisations individually, 
relate these results back to the original research questions and propositions, and begin analysing if there 
were any significant differences.  For example, the researcher approached the first case-study from a 
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dominantly operational perspective (failure of critical services such as electricity etc) when in-fact many of 
the resilience issues relevant to the case study organisations actually rested in their organisational culture.  
The key issues to arise from feedback loop 3 are presented in Chapter 6. 
3.5 Amalgamation of the Case-Study Methodology 
Grounded Theory was used to analyse all the data from each individual case study organisation.  At the conclusion 
of the case studies, and once all data had been gathered, the Grounded Theory approach was used to integrate 
information from all the organisations.  It was important, however, to ensure that the individual organisations did not 
loose their unique characteristics in this integrated analysis.  Therefore, the analysis of data did not attempt to look 
at all interviews from all organisations as one large data set.  Rather, the results from each of the organisations 
(information in the final reports issued to each organisation) was re-coded and analysed to find common resilience 
issues across all of the organisations.  The results of this integrated analysis are presented in Chapter 6. 
3.6 The Reduction of Bias in the Study 
The issue of bias is a key problem for most qualitative studies, and it was a significant consideration in the design of 
this research project.  There were several aspects of the study that had the potential to be adversely affected by bias 
and these are discussed below: 
3.6.1 Organisation Selection 
As detailed in Section 3.3.1, the selection criteria for organisations participating in this study was 
developed to help reduce the potential for bias in the research.  The potential for bias arose in several areas: 
• Does an over-representation of large or small organisations with potentially different resilience issues 
for each? 
• Do private organisations have access to different resources, in different quantities and qualities 
compared to public organisations thereby causing them to be subject to different resilience issues? 
• Is there likely to be differences in resilience issues for organisations that represent different industry 
sectors? 
• Does the location of offices/sites and their distribution (locally, nationally, internationally) influence the 
emergence of resilience issues? 
• Does the exposure to different hazard regimes influence the types of resilience issues that an 
organisation faces? 
• If an organisation has a high dependency on human resources as opposed to physical resources does it 
face different resilience issues compared to other organisations? 
Organisations were selected as best as possible to ensure there was a fair representation of organisations 
across all of the selection criteria.  Limitations were identified retrospectively, however, including the 
identification of additional types of organisations that may add value to the study (such as co-operative 
organisations, for example) and considering lifeline organisations under the Organisational Sector criterion 
rather than as an organisational type (criterion 2). 
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3.6.2 Data Collection 
One of the main objectives in the development of the 5-step process was to reduce the bias in data 
collection during this study.  It was important to find a way to collect information from a group of very 
diverse organisations in a way that was reliably consistent across the study.  It became apparent during the 
first group of interviews with CS1, the pilot study, that interviewing alone would not be adequate to ensure 
bias was not introduced, and there was a need for cross-checking of the information gathered.  Therefore, 
the development and introduction of the 5-step process became a vital tool in this respect.  Following 
interviewing, all participants were invited to check their interview transcripts.  The interview information 
was collated anonymously into a Draft Discussion document and a survey was generated based on this 
information.  The survey was given to all participants in the workshop (composed almost exclusively of 
interviewees in most of the organisations) and the results analysed and used as part of the final report.   
The interviews themselves were designed to be open-ended and semi-structured to allow the participants to 
lead the discussion as much as possible, within the study parameters.  As discussed in detail in Section 
3.3.2.1. each interviewee was provided with a written brief of the study objectives prior to the interview 
taking place.  Interview topics were focused on these objectives, but interviewees were able to explore 
those aspects of the organisation that they had the most experience and knowledge of.  The researcher was 
acutely aware of the issue of bias when conducting the interviews, and made every attempt not to lead the 
interviewee.  However, as previously indicated, where particularly interesting topics arose, the researcher 
did encourage the interviewee to expand on these topics. 
3.6.3 Data Analysis 
The iterative Grounded Theory approach gave the study a very clearly defined method of analysing 
information to arise in this study.  This was considered to be an important aspect in reducing bias, from a 
data analysis perspective.  In addition, parts of the 5-step process were instrumental in reducing bias from a 
data analysis point of view.  The anticipated strengths and weaknesses of the organisation that became 
apparent from the interviewing were incorporated into the REDS scenario used in the workshop to 
determine the accuracy of interviewee’s perceptions.  Further, the organisational components that were 
identified as important by participants during interviews were used to look at vulnerabilities; each 
workshop participant was invited to score each component in terms of its criticality, preparedness, and in 
most instances, susceptibility.  This constant cross-checking of information for each organisation was 
instrumental in the reduction of bias in this study.  
3.7 Qualitative versus Quantitative Data 
There were instanced in this study where it was considered appropriate to convert qualitative information generated 
from the interviews and workshops into quantitative data.  The reasons for such conversion were to provide 
organisations in the study with a method of comparing their performance in the various resilience indicators both 
internally (between departments and offices) and externally (compared to other organisations within the same 
sector).  This was most pertinent to those organisations who adopted the resilience assessment methodology, the 5-
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step process as an ongoing planning, assessment and development tool.  These organisations viewed the 5-step 
process and its outcomes as something that could give them a competitive advantage in their respective industries.   
The process of translating qualitative data into quantifiable terms was relatively simple and is described in detail in 
Chapter 4.  The translation took place after all of the organisations had been analysed and the data could be collated.  
Each organisation’s performance in all of the resilience indicators was assessed by the researcher relative to the 
other organisations in this study.  A qualitative scale was produced for each resilience indicator so that the research 
could produce an overall assessment of each organisation’s situation awareness, adaptive capacity and identification 
and management of keystone vulnerabilities.  Each organisation’s performance for individual indicators was scored 
out of 5 (1= very poor performance through to 5=excellent performance) relative to all of the other organisations in 
the study.  These scores were multiplied together to gather an overall score for situation awareness, keystone 
vulnerability identification and management and adaptive capacity.  For example, the maximum value for a 
moderate collated resilience score is calculated by multiplying 3 (the individual score) by 5 (the number of 
indicators) to reach 243.  Therefore the scale range is between the maximum value for a ‘poor’ rating (32) and a 
maximum value for a ‘moderate’ rating (243).  The scale used for collated scores was divided along the best and 
worst scores possible for each division in the scale as illustrated in Table 2 below. 
Multiplication of scores was preferred over addition of scores to better illustrate those organisations that performed 
well and those that performed poorly for each indicator. Table 3 shows the individual resilience indicator scores 
generated for each of the organisations and the collated scores across indicators.  Because the indicators were only 
analysed relative to the organisations in this study, it is foreseeable that organisations with better or worse 
performances in these indicators could be found. 
Following the construction of each of the resilience indicators, the researcher cross checked the overall profile with 
the information gathered during the study; in particular the draft discussion reports and the final reports provide to 
the case-study organisations.  This cross check was important to make sure that the researcher’s overall impression 
of each organisation’s resilience was reflected in the profiles created.   
3.8 Summary 
This chapter described the case-study methodology used in this study.  The discussion included the justification for 
using the case-study method and why a multiple case-study approach was used.  The chapter examined the research 
questions and propositions together with detailing the data collection, analysis and validation methods.  Also 
introduced was the 5-step process; a resilience management methodology developed with the case-study 
organisations and used extensively in this study as a data gathering tool.  Grounded Theory was introduced and 
examined as the principal method for analysing the data generated in the case-studies.  Finally, this chapter 
discusses the feedback loops that arose as a result of this study and what their implications are on the development 




Table 2:  Scoring system for both individual resilience indicators and for collated resilience scores. 
Scale for individual resilience indicators Scale for collated resilience indicator scores.
Performance Score Performance Score range 
Very Poor 1 Very Poor 0 - 1 
Poor 2 Poor 2 - 32 
Moderate 3 Moderate 33 - 243 
Good 4 Good 244 - 1024 





Table 3.  Summary table showing the individual and collated resilience scores for each case-study organisation.  For key to scoring system, refer to Table 3. 
  
  CASE STUDY ORGANISATIONS 
  Label CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4 CS5 CS6 CS7 CS8 CS9 CS10 
Roles and Responsibilities SA1 3 2 3 3 1 3 1 2 5 5 
Hazards and consequences SA2 1 2 5 4 3 3 2 2 5 3 
Connectivity Awareness SA3 4 2 4 3 1 2 2 5 4 5 
Insurance SA4 2 3 2 5 3 3 2 1 4 3 
Recovery Priorities SA5 3 1 5 4 1 3 3 4 5 2 





















SUMMARY SA comp Mod Low High High Low Mod Low Mod V.High High 
Risk mgmt and Planning KV1 4 3 4 5 3 4 1 1 5 2 
Exercises KV2 1 4 5 5 2 3 1 2 5 2 
Internal Resources KV3 3 5 4 4 3 4 3 2 5 3 
External Resources KV4 3 4 4 3 2 4 2 3 4 4 
Connectivity KV5 1 4 5 5 1 5 3 4 4 3 


























SUMMARY KVcomp Mod High V.High V.High Mod High Low Mod V.High Mod 
Silo Mentality Management AC1 2 1 3 3 1 5 3 3 3 5 
Communications and 
relationships 
AC2 1 2 4 2 2 5 2 5 5 5 
Strategic Vision AC3 5 2 3 3 1 5 3 4 4 3 
Information and knowledge AC4 3 2 4 3 1 5 2 3 5 5 
Leadership and management AC5 4 2 4 3 1 5 3 4 5 5 

























4 METHODOLOGY FOR ASSESSING AND IMPROVING 
ORGANISATIONAL RESILIENCE 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter details the facilitated 5-Step process that has been developed in this study for assessing and improving 
organisational resilience and has been used with all of the case-study organisations.  The 5-Step process has been an 
integral part of the case-study methodology detailed in Chapter 3 and has formed the basis of the data collection 
process.  Additionally, this chapter discusses how the 5-Step process has evolved during this study. 
Together the five steps reflect the connectivity between situation awareness, keystone vulnerability and adaptive 
capacity.  The steps have been designed to compliment one another and assist in assessing and improving 
organisational resilience. The steps are: 
• Step 1: Building an Awareness of Resilience. This is achieved through the use of interviews, surveys, discussion 
reports and by the introduction of Consequence Scenarios to assist in increasing awareness of hazards and crises. 
• Step 2:  Mapping of Organisational Components.  Facilitating an understanding of the components of an 
organisation builds situation awareness and provides a platform from which vulnerability assessment may be 
performed. 
• Step 3: Vulnerability Self Assessment. This involves a facilitated self assessment of criticality, preparedness and 
susceptibility of the organisational components from Step 2 to determine vulnerability both from all-hazards and 
for specified consequence contexts. 
• Step 4: Vulnerability Matrix. Using the information from Step 3, the vulnerability matrix is a tool offering a 
visual representation of the vulnerability data and used to assist decision makers in identifying keystone 
vulnerabilities. This also builds on situation awareness. 
• Step 5: Readiness Exercises and Disaster Simulations (REDS). This step builds situation awareness, enhances 
adaptive capacity and provides a chance to observe and experience vulnerabilities in a simulated crisis 
environment. 
Table 5 illustrates the links between steps and shows how each step relates to the attributes of resilience.  Figure 6, a 
schematic flow diagram, shows some of the process pathways between steps and the iterative nature of the process 




Table 5. A table showing the connectivity of the steps in the 5-Step process and how the steps relate to the attributes 
of resilience. 




• Interviews, Surveys, Reports 
Gathering information 
from key stakeholders and 
validating that data. 
• Consequence Scenarios 
To build awareness of 






A facilitated self-assessment of 
mapped components for their 
criticality, preparedness and 
susceptibility to determine 




Mapping of Organisational 
Components 
Build an awareness of what 
makes the business tick from 






A visual presentation of 
vulnerabilities from Step 3 to 
identify keystone vulnerabilities 
and enable prioritisation of these 




Readiness Exercises and Disaster 
Simulations to improve adaptive 
capacity looking specifically at: 
• Capability and capacity 
• Outcome expectations 
• Responsibility and accountability





Readiness Exercises and 
Disaster Simulations of 
different consequence 





Readiness Exercises and Disaster 
Simulations to test and identify 
keystone vulnerabilities in different 
types of crises. 
  
4.2 Objectives of the 5-Step process 
As identified in Chapter 1, it is important that resilience moves on from being a theoretical concept and becomes an 
operational construct with tangible outcomes for organisations.  The development of the 5-Step process in this 
research has had two principle objectives; the second objective emerged from the first during the research. 
Firstly the methodology was primarily developed to provide an effective, repeatable and verifiable way to gather 
information from the case-study organisations.  In conjunction with both the case-study method and the Grounded 
Theory method, the 5-Step process offered the researcher a way to gather information from each organisation in the 
same manner thereby reducing the bias that may be generated by a study of this type.  The steps have, therefore, 
principally been developed as the vehicle for data collection and data validation for the case-study methodology 
used in this research project, as detailed in Chapter 3.  In terms of situation awareness the process was developed to 
assist the researcher look at perceptions that influence decision making processes, and which impact on existing and 
future planning strategies.  The process offers value from a vulnerability perspective as it utilises several different 
types of data (surveys, interviews, scenarios) to identify and validate keystone vulnerabilities and decision making 
around those vulnerabilities.  Finally, when tackling data gathering regarding adaptive capacity the process allows 
observations and interaction with the organisation in a simulated scenario.  This enabled the researcher to gather and 
validate information on communication pathways, decision making and leadership, perceptions and other key areas 
of study.  In all ways, the 5-Step process was designed with information gathering, clarification and verification in 
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mind and compliments the general research methodologies of case study theory and grounded theory used in this 
study. 
Secondly, the 5-Step process offered the researcher and the organisations a structured methodology for assessing 
and eventually improving upon resilience within the organisation; an objective that emerged as the 5-Step process 
was used with the case-study organisations throughout this project.  The 5-Step process is designed to act as a bridge 
to link all the other planning strategies that an organisation may have and it seeks to provide a platform from which 
these strategies can be used in an overarching, holistic approach.  While strategies such as risk management, 
business continuity and emergency management planning are commonly viewed as intrinsically related, a practical 
means of linking them is often absent.  Implementation of resilience strategies using the 5-Step process could also 
help an organisation to successfully navigate the post-crisis period and integrate resilience into its day-to-day 
operations.  The process achieves this by encouraging increased situation awareness, a greater understanding of 
keystone vulnerabilities and improved adaptive capacity.  Furthermore, the process concentrates on encouraging 
decision makers to learn more about their underlying value systems, expectations of their enterprise and key 
stakeholders, and offers a vehicle for testing strategies and plans in a simulated and educational environment. 
4.3 Theoretical Basis of the 5-Step process 
Different theoretical ideas and principles form the basis of various parts of the 5-Step process.  As discussed above, 
the original and principal objective of the use and development of the 5-Step process was one of consistency in data 
collection techniques.  However, as the study progressed, the opportunity to develop some of the steps into a tool for 
organisational development and learning presented itself.  This became a secondary, although significant, objective 
of the final development of the 5-Step process and the focus of its future development.  Fundamentally there are 
three foundation concepts upon which the steps are built.  These are described below. 
4.3.1 The Grounded Theory Methodology 
Grounded Theory has had a significant influence on the development of the 5-Step process as a data 
gathering tool.  Because this study is largely qualitative in nature it is important that data is gathered in a 
structured and standardised way to discourage bias and to enhance the validity of the results.  Because this 
study was also largely exploratory in nature, the validation of the data by experts was required and this 
involved feedback from the participants themselves.  This was achieved in the extensive reporting and 
surveying that took place in the study.  The reports served a dual purpose.  Firstly, the reporting process 
provided the organisations with an opportunity to validate the information gathered themselves (this was 
like offering the organisations a mirror of their perceptions, processes, systems and operations) with 
allowed the researcher additional access to the organisations.  The reports and surveys also provided the 
researcher with a systematic analytical process; a way to look at the data rather than getting lost in looking 
for data (Robrecht, 1995; Schatzman, 1991).  In turn, this meant that information could be analysed 
systematically for individual organisations and in terms of collating information across the case-studies. 
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4.3.2 Organisational Learning Theory 
The REDS were originally designed as a way of assessing the decision making processes and relationships 
within the case-study organisations using semi-experimental situations; incorporating scenarios, which are 
a commonly used method (Ash and Smallman, 2008; Berggen, 2005; Roth, Woods and Pople, 1992).  The 
scenario based approach to the REDS was adopted to enable the researcher to uncover information about 
organisational decision making in both day-to-day and (simulated) crisis situations and allow comparison 
across case-studies.  The task of designing scenarios for the analysis of crisis situations is traditionally a 
difficult one.  Scenarios in the past have been most typically used to tackle situations where the outcome is 
known, but where the probability of occurrence and/or the pathway to that outcome is not known.  
However, organisations are being exposed to an increasing variety of risks and hazards that were 
previously unanticipated; events which are most often complex, multi-dimensional and often paradoxical in 
their nature.  As such the events have the potential to significantly impact organisational and management 
structures (Postma and Liebl, 2004). 
Scenarios are most useful because of their ability to uncover information on both current and future 
situations (Carroll, 2006) and they have been used extensively in fields of strategic management and 
operational design as well as technological fields such as human-computer interaction.  Scenario based 
information gathering may also be useful as a reality check, both for the researcher and for the 
organisation; allowing testing of ‘operational capacity against a likely event that is understood in some 
way’ (Buckle et al., 2000).  As a byproduct of the consequence scenario design in this study was the ability 
to challenge and influence the mindset of managers by offering them a view of possible future perspectives.  
This, in turn allowed the researcher to observe perceptions and decision making in relation to these 
perspectives.  Further, this may influence an acceleration of organisational learning (Postma and Liebl, 
2004, Bood and Postma, 1997), although this was a secondary aspect of developing the scenarios.  As this 
study progressed it became apparent that the 5-Step process could also be used as an organisational 
learning tool.  Therefore, elements of organisational learning theory were integrated into the development 
of the REDS (a detailed discussion of organisational learning is presented in the literature review in 
Chapter 2). 
4.3.3 The Risk Management and Business Continuity Approach 
All but one of the organisations in this study was aware of and/or using AS/NZS 4360; the Australian and 
New Zealand risk management standard.  Additionally, most of these organisations were using the risk 
matrix in this standard as a tool for risk management, or a derivative of it, as part of their risk management 
planning strategies.  As a result, the majority of the organisations in this study had a working knowledge of 
risk management and were in varying stages of integrating it into their organisational culture.  Additionally 
many of the organisations were using some form of business impact analysis; derived from a business 
continuity approach.  The aim of using a risk management and business continuity based approach to 
identify resilience issues was to provide continuity of processes for the organisations, and not to burden 
them with an additional process that may be considered unwelcome.  In order to gain the confidence and 
buy-in of the organisations it was important to use versions of tools that they were likely to already be 
familiar with.  In particular, the Vulnerabilty Matrix was developed as a way to graphically identify key  
55 
 
organisational components that have the potential to impact on both the risk management process and the 
business impact analysis.  This tool was designed specifically to look similar to traditional risk matricies so 
that organisations using the tool did not have to learn complicated new strategies for gathering this valuable 
information.  
4.4 The 5-Step Process 
4.4.1 Step 1: Building an Awareness of Resilience Issues 
In order for resilience management to be effective an organisation must develop a clear understanding of 
the issues that contribute to its resilience; it must develop its situation awareness.  This includes: 
• the current and projected reality of the organisational operating environment; the resources that the 
organisation has at its disposal; 
• the expectations and limitations of all stakeholders, and; 
• the positive and negative impacts of various types of crises. 
The assessment of situation awareness was ongoing with each case-study organisation.  It began with the 
initial data collection phase of interviews with key stakeholders and was followed up by surveys and 
reporting back to the organisation with the draft discussion document.  Additionally, during the workshop 
session each organisation (two organisations did not participate in this exercise) participated in a 
brainstorming exercise to assess and build their knowledge of potential hazard situations and their expected 
impacts using Consequence Scenarios.  These techniques are described below. 
4.4.1.1 Interviews, Surveys and Reporting 
A detailed discussion of how interviewing was carried out is presented in Chapter 3.  A brief overview is 
given here to illustrate how interviewing, surveying and reporting fits into the 5-Step process.  Interviewing 
key stakeholders internally (staff, shareholders etc) and externally (customers, suppliers, contractors and 
even the wider community etc) is an excellent method for assessing situation awareness.  Those conducting 
the interviews should be experienced interviewers, have a good understanding of resilience management 
and be able to provide an objective perspective.  The individual/s facilitating the interviews need to be 
aware of the relative importance of information gathered; comments made by only one individual may not 
be representative of the entire organisation, but if seemingly anomalous comments are made by a senior 
decision maker, there may be significant implications on overall organisational resilience.  Therefore it is 
important that the interviewer remains objective and open to all potential resilience issues that arise. 
Once this initial information has been gathered, it is important to present the findings back to the 
organisation.  Discussion reports are an ideal way of doing this, and they encourage the organisation to 
look at itself and its perceptions from an external perspective.  These types of reports also offer the 
organisation a mirror of the perceptions (and possibly misconceptions) that pervade the organisation, and of 













Figure 6. A schematic flow diagram illustrating the iterative nature of the 5-Step process and the connectivity 
between steps to achieve improved resilience for organisations. 
Initial surveys may be created from the discussion document, which help determine the validity of 
comments made during interviews.  The surveys can also assess the degree to which particular views or 
perceptions permeate the organisation or even external stakeholders.  Surveys are valuable for highlighting 
how well particular strategies or procedures are progressing in an organisation.  Many organisations have 
versions of staff/stakeholder engagement surveys and these can be a valuable source of information for 
developing resilience management.  Furthermore, surveys can be conducted with the wider community to 
assess connectivity and the perceptions of the organisation in this environment. 
4.4.1.2 Consequence Scenarios 
It is important to assess the level of understanding that an organisation has of both the hazard events that it 
faces and the potential consequences that may arise from those hazards.  Often, even if the hazards are very 
low probability, the consequences are so unacceptable that the organisation cannot ignore them. In many 
instances these are exactly the events that are not planned for and organisations tend to rely on an assumed 
level of ability to deal with these extreme hazards.  Some organisations also have difficulty in moving past 
those events previously experienced toward a greater awareness of those hazards not previously considered 
or encountered. 
A set of four Consequence Scenarios has been developed to help organisations improve their awareness of 
crises and consequences.  The Consequence Scenarios are designed to simulate a wide range of potential 
effects on the study organisations.  Due to the variability in how specific threats may affect an organisation, 
specific hazards have been disregarded in favour of a set of particular event consequences.  If the particular 
consequence of interest is complete physical destruction of an organisation's premises, the actual hazard 
























Christchurch an Alpine Fault rupture earthquake might cause this for many organisations, however this 
event would not have the same consequences in Auckland. 
As with any event scenario, there will always be known unknown factors and unknown unknowns.  The 
aim of presenting the case study organisations with these Consequence Scenarios is three-fold. 
• Firstly it encourages organisations to identify those events that are foreseeable and also encourages 
organisations to consider how they might cope with those outcomes that they cannot foresee.  To this 
end, the Consequence Scenarios are also important in assessing the ability of the crisis management 
team and the overall management structure of the organisation to adapt to situations outside of their 
expected outcomes.  This reflects an organisations adaptive capacity which will be discussed in Section 
4.6. 
• Secondly, the consequence scenarios provide organisations with a vehicle to investigate how they might 
address the failure, temporary or otherwise, of linked organisations.  It is important for organisations to 
not only consider how the downfall of an important ally or rival will affect them, but how they might be 
able to maximise and even prosper from this type of situation. 
• Finally, Consequence Scenarios allow organisations to prepare for different hazard events that have 
similar consequences at the same time.  Planning for a range of hazards in a consequence based 
framework can be more economical than for individual hazards.  Often the strategies used to mitigate 
one hazard can be used for other hazards.  Therefore Consequence Scenarios offer an organisation a 
way of collating the critical components of crisis situations so that it can maximise its resources in 
preparing for these types of hazards.  Table 6 outlines the Consequence Scenario framework developed 
in this study and used with all of the case study organisations to help organisations identify specific 
hazards and impacts; both positive and negative. 
4.4.2 Step 2 - Determination of Essential Organisational Components 
Also important from a situation awareness perspective is an organisations understanding of the essential 
components that make it tick from both an internal and external viewpoint.  Mapping the essential 
organisational components for each case-study was completed in conjunction with the interviews and 
refined during the survey and reporting process.  The details of organisational component mapping are 
discussed below. 
4.4.2.1 Component mapping 
Organisations implementing resilience management strategies should identify the degree to which they 
intend to apply the process; within senior management, throughout a department, throughout the entire 
organisation or in conjunction with key linked organisations.  The way in which an organisation achieves 
this is to identify the organisational components that are integral to operations at the chosen scale.  
Additionally, one of the most critical aspects of this process is the identification of links between 





Table 6. Details of the consequence scenarios used to improve an organisation's situation awareness. 






This scenario tests an organisation’s response to and recovery from significant physical 
damage to buildings, contents, and resources, coupled with severe disruptions to lifeline 





This scenario focuses on an event resulting in extended staffing absences.  In this event 








Scenarios of this nature focus on an organisation specific incident resulting in severe disruption 
to normal operations and reputation impacts and may include loss of life or injury.  The intense 
focus of media and regulatory agencies requires the organisation to focus on managing 








This scenario tests organisational response and recovery regarding impacts on business flow 
through the organisational network such as key suppliers or customers.  This could include, for 
example, the impacts of government restrictions on fuel supplies or the collapse of 
infrastructure such as electricity or telecommunications.  
Mapping organisational components is a task that can be a facilitated process but maps should not be 
compiled entirely by external facilitators.  The reason for this is that successful resilience management 
requires ongoing development of situation awareness within an organisation and involvement in mapping 
an organisation's key components and the links between them is critical to this development.  Furthermore, 
those responsible for the implementation of resilience management in an organisation should be involved 
as much as possible with mapping components to increase their own situation awareness. 
There is a distinction between internal components and external components for an organisation.  Internal 
components are those that the organisation has the direct ability to manage in terms of resilience.  For 
example, employment contracts with staff would be an internal component.  External components on the 
other hand are those that, while potentially having some influence over component management, an 
organisation had no direct ability to change.  For example, the supply of telecommunications services by a 
third party supplier would be an external component because although the organisation may be able to 
manage its response to such an outage, it cannot control the cause of that outage.  In this study, 
organisational components were mapped with each organisation individually.  As the study progressed it 
became apparent that a core set of components was emerging; several components were critical to all 
organisations studied. Around these core components, another set of organisation specific components were 
developed.  The scale of the component mapping in this study was at a high level strategic perspective of 
internal and external components.  Table 7 shows some of the core components, internally and externally, 
that were observed from this study.  These components are then used to further the resilience management 
process by enabling organisations to critically self-assess the vulnerability of these components; this is 
discussed in the next section. 
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Table 7. An example of the types of internal and external organisational components mapped for 
organisations in this study. 
INTERNAL COMPONENTS 
Physical Components Human Components Economic Components 
Buildings Offices Communication/ General Staff Direct Risk Management 
And IT Hardware Relationships Senior Staff Planning Continuity Planning 
Equipment Security  Board  Emergency Management 
 Vehicles Management Leadership  Cash Flow 
 Software/IP  Succession  Market/brand Knowledge 
 Inventory  Staff Welfare  Insurance 
Services Generators Information/ Backup   
 Fuel Supplies Knowledge Privacy/Protection   
 IT networks  Training/Review   
EXTERNAL COMPONENTS 
Physical Components Human Components Economic Components 
Services Electricity Communication/ Emerg. Services Indirect Interconnectedness 
 Water Relationships Local Authorities Planning Govt. Compliance 
 Sewerage  Customers  Contracts 
 Telecommunications  Suppliers  Reputation/Image 
 Transportation  Media   
4.4.3 Step 3 - Self Assessment of Vulnerability 
An assessment of vulnerability is important in resilience management because it contributes to increased 
situation awareness, promotes the development of adaptive capacity and also gives the organisation 
something tangible to work towards.  Vulnerability is self assessed to improve the organisational buy-in; 
there is always a danger having an external facilitator assessing vulnerability as key stakeholders may feel 
misunderstood or misrepresented by the facilitator and not accept the recommendations.  Using a self 
assessment technique of vulnerability the organisation is encouraged to take ownership of the issues that 
emerge, and consequently can accept accountability for improving vulnerabilities. 
An important part of the vulnerability assessment is establishing the context.  Initially the assessment 
should be conducted from an all hazards perspective, and then a more detailed context can be obtained 
using the consequence scenarios from Step 1.  Additionally, the scale of the assessment needs to be 
established using the component mapping from Step 2.  The vulnerability assessment requires 
consideration of criticality and preparedness with susceptibility also assessed for the chosen context, all at a 
scale appropriate for the purposes of the organisation.  The details of the self assessment process are 
described below and Section 4.5 details how this assessment is used to identify and prioritise keystone 
vulnerabilities in an organisation. 
4.4.3.1 Selecting the Scale of Assessment 
Prior to the development of resilience management strategies, an organisation must first determine the 
desired scale of assessment.  Does the organisation want to explore strategies to target senior management 
or a particular department, a particular geographic locality or office, or perhaps the entire organisation?  If 
an organisation targets only one part of itself (a single department or business unit for example) then the 
same techniques should be applied to other parts of the business to ensure all potentially critical linkages 
between components are identified.  Once the scale has been established, the organisation can then assess 




The key question to ask when assessing criticality is 'how important is this particular component to the 
whole organisations ability to respond to/recover from crises?'  The assessment process, therefore, is 
applied to two distinct time frames in relation to crises; response and recovery.  The immediate response 
phase occurs either during or immediately following the onset of a crisis.  This may differ depending on the 
nature of the event.  The response phase for an earthquake may be a matter of hours or days while the 
response to the outbreak of infectious disease nationwide may be weeks or months.  An organisation moves 
into recovery when it is beginning to think about returning to business-as-usual conditions.  The move from 
response to recovery is not always observed as a discrete period following a crisis and recovery may not be 
recognisable as 'business-as-usual' conditions because the operating environment has changed dramatically 
due to the crisis event.  Criticality for both response and recovery is divided into four broad categories: 
very high, high, moderate, low.  It is important when assessing criticality the organisation also considers 
the connections between organisational components, and the potential criticalities of these links. 
4.4.3.3 Preparedness 
When assessing the preparedness of components the organisation should ask 'what level of planning or 
inherent robustness does this particular component have for loss or impairment of its function'?  
Preparedness is therefore measured qualitatively; high, moderate, low, none.   For example, electricity 
services may have a high level of preparedness because the organisation has chosen to purchase a 
generator.  However, an organisation without a generator might consider that its level of planning for the 
loss of electricity is low.  Some components may have an inherent robustness (a highly functioning crisis 
leadership team with effective decision making, for instance) while others require specific pre-planning 
strategies by the organisation to increase their redundancy.  As with criticality, it is important to consider 
the connectivity of components when assessing preparedness to ensure that all aspects of the organisational 
system, in the given context, are captured by the assessment. 
4.4.3.4 Susceptibility 
An assessment of the susceptibility of components is intended to encourage an organisation to consider 
more carefully the potential impacts of different types of crises.  An organisation should ask 'how badly 
impacted is the performance of this particular organisational component likely to be in the event of this 
particular scenario'?  For example, electricity services may be highly susceptible to a regional crisis that 
impacts infrastructure such as an earthquake, but have a very low susceptibility to social disruption such as 
an influenza pandemic.  Susceptibility is therefore determined qualitatively; very high, high, moderate, and 
low. 
In order to successfully assess susceptibility, an organisation should consider a particular context.  
Organisations can use any number of techniques to provide such context; from experience of a previous 
crisis situation, to a political push for crisis response to particular impending events.  In this study, the 
Consequence Scenarios (Section 4.2.2) have been used to provide the crisis context for the vulnerability 
self assessment.  When developing scenarios for the case study organisations typically elements of two or 
more of the Consequence Scenarios were used to provide context.  Not only does this provide an economy 
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of scale for organisations by enabling it to look at more than one scenario at a time, but it also provides a 
more complex context.  This helps an organisation to better approximate the reality of a crisis and will 
provide a more detailed picture of the organisations strengths and weaknesses and connections. 
4.4.4 Step 4 - Identification and Prioritisation of Keystone Vulnerabilities 
There are two ways to interpret the vulnerability information from Step 3.  Firstly this information can be 
considered from an all hazards approach using the criticality and preparedness information for response and 
recovery phases of a crisis.  Secondly, the organisation can consider the susceptibility information as part 
of the vulnerability picture to look at particular vulnerabilities for an event type of immediate concern, for 
example influenza pandemic or as a review of a previous event.  The intersection of the various attributes 
of vulnerability introduced above (Section 4.4) can help to indicate which organisational components 
present the greatest threat to an organisation in a given context (all hazards or consequence specific).  
These are called keystone vulnerabilities.  Keystone vulnerabilities are components (or links between 
components) that, in the event of their failure or loss, have a significant negative impact on the 
organisation.  These may occur as either sudden catastrophic failure in the organisation or be more 
insidious with cascading failures over time.  Identification of keystone vulnerabilities often takes a more 
considered and structured approach to uncover.  These vulnerabilities can be hidden within the system and 
the organisation may have little or no awareness of their potential to create further crises within the main 
event. 
It is also important that an organisation looks at its keystone vulnerabilities as interconnected parts of a 
system and not in isolation.  There is the potential for some organisational components to be more highly 
vulnerable when considered as part of a system than in isolation; a cascading failure (Barbarasi, 2002).  For 
example, electricity may be considered as a vulnerability on its own, but when considered as part of a 
system, its failure may cause other components to become keystone vulnerabilities.  It is also possible that 
the opposite is true; that some organisational components, when considered in isolation, may appear to be 
more significant vulnerabilities than if considered as part of the whole system. The following discussion 
outlines the use of the vulnerability matrix.  This is a simple visual tool, developed as part of this study, to 
help organisations identify and prioritise keystone vulnerabilities. 
4.4.4.1 The Vulnerability Matrix 
Vulnerability matrices are produced using preparedness and criticality data obtained in Step 3.  This 
produces an assessment of vulnerability at an 'all-hazards' level.  Additionally, susceptibility information is 
used to produce a context specific matrix.  Examples of both types of vulnerability matrices are presented 
in Figure 7. 
Criticality is plotted on the x-axis and preparedness on the y-axis.  Each organisational component is 
represented by a ‘hole’ in the matrix. For the 'all-hazards' matrix, all the holes are of equal size and it is 
their position on the matrix that determines their status as keystone vulnerabilities.  Susceptibility data 
however, is indicated by different sized 'holes'; the larger the 'hole' the greater the degree susceptibility.  
For these context specific matrices, keystone vulnerabilities are identified both by the size of the hole they 
produce as well as their position on the matrix. 
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Keystone vulnerabilities are those often innocuous components and links that have the potential to be 
show-stoppers for an organisation.  They should be identified as quickly as possible and as part of an 
integrated vulnerability assessment.  Further, matrices can be produced to look at different aspects of an 
organisation, concentrating on human resources, external stakeholder links, or essential infrastructure for 
example.  They can also be used to look at keystone vulnerabilities for different business units or 
departments and compared to overall vulnerability for the entire organisation. 
The vulnerability matrix is a tool that quickly assists decision makers to visually identify those components 
that present the greatest potential threat which can then be collated and treated accordingly.  In this way, 
the matrix is an important vulnerability prioritisation tool for an organisation and can greatly assist in 
helping focus attention and resources to where they will provide the greatest value for an organisation. 
4.4.4.2 Keystone Vulnerability Prioritisation 
The matrix is divided into four categories of vulnerability.  The highest vulnerability category is in the top 
right-hand quadrant moving through to the lowest vulnerability in the bottom left-hand quadrant (Figure 7). 
An organisation plots the results of the vulnerability assessment on the matrix using the criticality and 
preparedness information.  The organisational components that fall within the highest vulnerability 
categories on the matrix are likely to be the most important keystone vulnerabilities and should be the ones 
addressed first in any planning strategies.  In Figure 7a the matrix shows that components #6 and #1 would 
be considered as the most important followed by #4, #10 and #2, then #9, #8 and #3. 
If an organisation wanted to investigate its keystone vulnerabilities for a particular planning strategy (for 
example pandemic or loss of a particular link in the supply chain) it would then use the susceptibility 
information.  In Figure 7b, the susceptibility information has been included on the vulnerability matrix.  In 
this example component #1 is a greater keystone vulnerability in this type of event than #6 because it 
represents a larger 'hole' in the matrix within the same vulnerability category on the matrix (in Figure 7a 
these components would have been considered relatively equally).  The organisation may then identify 
component #4 and possibly #2 as greater vulnerabilities than component #6, again because of their position 
and the size of the 'holes' they create in the matrix.  In this way the organisation can more specifically target 
those components that present the greatest keystone vulnerabilities for the particular context being 
investigated. 
Keystone vulnerabilities, those often innocuous components and links that have the potential to be show- 
stoppers for an organisation, should be identified as quickly as possible and as part of an integrated 
vulnerability assessment.  Further, matrices can be produced to look at different aspects of an organisation, 
concentrating on human resources, external stakeholder links, or essential infrastructure for example.  They 
can also be used to look at keystone vulnerabilities for different business units or departments and 
compared to overall vulnerability for the entire organisation. 
The matrix is a powerful tool that quickly assists decision makers to visually identify those components 
that present the greatest potential threat which can then be collated and treated accordingly.  In this way, 
the matrix is an important vulnerability prioritisation tool for an organisation and can greatly assist in 
helping focus attention and resources to where they will provide the greatest value for an organisation. In 
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this study the vulnerability matrix has been used entirely from a qualitative perspective, however there 
exists the potential to create a more quantitative assessment process.  This would feasibly help 
organisations to better identify and rank keystone vulnerabilities, and also better compare vulnerabilities 
between departments, offices and even between organisations within an industry if required.  This is 
discussed as part of the future work proposed in Chapter 7.  
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Figure 7a.  
Vulnerability Matrix 
showing organisational 
components in an all-







































































Figure 7b.  
Vulnerability Matrix 
showing organisational 
components in a context 
specific matrix.  Circle 
size represents 
susceptibility to a given 
context. 
 
Figure 7. Sample vulnerability matrices showing (a) an all-hazards approach and (b) a context specific 
approach to determine keystone vulnerabilities for organisational resilience. 
All-Hazards Vulnerability Matrix 
Context Specific Vulnerability Matrix 
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4.4.5 Step 5 – Increasing Adaptive Capacity 
The final stage in the 5-step process focuses predominantly on identifying and developing adaptive 
capacity in an organisation.  Adaptive capacity is largely concerned with the cultural capital of an 
organisation and there are several detailed methodologies in existence to measure some of the 
psychological aspects of this culture (for a review see Chernyshenko and Stark, 2005).  It may be difficult 
for organisations to incorporate these methodologies into their day-to-day business due to the complexity of 
these models, financial constraints and the availability and skill of staff to perform the assessments.  For 
this reason, the tools in Step 5 are designed to provide a time and resource efficient way to assess and 
improve overall resilience for organisations via developing adaptive capacity, without getting lost in too 
much detail.  Step 5 is intended to provide tangible outcomes for organisations, and assist them in 
developing immediate action plans to address key resilience issues, particularly in relation to adaptive 
capacity, but also in terms of situation awareness and keystone vulnerabilities. 
4.4.5.1 Readiness Exercises and Disaster Simulations 
Ultimately, this 5-step process is about providing simple and practical tools for decision makers to assess 
and increase an organisation's resilience for times of crisis.  As such, one of the most important tools used 
in the process is the Readiness Exercises and Disaster Simulation (REDS).  REDS encourage organisations 
to experience their vulnerabilities and strengths in a simulated crisis environment and offer a platform from 
which to critically assess decision making and communications.  Scenario exercises help an organisation to 
increase its awareness of the operating environment in a crisis and the potential impacts of different event 
types.  For those organisations that have engaged in producing emergency plans or business continuity 
planning, scenarios offer an excellent opportunity to test these plans before they are needed in a real 
situation.  The scenarios used with the organisations in this study are presented in Appendix G. 
Ideally REDS are conducted with groups of between 8-12 individuals who have wide ranging knowledge 
of the organisation and represent key decision makers. REDS can be modified for smaller organisations, 
but for larger organisations, groups should number no more than 12.  Additional exercises should be 
conducted if more people are to be involved.  Experience with the case-study organisations has indicated 
that 12 is the maximum number of participants that can reasonably participate in the REDS and still ensure 
that all participants can have an active role in the exercise.  
REDS are structured into six distinct stages that are conducted sequentially and described below. 
• Stage 1 - Group Selection and Scenario Presentation 
If the group numbers more than eight individuals, it should be divided into two smaller groups with 
equal numbers.  The groups are presented with a detailed event scenario and are asked to consider this 
event from a specific time frame for the immediate recovery phase. (This may be minutes, hours, or 
days depending on the nature of the event). 
• Stage 2 - The Response Phase 
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Each group is asked to consider the following four questions. 
Question 1. What are the major issues facing the organisation at this time (following the crisis)? This is 
simply a brainstorming exercise where all the potential problems that the organisation faces in the 
aftermath of an emergency are identified and listed. 
Question 2.  What are the main priorities that the organisation must consider?  The participants must 
consider what they actually need to do, how, in what order and who will be responsible for what 
actions. 
Question 3. What are the lesser priorities and how long until these become critical? This offers 
participants an opportunity to view the crisis from alternative time frames.  This question encourages 
participants to do a horizon scan of the issues and to consider within what time frame are these likely to 
become important? 
Question 4.  What could the organisation do prior to a crisis to better prepare for this situation?  This 
question is designed to produce an action-plan that can be immediately developed by the organisation to 
improve its resilience. Here the participants are asked to consider the most significant gaps in the 
response approach during the REDS and what they could do prior to an event to minimise their impact 
on the organisation.  As part of the action- plan approach, time frames for implementing the plan should 
also be considered. 
Stage 3 - The External Perspective 
In the exercise, one individual from each group is taken aside and asked to consider the scenario from the 
perspective of one or more key stakeholder groups. In many instances the facilitator removes individuals on 
whom the groups show a high dependence for leadership and decision making.  This helps to highlight the 
possible consequences should these people be absent in a real crisis.  The external perspectives of these 
individuals are later presented to the groups as part of a debriefing to determine if the organisation 
adequately considered these groups and their concerns/demands/expectations in the overall REDS. 
Stage 4 - Break and Review 
Participants are encouraged to take a break from the exercise and facilitators can offer comments on how 
the groups are doing, as well as suggest tips and advice for improvement.  This is a valuable chance for 
participants to reflect on how well they achieved what they were asked to do, and how they might improve 
their performance, individually and as a group. 
Stage 5 - The Recovery Phase 
Groups are then bought together for the recovery phase of the REDS. Each group is given an overview of 
the scenario from a different time perspective.  Typically this time frame is well into the organisational 
recovery from the event.  Participants are asked to consider the same questions as in Step 2, using the new 
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scenario time frame and taking into consideration the comments and advice given during the break in Stage 
4. 
Stage 6 - Debriefing and Action Plans 
At the conclusion of the REDS, the participants take part in a group debriefing that includes the external 
perspectives obtained in Step 3.  Debriefing is a very important part of REDS and a way for the 
organisational decision makers to create an action plan that can be addressed immediately.  The action plan 
can quickly reduce vulnerability as well as improve awareness, adaptive capacity and, therefore, overall 
organisational resilience.  Creating an action plan at the conclusion of the REDS has another benefit; it can 
capitalise on the momentum of the organisation and capture the creative thinking that often arises from 
these exercises. 
Over time as part of a resilience management strategy and using different consequence scenarios as the 
basis for each exercise, REDS can help to highlight some of the cultural strengths and weaknesses in an 
organisation. REDS also helps the organisation to assess, and subsequently improve, its capacity to meet its 
obligations in various crisis situations. 
During REDS it is possible for an observer to determine the (relative) level of awareness about hazards and 
the potential impacts on the organisation resulting from these hazards.  It also allows the observer: 
• To see how well the decision makers understand minimum operating requirements.  
• To see how well decision makers communicate the minimum operating requirements to other decision 
makers.  
• To assess levels of awareness regarding roles and responsibilities of key stakeholders.  
• To encourage participants to view the simulated crisis situation both from an internal and external 
perspective.  
• To assess the organisations awareness of its connection with stakeholders and the impacts that may 
arise from disturbance to these links.  
• To observe the decision making process in action.  
• To assess the organisations strategic vision and purpose and how well this is understood throughout the 
organisation. 
REDS is an excellent way to provide the necessary context for making vulnerability assessments.  REDS 
allows stakeholders and decision makers (both internally and externally) to actually experience these 
vulnerabilities in an environment simulating a real emergency. REDS helps organisations to see, not only 
their own vulnerabilities more clearly (and in context), but also the potential vulnerabilities in other linked 
organisations or system. 
4.5 Synthesis 
The 5-Step process has been developed in consultation with the case-study organisations to produce a methodology 
for assessing and improving organisational resilience.  The steps target one or more of the attributes of resilience: 
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situation awareness, keystone vulnerabilities and adaptive capacity.  The information generated from using the 5- 
Step process with the case study organisations forms the basis of the integrated analysis in this study detailed in the 
following chapters. 
4.6 The Resilience Profile 
The resilience profile is a relative, qualitative representation of overall resilience in an organisation.  The profiles 
have been generated for each of the case-study organisations and are presented in Chapter 6 along with summaries 
of the case-study findings.  An example of the resilience profile is presented in Figure 8. 
Each axis on the resilience profile is divided equally into five categories representing the degree of situation 
awareness, identification and management of keystone vulnerabilities and adaptive capacity; very high, high, 
moderate, low and very low.  An envelope of resilience is created by joining the points along each axis.  As can be 
seen in Figure 8(a) an organisation with a high degree of resilience will have an envelope of resilience that plots 
close to the end of each axis, and away from the centre of the diagram; the envelope of resilience is larger for 
organisations with higher resilience.  An organisation with low resilience will plot much closer to the centre of the 
triangle on each axis. Figure 8(b) shows an organisation with a low overall resilience for comparison.  The axes 
situation awareness and adaptive capacity are simple to conceptualise.  An organisation with high situation 
awareness or adaptive capacity will plot in the high zone on the diagram.  The axis for keystone vulnerabilities can 
be somewhat counter-intuitive however.  The very high zone represents increased resilience, and therefore an 
organisation that plots in the very high zone for keystone vulnerabilities is one which has these clearly identified and 
well managed. 
The degree of each variable is assessed on a qualitative basis by the researcher after taking into consideration all of 
the information about each case study organisation.  A set of resilience indicators has been derived from the 
integrated analysis of case-study information (see Chapter 5), and each organisation was scaled according to their 
performance on each indicator relative to the other organisations in the study.  Each indicator therefore has at least 
one organisation with a very high ranking and one with a very low ranking.  All other organisations are compared 
against these two end points and given a relative ranking.  Indicators were categorised according to their influence 
on situation awareness, keystone vulnerabilities or adaptive capacity.  The relative rankings of all the indicators for 
each organisation are presented in Chapter 5. 
Once the organisations had been ranked for all the resilience indicators, information was then collated. Indicators 
were given a numerical value (1 = very low through to 5 = very high), and the results for each organisation were 
calculated.  The numbers for each indicator were multiplied to give a collated value for situation awareness, 
keystone vulnerabilities and adaptive capacity (Equation 1).  These values were in turn graded to represent very low 
through to very high values, and each organisation was then given a rating on this qualitative scale.  Therefore, each 
organisation was given a rating for situation awareness, keystone vulnerability and adaptive capacity that was 





Collated Situation Awareness = 
Collated Keystone Vulnerabilities = 
Collated Adaptive Capacity = 
  
SAi1  x  SAi2  x  …… SAin 
KVi1 x  KVi2  x …… KVin 
ACi1 x  ACi2  x …… ACin 
i = resilience indicator 
SA = Situation Awareness 
KV = Keystone Vulnerability 
AC = Adaptive Capacity 
Equation 1. Collation of resilience indicators. 
Again, the process of allocating a numerical value for the qualitative rating was applied and the results again 
multiplied to derive a ranking of Relative Overall Resilience (ROR) (Equation 2). 
Relative Overall Resilience (ROR) = SA  x  KV  x  AC 
SA = Situation Awareness 
KV = Keystone Vulnerability 
AC = Adaptive Capacity 
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(b) Organisation with 
Very Low Resilience 
Figure 8. The Resilience Profile.  For an organisation with very high resilience (a) the resilience envelope (black 
and white hashed area on the diagram) will plot close to the apex of each axis of the triangle, in the very high zone.  
For an organisation with very low resilience (b) the resilience envelope will plot much closer to the centre of the 
diagram for each axis. 
The resilience profiles show the relative rankings for each attribute of resilience, and the envelope of resilience 
represents the Relative Overall Resilience (ROR) of each organisation comparative to the others in the study.  These 
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This chapter outlines in detail the 5-step process that provides organisations with practical tools and a framework 
which can be used to build resilience both in day-to-day business as well as for crisis management.  The 5-Step 
process centres on increasing situation awareness in organisations, encouraging further identification and 
management of keystone vulnerabilities and developing adaptive capacity.  Each of the five steps addresses one or 
more of these attributes of resilience.  In addition, this chapter introduces the resilience profile.  The resilience 
profile is used to visually present the relative overall resilience for each organisation (see Chapter 6), and this 
chapter explains how these profiles are generated and how to interpret them.  Details of the evolution of the 5-Step 
process are presented in Appendix B and provide a valuable insight into how the knowledge of resilience has 
developed over the course of this study. 
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5 RESILIENCE INDICATORS FOR ORGANISATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
All of the case-study organisations were analysed to determine the common resilience issues that emerged. This 
discussion details these issues and categorises them according to the attributes of resilience; situation awareness, 
keystone vulnerabilities and adaptive capacity. For each organisation in this study, the indicators were assessed to 
produce a relative resilience profile and these will be discussed in the following section. It is important to recognise 
the relationships between the indicators in each section. Situation awareness has influence over the performance of 
an organisation in identifying and managing keystone vulnerabilities, and both of these influence adaptive capacity 
for organisations. Where possible, the following discussion details specific issues but the reader is urged to be 
mindful of these intrinsic relationships. 
At the end of this chapter, each organisation is given a rating for all of the indicators relative to the performance of 
the other organisations in this study. These ratings are then collated and used to produce an overall estimate of 
relative resilience which is also used to produce the resilience profiles for each organisation presented in Chapter 6. 
5.1.1 Maintaining Case-Study Integrity 
Each of the case-study organisations were individually analysed using Grounded Theory, with interviews 
and other information being coded and key resilience issues identified for each individual study. For the 
integrated analysis, the original information coded from interviews and other data sources was not re- 
coded. The reason for this was that the uniqueness of each organisation needed to be preserved, and simply 
combining all the interviews and re-coding them was inappropriate.  Therefore, the results of each 
organisation were coded to look for common resilience issues across the case-studies, without affecting the 
integrity of each organisation as a unique entity. 
5.1.2 Reports and Confidentiality 
The final case study reports sent to each of the organisations were used for the integrated analysis. The key 
resilience issues are summarised in Chapter 6 and a more detailed analysis presented in Appendix C. Due 
to confidentiality agreements with each organisation, both the individual case-study reports and the 
summary in the previous chapter were issued to each organisation and reviewed from a privacy protection 
viewpoint. The organisations had no additional input into the results. Again, it is important to note that the 
resilience issues to arise for each organisation are relevant to the time the study was conducted. Several 
organisations in this study have made further progress on some of these issues, and the summaries in 
Chapter 6 may not be entirely relevant to their present situation. 
5.1.3 Keystone Vulnerability Analysis 
Additionally, information such as the vulnerability analyses and vulnerability matrices were compared to 
look for common resilience issues. The organisational components were mapped over the course of this 
study, and correlated with other case-studies in the research. Additionally, information regarding the 
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keystone vulnerabilities was integrated across these organisational components; generated from the 
individual vulnerability analyses and composite matrices for each organisation. Appendix C shows how the 
set of organisational components has developed during this study, from CS1 to CS10 and also highlights 
the keystone vulnerabilities identified by organisational self assessment for both response and recovery. 
The vulnerability matrices are presented in Appendix E. 
5.1.4 Composite Awareness of Resilience Indicators 
The resilience profiles in Chapter 6 are a relative measure of overall resilience in the case-study 
organisations. The relative degree of situation awareness, keystone vulnerabilities and adaptive capacity on 
these profiles were based on the composite results of the resilience indicators presented in this chapter. 
Chapter 4 explains in detail how the composite assessments are made to produce an overall resilience 
rating. The organisations identified as being most successful for each resilience indicator are identified, and 
the other organisations are compared relative to these top performers. It must be noted that those 
organisations with the highest rating for these indicators are not necessarily ideal performers.  This 
assessment is only performed relative to the other organisations in this study. The discussion in this chapter 
therefore explores both the weaknesses of how organisations manage their resilience issues, together with 
how they successfully address them. Further, the information is designed as a starting point for a more 
quantitative assessment of these aspects of resilience potentially leading to the ability to benchmark 
organisations, and gather more information from individual industry sectors, business sizes or other 
characteristics. These possibilities are explored in Chapter 7. 
5.2 Principal Resilience Issues 
The following discussion presents the results of the integrated analysis of case-study information. Each attribute of 
resilience (situation awareness, keystone vulnerabilities and adaptive capacity) are subdivided into resilience 
indicators.  Each indicator represents a generic resilience issue that has been observed over the majority of 
organisations in this study. A more detailed discussion of how each indicator manifests for each organisation is 
presented in Appendix C and summarised in Chapter 6. 
5.2.1 Situation Awareness 
Situation awareness refers to an organisations awareness of its entire operating environment, including 
threats and opportunities, connectivity and internal and external stakeholders. A total of five resilience 
indicators were identified under the banner of situation awareness are discussed below. 
5.2.1.1 Roles and responsibilities (SA 1) 
A key awareness issue for all organisations in this study was that of roles and responsibilities; both the 
knowledge of ones own role in the organisation as well as and knowledge of roles and responsibilities of 
others in the organisation. Almost all of the organisations in this study displayed significant problems with 
knowledge of roles and responsibilities in day-to-day operations.  Those organisations that had experienced 
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crises in the past also indicated that these problems were exacerbated in stressful situations. The symptoms 
of poor awareness of roles and responsibilities included: 
• Staff feeling undervalued,  
• Staff not being consulted in areas where they had expertise,  
• Increasing levels of mistrust of decision makers, and  
• Feelings of disengagement with the organisational vision. 
‘I think the key to it is local people for local solutions, because [there were a few] more problems when 
[larger, non-local organisation] came on board.  That was really difficult, because they've breezed into the 
[operations centre in the crisis], and they had these textbook solutions that they were going to apply.  I 
thought they had a cheek really, telling us what we had done wrong, and this that and the other thing.  It 
wasn't really the time or place.  I found that quite disconcerting’.  Staff member describing what happened 
when a another organisation came in to take over operations during a significant crisis. 
‘It was more when outsiders came in that things fell apart.  That might be an unkind comment to make but 
the [larger, non-local organisation].  The whole thing was really [about] local people having a sense of 
ownership.  I don't think you can manage disasters by the book.  Not going to happen … with silly things 
like, you would have to fill out this little incident report, and they were lobbying as well.’  It was a really 
bureaucratic thing’. Another staff member describing the same situation as above. 
Many organisations had difficulty in balancing the desire for autonomous decision making and 
decentralisation with maintaining essential connections with staff, particularly where there is a significant 
geographic distribution of offices and staff.   
‘We are migrating closer to the mother ship…there is a history in [this organisation] of units migrating 
away and getting too close to the fire.  There are no thoughts to operationalism.  I support moving closer to 
[parent organisation] but they are understaffed to make the decisions that we need to make.  That’s 
because DTA [delegated technical authority] is too hierarchal.  We need a more autonomous structure for 
DTA.  When board signs off that [business unit CEO] has x-amount of capital, I should be able to sign off 
as the chief technical officer for [this business unit]’.  Discussion of roles and responsibilities and the link 
with decision making between a business unit and the parent organisation. 
Even in organisations where the geographic distribution of offices was not a factor, staff in different 
departments often had little or no knowledge of what others in the organisation were doing, or the potential 
roles that they might play in a crisis. This was a surprising outcome at an executive level in some of the 
case-studies, and is thought to reflect an underlying silo mentality in these organisations (see Section 
5.2.3.1). One organisation did not appear to have a significant problem with knowledge of roles and 
responsibilities in the organisation. This is thought to be partially due to the relatively small number of 
staff, a single office environment, and a 'family' philosophy in decision making where all staff are expected 
and encouraged to contribute to finding solutions for problems.   
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‘[the organisation] promotes a culture where all staff can have input into developing the business and 
coming up with new ideas and solutions to problems’.  Discussion of what the ‘family’ nature of the 
business means to the organisation. 
Another aspect of this issue is the strict definition of roles and responsibilities in an organisation, and a 
strong adherence to these descriptions. Two organisations exhibited this clearly. In both organisations the 
staff display very defined roles in the organisational structure, and their mandate for decision making, and 
associated responsibilities are clearly spelled out. These employees tend to work strictly within the 
boundaries of these roles and seem to be very reluctant to step outside of these. Not only does this appear to 
be a barrier to the flow of knowledge in the organisation, especially of the roles, responsibilities and 
expectations of others in the organisation, but also reduces the flexibility of the organisation from a 
decision making perspective. This, in turn, has an impact on the organisations adaptive capacity and will be 
discussed in Section 5.2.3. 
These issues have been previously been identified in the literature.  Senge (1990) discusses the issue of 
shared vision, and the concept of ‘common caring’ and shared mental models for healthy organisations.  
Further, Senge talks of a group of learning disabilities that are fundamentally based on a lack of systems 
thinking for employees and organisations in general.  These include: 
1. ‘I am my position:’ just do your job, everything will be OK. 
2. the enemy is out there:’  Blame someone else 
3. the illusion of taking charge:’  shoot, then aim. 
Many of the difficulties in ensuring appropriate awareness of roles and responsibilities in an organisation 
centre on common or shared visions of the organisation and of the individual themselves (further discussed 
in Section 5.2.3.3 on organisational visions). 
The influence of the overall organisational culture has been suggested to have a direct impact on the 
awareness of roles and responsibilities.  Klein, Bigley and Roberts (1995) suggest that cultural belief 
patterns in high reliability organisations (HRO’s) are related to the attitudes of staff and ‘role perceptions 
such as whether one has clear or conflicting expectations about what is expected of him/her…’ (p 773).  
The authors also discuss several types of organisational cultures, one of which is particularly identifiable in 
the organisations of this study. 
Turner (1994) identifies that rigid hierarchies in organisations can lead to the stifling of information flow 
and potentially build up to crises during the disaster incubation period.  This, combined with other 
problems such as inadequate information being available to people who need to have the information, may 
be indicators of sloppy management as a precondition to disaster. 




5.2.1.2 Hazard and Consequence Awareness (SA 2) 
Some case study organisations had a good awareness of both the impacts and risks for some hazards. These 
were typically high profile potential events or events already experienced by the organisation, for example 
a major earthquake, the threat of influenza pandemic outbreak or a high intensity rainstorm or flood. 
Overall, however, there was a limited awareness of the range of hazards the organisations may be exposed 
to as well as the potential impacts of these events.  
‘Weaknesses…I guess that would be some sort of small system failure that we have not perceived.  I don't 
see any greater risks out there.’  Discussion of the range and type of hazards and risks that the organisation 
in question may be exposed to. 
Furthermore, there was also a poor understanding of how manageable these events could be. Even those 
organisations displaying the highest situation awareness tended to be reactionary in their dealing with 
crises, and this is partially a function of a lowered awareness of what threats and opportunity these events 
may present. One organisation, for example, when faced with the loss of telecommunications networks for 
a week claimed that they would simply shut up shop and go home with no discussion of what they would 
do once the service was restored. The awareness of high profile events was also limited for many 
organisations.  Earthquakes were particularly misunderstood in the case-study organisations;  
‘A major disaster for [this organisation] will be when the tsunami or earthquake comes to [town].  And we 
have no protection for that.  The soil we’re on will turn into liquid and I hope I’m flying on the day that 
happens’.  Comments about hazard impacts in one organisation. 
Those organisations that had experience of significant crises were very aware of the problems associated 
with any reoccurrence of these events. However, despite good planning in some instances, the planning was 
very event specific and there was little consideration of extending the planning to incorporate other events 
with similar consequences. 
Many of the organisations in this study had a good awareness of potential pandemic outbreaks and some 
had invested time in planning for such an event. Unfortunately none of these organisations had considered 
the long-term effects of large scale human resources shortages in such an event. Furthermore discussion of 
pandemic typically exposed a perception that pandemic is largely irrelevant as a potential threat. While 
some organisations had considered what the consequences might be if New Zealand's borders were closed 
few interviewees believed that this would actually happen.  Despite the high awareness and the wealth of 
information presented to these organisations in the recent past regarding planning for pandemic, little had 
been done by most case-study organisations. There were some exceptions; two organisations had pandemic 
plans in place, or were developing them. However, even decision makers in these organisations had not 
considered the applicability of their pandemic planning to other potential hazard events, or attempted to 
expand planning into an all-hazards approach. 
The holistic viewpoint of systems thinking is often quoted in the literature as the remedy for the problems 
identified in this study regarding awareness of hazards and their consequences.  Senge (1990) proposes that 
76 
 
systems thinking, as a way of seeing wholes, should form the framework from which organisational 
interdependencies are formed.  This includes seeing the complex interrelationships between cause and 
effect in all situations; a principle facet of such thinking is understanding that cause and effect are not 
always closely related in time. 
5.2.1.3 Connectivity Awareness (SA 3) 
Most of the organisations in this study had a good awareness and understanding of their immediate 
operating environment and the impacts of the loss of key customers, key suppliers and other critically 
linked organisations. However, an advanced awareness of their connectivity with the entire community of 
stakeholders was not widely observed. Several organisations claimed that they had a good understanding of 
the expectations and limitations of their stakeholders, but as the study progressed this understanding was 
shown to be more limited than anticipated. For example, some organisations highlighted that they have no 
ability to monitor customer's satisfaction, movement or demand, and have no substantial awareness of what 
might be expected by these customers in various types of crises. 
The awareness of internal stakeholders was also limited in most of the organisations. It appears that few 
organisations consider their staff as stakeholders, and as such the awareness of employee fears and 
expectations in a crisis are very poorly understood. Many of the larger organisations commented on the 
difficulties of informing and engaging staff in planning strategies for emergency management, particularly 
regarding pandemic (staff not wanting to know, decision makers not wanting to frighten staff unnecessarily 
etc). However, few of these organisations had made any effort to increasing the awareness of key decision 
makers about staff issues. Some exceptions included the use of staff engagement surveys (only in one 
organisation) and small size (number of employees). Additionally, one organisation was making an effort 
to engage with staff by making them responsible for planning and business continuity in individual offices. 
However on the other hand, some key decision makers in another organisation viewed staff as a potential 
liability in a crisis.  
‘…it’s too early to engage in a lot of planning and preparation because we [owners] don’t want to scare 
the staff and customers…’comments from the owners of one organisation regarding the perceptions of staff 
about emergency planning. 
Seeing the whole picture is critical for organisations that wish to understand these complex connections.  
Again, an awareness of the systemic nature of organisations (both internally and as part of a wider, global 
network of organisations), is a fundamental skill for the resilient organisation.  As Senge (1990) explains, 
organisations must remember the principle of the system boundary; it is acceptable to see and understand 
the individual parts of the system, but it is unsustainable without a clear understanding of the integrity of 
the whole system.   
5.2.1.4 Insurance Awareness (SA 4) 
The knowledge of levels of business interruption insurance and availability of other insurance products 
varied considerably in the case study organisations.  In most organisations this knowledge only extended to 
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an assumption that there was some level of coverage, but few knew any details of what this involved.  Most 
participants in this study assumed that business interruption insurance would be immediately accessible 
following a crisis, and also that it would provide adequate coverage for the duration of the event and 
expected recovery. After discussions during interviews and REDS some participants commented that the 
current levels of coverage would be inadequate to cover the duration of several types of events. In addition, 
there is a general lack of awareness of the expected availability of damage assessors and other professionals 
to process insurance claims in a large scale physical event.   
‘I think it's [business continuity insurance] either 18 months or two years, from memory.  We have a 
certain amount of self cover, which is just a pragmatic approach because we can afford to cover up to an 
excess level...I’m not sure what that is now’.  Discussion in one large organisation about the need for, and 
coverage of, business continuity insurance. 
The levels of awareness regarding insurance, particularly in relation to disaster recovery or business 
interruption have been identified by researchers previously.  For example, in their study of the 1993 
Northridge earthquake, Tierney and Dahlhamer (1997) discovered that very few businesses affected by the 
earthquake actually had any insurance coverage for either physical damage or business interruption.  While, 
in New Zealand EQC coverage would be a factor, few of the organisations in this study seemed to have a 
clear understanding of what such insurance would cover or exclude.   
5.2.1.5 Recovery Priorities (SA 5) 
‘It's a dynamic thing.  I don't think it's fair to say that you actually recover back to where you were because 
things don’t stay the same.  So you have to look at, you can't measure recovery in terms of time or in terms 
of events even.  You have to look at it in terms of the mental well being and attitude of the group.  If you say 
that someone is back living and enjoying life again and have put the event behind them and I would say 
that that defines recovery.’ A senior manager discussing what recovery means for this organisation and the 
priorities that stem from that understanding. 
Another important component in situation awareness is the level of understanding about minimum business 
requirements and organisational recovery priorities. All of the organisations in this study had a limited 
awareness of what might be required of them in a large scale, long duration, or extensive disaster. Several 
of the case studies were very introspective and had little awareness of the ability of other organisations to 
meet their needs.  These same organisations had a poor perception of the importance of their own needs 
over the needs of others in the wider community; organisations or individuals.  Tierney and Dahlhamer 
(1997) identified, in a study of business recovery and losses from the 1993 Northridge earthquake that 
business planning relied heavily on protection of specific business locations rather than identifying and 
planning for problems that originated offsite; for example, lifeline failures. 
While most of the case studies seemed to have a clear understanding of their business priorities during day-
to-day operations, this was not apparent from a crisis perspective. Only one organisation clearly identified 
its key response and recovery priorities and the relationship with business continuity. In contrast, another 
organisation was unable to identify key recovery priorities and the organisation did not have a clear idea of 
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minimum operating requirements following a crisis. This was true for most of the organisations. 
Interestingly, for some organisations in this study, there was an assumption that these key priorities were 
well known, particularly among the executive or senior management teams. However, during the REDS, it 
became clear that these priorities were common knowledge only for individual departments and not the 
organisation as a whole. 
‘During the workshop it became apparent to participants that [the organisation] has limited knowledge 
regarding the prioritisation of services to customers; the identification of clients that can cope with a loss 
of services for extended periods of time and those which cannot.  Currently if [the organisation] were faced 
with the partial restoration of services to customers, the organisation has no systems in place to do this 
task effectively.’  Comment from the final, post REDS report to one organisation regarding recovery 
priorities. 
Researchers have identified the problems that organisations face in terms of recovery, particularly if the 
event(s) that they experience substantially disrupt business operations (Webb, Tierney and Dalhamer, 2003; 
Tierney and Webb, 2001). 
5.2.2 Keystone Vulnerabilities: Identification and Management 
This section discusses common issues surrounding the identification and management of keystone 
vulnerabilities and their impact on overall organisational resilience. Keystone vulnerabilities are those 
components of an organisational system that have the potential to cause the greatest negative impact, either 
catastrophically or insidiously. The following discussion divides keystone vulnerabilities up into a set of 
five indicators as described below. 
5.2.2.1 Planning Strategies (KV 1) 
‘Interviewer:  Is the problem lack of vision, or lack of ability to implement it? 
Interviewee:  Both!  We are not wild enough in the [area of innovation].  There is lots of risk…we are not 
good at that…we plan things to death’.  Middle manager from one organisation commenting on support for 
innovation in the organisation. 
Several of the organisations in this study have ongoing risk identification processes and have engaged in 
some emergency and recovery planning. These are typically the largest organisations in terms of employee 
numbers and often have the backing or driving force of a parent company, or even other organisations 
within the industry. Often when the planning process is directed by (but not performed by) the parent 
company it is considered to only have partial relevance to the organisation at a local level. As highlighted 
in Section 5.2.1.2 above, often planning centres on a small number of specific events or risks. Only one 
organisation claimed that it was attempting an all-hazards approach with its planning strategies, but even in 
this organisation evidence suggested that the focus was on a small number of specific events.  One of the 




‘You are much more likely to get buy-in [in the risk management process] if you have got a strong 
community and [then] anything you want to change or progress [is possible]’.  Risk manager comments on 
planning. 
There appeared to be a handful of drivers for organisations in terms of risk management and planning. 
• One case-study organisation indicated that it was engaging in business continuity planning because of 
insurance company demands. This business was enthusiastic about creating a business continuity plan 
in order to potentially reduce its business interruption insurance premiums.  However there were 
significant reservations in the organisation about the effectiveness of this as a driver. 
• In several organisations the increasing awareness of pandemic proved a clear driver for planning. 
However, as previously mentioned, this planning was specifically for pandemic, and not extended to 
include other related hazards or similar hazards at a variety of scales. Directives from other linked 
organisations or from the parent company were also identified as drivers for planning. 
• Some of the organisations in this study have a mutual working relationship for day-to-day operations, 
and thus the planning strategies of one organisation have the potential to impact on the other. Also, the 
parent company or group has an influence on the implementation of risk management and other 
planning strategies. Again, there are concerns that the lack of an internal driver for planning has a 
negative impact on the enthusiasm for the planning process as well as engagement with all stakeholders. 
The vision of what an emergency plan or business continuity plan should consist of was also a contentious 
issue in this study.  One organisation highlighted this problem with a significant number of key decision 
makers expecting a plan to be a 'magic box' with all the answers and which would spell out all required 
actions for all hazards. Others indicated that the plan should be little more than a collection of key contact 
details and some basic procedures for staff from a health and safety perspective. Typically the problems 
arose when different decision makers in the one organisation had a different vision of the plan and planning 
process. 
‘…we haven’t worked through the process enough yet and we don’t have firm plans in place yet and we 
don’t have that ‘locked box’ of instruction and the manual of basically what we are going to do [in a 
crisis].’  Senior manager in one organisation discussing his expectations of crisis planning. 
‘…all the [emergency] plans should mirror what you would do naturally.’  Senior manager commenting on 
the strengths and weaknesses of the organisation’s existing planning. 
‘I don't even know if this [organisation] has anywhere a list of cell phone numbers that may be needed’.  
Discussion in one organisation talking about the extent of knowledge of the organisation’s emergency 
planning strategies. 
5.2.2.2 Exercises (KV 2) 
Participation in exercises for emergency management is typically restricted in most of the study 
organisations to fire evacuation drills on a regular (6-12monthly) basis. However, for some of the 
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organisations in this study, participation in either in-house or externally managed exercises is a regular part 
of the planning process. During this study the researcher was able to observe three of the case-study 
organisations in independent exercises. Two organisations participated in an exercise at a regional scale 
and another ran its own in-house exercise during the interview phase of the study. The value of exercises 
for emergency management and business recovery is perceived differently by different people and 
organisations in this study.  
‘This year we ran a crisis scenario in the business, so now have procedures around a crisis room, tools 
available, who you call…and one has actually been run.  Network computers were crashed…that was the 
first time we did that one…I can see us doing more of that…Its mind expanding and mentally prepares you 
for what might occur’.  Comments from a general manager in one organisation after participating in an in-
house crisis exercise. 
Exercises, in the form of REDS, were an integral part of this research, and engagement of organisations 
was often difficult to secure. Overall, organisations claimed that a major barrier to exercising plans was the 
availability of appropriate staff, as well as an unwillingness to have any impact on day-to-day business, 
albeit short-term. 
One organisation expressed a significant reluctance to exercise claiming that it was not confident in the 
ability of its plan to meet the demands of the exercise. Another organisation claimed that its experience in 
real world events meant that it did not have to exercise. This organisation was very focused on previous 
experiences, and was largely unaware of the benefits that could be gained taking these experiences into 
their planning processes. The danger for this case-study was that without exercises, positive lessons from 
the past would not be transferred to future event management, or to new staff and stakeholders. 
‘The preparation was good… in terms of preparations we were very well-prepared.  We had had exercises 
in emergency situations, and I must say that the exercises were completely different to what the event…to 
how you work in the event.’  A senior manager from one organisation commenting on the differences 
between exercises held and actual performance during a real event. 
The value of exercises in organisations is debated in the literature.  Coming from the perspective of the 
learning organisation the team’s ability to work together seamlessly is critical to success.  Senge (1990) 
supports the view that teams cannot rely upon talent and a shared vision of the organisation and the future; 
they must be confident of how to act in a given situation and, equally importantly, of how the other 
members of the team are going to act.  A fundamental way to achieve this type of alignment between team 
members, as well as between teams within an organisation, is to ‘practice’.  Senge advocates the doctrine of 
practicing dealing with situations within a controlled environment to ensure that learning is possible. 
5.2.2.3 Capability and Capacity of Internal Resources (KV 3) 
The following discussion about internal resources is subdivided into three component; physical resources, 
human resources and process resources. Physical resources include buildings and other structures, internal 
services and critical contents and equipment. Human resources involve the capability and capacity of 
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employees in the organisation. Process resources include the capability and capacity of economic and 
administrative resources. 
Buildings and Structures 
A substantial proportion of case-study organisations had no planning in place for alternative office space. 
Most had made significant assumptions regarding the continuation of critical services, and also had high 
expectations about their ability to work remotely in a crisis. Additionally all of the organisations had not 
considered limitations on the availability of external trades-people and professionals to assist in rebuilding 
following a crisis. While some organisations had made significant efforts towards ensuring that their 
chosen emergency operations centres were well equipped, there were some potentially disastrous omissions 
or assumptions made. Many of these related to the availability of essential services (water, electricity, 
telecommunications etc) for these operations centres. 
‘We've had it [a generator] for a while, but the Auckland power crisis made people think that much harder 
about not having power.  A lot of people put in generators at that time, but have gone back to the old 
habits.’  Observations from a general manager about the perceptions of backup generators in organisations. 
A critical point is organisational understanding of the co-dependencies that exist regarding internal 
services, of which few of the organisations were fully aware. Information technology is a case in point. 
Several organisations had identified the potential for failure of critical information systems, and had chosen 
to create backup systems, some even in different cities. However the impact of the loss of electricity for 
these technology services was not widely recognised. While some of the organisations had purchased diesel 
generators to provide continued electricity for some key functions only a few people knew which functions 
these were. Interestingly, some of the smallest organisations in this study had generators compared to larger 
organisations. 
‘So things were dropping off line and make life interesting the water ran over and flooded the telephone 
exchange, close to [nearest city].  So that cut us off and we lost a line going at the other stream.  So 
effectively, we got cut off in the communications sense, because of water taking out some telephone lines 
and overuse of the system on the battery power.  Telecom did a reasonable job of getting batteries in 
helicopters backup to the exchanges to get things going on, we didn't lose communications for a long 
period of time, but it was a critical period of time and critical period in the event.’  Discussion about the 
problems an organisation encountered with a recent crisis event and essential services. 
Human Resources and Succession 
The importance of human resources is highly regarded by all of the case study organisations. However, 
many of these organisations do not have a full appreciation for how difficult it may be to engage, retain, 
recruit or support staff in the aftermath of a crisis.  Most of the organisations had considered the pandemic 
scenario prior to their participation in this study and some had engaged in specific planning for pandemic.  
However, few of these organisations had a full understanding of the extent of the potential human resources 
shortage, or the duration over which this might be a problem. Further, other types of crises were largely 
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overlooked from a human resources perspective. For most organisations, the loss of human resources 
would probably be the result of death, injury or mental trauma in the aftermath of a physical emergency, for 
example an earthquake, a fire or an explosion. The impacts on staff as a result of reputation impacts (fraud, 
health and safety problems, legal proceedings) were typically not regarded by any of the organisations 
other than in passing. This limited the levels of engagement with staff, and potentially has negative impacts 
for the organisation in communicating with staff in a crisis. 
The issue of an ageing workforce and a workforce that is increasingly unwilling to do manual work is also 
a problem for some organisations. This was highlighted by the recruiting staff issues. There were also 
problems identified with inconsistent drug and alcohol policies for recruiting new staff across industries; 
some organisations in an industry may have more lenient policies and make recruitment difficult for other 
organisations in that industry. 
‘We have problems were getting all the staff that we want…Getting the experience and all that.  We've had 
a shortage now for about two years.  So we've got enough.  Well, we get by with what we have, but we 
could do with more.  So, if those people became incapacitated we would be struggling.’  Problems with 
human resources identified by one organisation considering day-to-day operations; problems exacerbated 
in a crisis. 
Succession of staff from an emergency management perspective was shown to be a significant issue. One 
organisation has already been through the trauma of a major event and identified the problems associated 
with not having a roster system in place for emergency staff but had not put any structure in place to 
remedy this situation. Some of the organisations have clearly identified successors for key senior staff and 
decision makers, even if this has not been translated into a formal planning process. Two organisations 
favour identifying the most appropriate people for an emergency situation based on the nature of the event. 
However this technique was not observed during the REDS for one of these organisations. Often some of 
the most important individuals for crisis management are those who have a vast or critical knowledge and 
these people are typically not included in any succession planning. Mentoring is often disregarded because 
of the availability of suitable staff, and the economics of having two or more people learning the same job.  
Researchers and practitioners alike have identified this dichotomy in business planning.  The most valuable 
resource that any organisation has at its disposal is the knowledge held by the employees and yet no 
organisation can afford to build redundancy in this knowledge base by employing additional staff, just in 
case of a disaster (Sheffi, 2001).  Therefore the field of knowledge management and human relations 
management is a pivotal area of organisational planning and learning (McCann, 2004). 
There are also issues related to the strategic vision of an organisation and the succession of staff in a crisis, 
particularly at a decision making level.  During the exercise with one particular organisation staff were very 
reluctant to express their strategic objectives for the emergency response.  The main reason was because 
decision makers have not comprehensively considered the impacts and extent of larger scale crises or the 
amount of staff that may be required to ensure adequate continuation of services. 
Very few of the organisations in this study had considered that crises may occur coincidently with a need to 
continue business-as-usual and what this might mean from a human resources perspective.  During the 
83 
 
debriefing with one organisation, the designated emergency controller expressed his surprise at how many 
people were needed in the emergency operations centre to ensure the smooth management of the event. 
Typically the organisations in this study were unprepared for the demands placed on staff in a crisis, and 
for the numbers of staff that may be required as well as where additional staff may be sourced from. 
Process Resources 
The standardisation of systems and procedures for organisations is a resilience issue together with the 
amount of economic and financial support available in a crisis. The creation of systems and procedures that 
extend across an organisation are typically seen as favourable.  For example, Sheffi (2001) stresses that 
critical processes should be documented and such documents are readily available to all members of an 
organisation as they are critical to any sort of preparedness training.  Further, he states that the 
standardisation of business processes and practices throughout an entire organisation, regardless of how big 
or small, is an essential tool in creating redundancy and ensuring the organisation can recover quickly from 
disasters. However, in this study some organisations that did have these standardised processes available 
chose not to use them or decision makers were divided about the applicability of the systems and 
procedures because they were developed by a parent, or other linked, company. In contrast, organisations 
that did have effective, well communicated and flexible systems and procedures that extended through and 
were understood by the entire organisations were typically better equipped for crisis than those that did not. 
‘We have to do things were we are seen to be supportive of the broader organisation...we do NOT have 
these [necessary] systems and we will build things around those systems…and until someone can do that, 
we will not be able to achieve our objectives.  Accountability and the freedom to achieve the vision without 
having to toe a line that doesn’t reflect the vision…It’s about not being encumbered.’  Discussion in a 
business unit of the systems and procedures imposed by the parent organisation. 
The organisations financial position, its economic stability and that of any relevant parent or governing 
organisation were identified as significant strengths. Those organisations that had no debt, a large balance 
sheet, or the availability of large amounts of money in a relatively short period were often more flexible 
and creative with their decision making processes. However, there were some notable exceptions where an 
organisation's assumption of the resources available to it seems to foster an air of complacency in decision 
making during a crisis. 
‘…our first task was to fix the problem, then later on we think about responsibility.  Comes down to the 
large balance sheet…we don’t have to worry about the cost.  We got started and found more cost effective 
ways as we went.  That’s from the luxury of a large balance sheet…some companies, even if they want to, 
can’t do that.’  Discussion of the approach taken to solving problems during crises and the advantages of 
an organisation’s favourable financial position. 
The concept of an organisations pre-disaster financial condition as an indicator of post-disaster survival has 
been well documented (Dalhamer and Tierney, 1996; Alesch and Holly, 1998).  For example Durkin 
(1984), in a study of businesses that experienced the 1983 Coalinga Earthquake, found that those 
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organisations which were ‘marginal or in financial trouble’ before the earthquake, were slow to recover, if 
at all. 
5.2.2.4 Capability and Capacity of External Resources (KV 4) 
The capability and capacity of external resources highlight concerns for organisations.  The development of 
systems and protocols to reduce these vulnerabilities is very much related to the organisations awareness of 
its role and its connectivity with key stakeholders. It is also related to an organisations overall recovery 
priorities as well as the limitations and expectations of linked organisations.  There is a considerable body 
of literature available that focuses on supply chain management and disruption or crisis situations.  For 
example, Sheffi (2001) discusses the issues facing supply chains and organisational systems and procedures 
following the 2001 terrorist attacks in the USA.  He identifies four challenges to organisations in the wake 
of these attacks; the ability to prepare for further attacks (or the next disaster), managing supply chains 
under a cloud of increasing uncertainty, managing the private/public organisational relationships and the 
challenges facing organisations and their cultures internally.   
The following discussion focuses on the expected availability of external resources for the case-study 
organisations and the degree of preparation for the loss of external services and supplies/equipment. 
External Assistance 
The organisations all appeared to have expectations of emergency services, government agencies and Civil 
Defence that are disproportionate with the support these organisations could reasonably offer, particularly 
in a large scale emergency. Many organisations do not have an accurate vision of their own importance in 
the community and expect that support would be immediately available; extra staff, water supplies, 
builders, insurance assessors.  There was little or no consideration that other organisations would be seen as 
more important from both a response and recovery perspective in a large scale event. There was one 
significant exception to this; one organisation viewed itself as a critical lifeline and was attempting to 
engage with critically linked external organisations. However, this view was not necessarily supported by 
these organisations.  An organisation’s ability (or inability) to clearly see its place in the supply chain is a 
critical aspect of these observations.  Sheffi (2001) clearly identifies that in post 9/11 America 
organisations need to realise that their long term fate rests not on their own performances alone, but is 
intrinsically intertwined with their supplier’s, customer’s and even their competitor’s performance, 
particularly in crisis situations. 
‘…but in the immediate aftermath of a major earthquake we’re not on the high list of what people are 
worried about…they’re going to be worried about the essential services, and we will be down the track, but 
down the track we’re certainly going to have to do it [recovery] and we’ve got no business continuity 
planning [currently in place]’.  Discussion of one organisation’s role in the community, particularly 





Electricity was the critical service that all organisations were acutely aware of as a keystone vulnerability, 
closely followed by telecommunications and information technology services.  International studies have 
shown the importance of lifeline services, electricity in particular, for organisational survival.  Tierney and 
Nigg (1995) report that 55% of businesses in their survey in Des Moines consider electricity to be the most 
critical of lifeline services and 82% viewed electricity as ‘very important’ to continued operations of a 
business.  Transportation was considered a vital service for some types of events for all case study 
organisations, and from a recovery perspective water and sewerage services were critical. However, many 
of the organisations in this study did not have a full awareness of what the loss of these services might 
mean to continued operations. Therefore they did not adequately plan for either the loss of services or for 
continued operations once services were restored. Several organisations had considered or purchased 
backup generators to ensure the continuation of electrical supply to key parts of the business. One 
organisation claimed that it was too difficult to get resource consent and other permits to install a generator, 
and that the cost of this process was prohibitive.  
‘A while ago I identified a backup power supply that wasn’t too expensive.  Finance rejected it because we 
haven’t had a problem before so it wasn’t worth spending the money so we don’t have a backup power 
supply’.  Senior Manager discussing the problems encountered in convincing other decision makers that a 
backup power supply was important. 
Other organisations with generators identified that the availability of fuel to run the generator was critical.  
There was no formal planning for continuation of fuel supply by any of the organisations in this study. 
Most organisations with generators had partially tested their generators, but there was a significant amount 
of disagreement within most of these organisations regarding what the generators were actually providing 
power for.  In a survey of the businesses in Auckland and Christchurch in New Zealand (Stephenson, 2007) 
identified that 46% of organisations in fast moving consumer goods and 32% of businesses in the Auckland 
electricity crisis in the construction industry had reserve power systems in place.  However only 8% of 
manufacturing businesses in the same survey had reserve systems. 
A key problem for organisations in planning for service outages is the perception that they cannot control 
when they happen or their duration. This appears to encourage a climate of disempowerment in 
organisations regarding planning for service outages which extends through to limited planning for the 
return of services to the organisation.  The lack of planning therefore is heavily influenced by the 
organisations awareness of the severity of the event and a tendency for limited strategic thinking and a 
'fighting fires' approach to emergency management planning. 
Supply Network 
The degree to which organisations plan for continued supply of essential goods and services is also 
identified as a significant keystone vulnerability issue.  Only one organisation had approached its most 
critical suppliers and attempted to establish preferential supply in a crisis situation. This same organisation 
also had well established and ongoing relationships with a communications consultant for media 
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management in a crisis.  Some organisations identified that their most important suppliers and consultants 
were likely to be limited in their ability to provide support in a crisis, but these organisations had made no 
steps to ensuring the services of alternative organisations, or establishing preferential service agreements.   
‘We are dependant on a number of specific suppliers and in some cases products that they provide to us 
are unique to us so we can’t get them from anywhere else’.  Manager from one of the organisations 
discussing the limitations of the supply chain. 
Most organisations in this study believed that their day-to-day relationships with critically linked 
organisations (including customers and competitors) were excellent and that this would be enough to 
ensure a continuation of expected levels of service and communications in a crisis.  Sheffi (2001) identified 
this as being a potentially critical issue for organisations in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks stating that 
‘clearly, suppliers are likely to allocate products first to customers with whom they have long-term 
relationships, giving this type of relationship added value in the new environment’ (p2).  None of the 
organisations in this study had considered in any detail the problems associated with a large scale crisis; for 
example, the availability of builders, plumbers and electricians or the availability of damage assessors for 
insurance in a large scale regional wide earthquake.  The problems for organisations dealing with supply 
chain crises are covered extensively in the literature (see Khan and Burnes, 2007 for an overview).  Senge 
(2006) uses the global food market as a case-study of the supply chain network and discusses the need for 
individual organisations to begin looking at the system wide issues, rather than coming from a singular 
perspective.  Practically speaking, however, the tools available to organisations to manage their risks from 
the supply chain network are limited and untested (Khan and Burnes, 2007) making this an area of 
significant vulnerability for all organisations. 
5.2.2.5 Organisational Connectivity (KV 5) 
Some organisations seemed to have excellent relationships and a good understanding of the connectivity to 
other critical organisations in day-to-day operations.  However, there was significantly less thought put into 
how to maintain these relationships in a crisis. Connectivity awareness is discussed in Section 5.2.1.3 and 
the following discussion echoes many of the sentiments expressed there.  Even with a clear understanding 
of the relationships between contractors, suppliers, consultants and staff, for example, very few 
organisations had actually formally (or even semi-formally) engaged in planning to address these issues. 
As previously mentioned most organisations in this study believed that their day-to-day connections would 
be the same ones they would need in a crisis. Only one organisation had considered a different perspective 
and was actively approaching emergency management agencies to establish contact. Some other 
organisations had ongoing relationships with these organisations due to regular participation in multi-
organisational exercises or because of their role in the community. Those organisations that viewed their 
contribution to society as being critical to emergency response and/or recovery typically had endeavoured 
to establish emergency relationships with key response organisations like Civil Defence. 
This phenomenon has been discussed by several authors.  For example Turner (1994) discusses the 
problem of ‘groupthink’ as a cause of sloppy management and disaster generation.  The ‘blinkered, 
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unrealistic view’ that senior managers have of their own organisations can contribute to inadequate 
management of potentially dangerous situations.  The influence of groupthink on not just events but also on 
staff can create a situation where the decision makers in an organisation ignore or overrule warnings from 
outside their organisation.  If groupthink can have such significant influence over an organisation’s 
perceptions of its own operations, then perhaps it is foreseeable that groupthink can also influence an 
organisations perceptions of other linked organisations in its sphere of operations. 
‘Interviewer:  The uncertainty you talk about, where does that uncertainty stem from? 
Interviewee:  I’m not worried about the leadership team.  They guide us.  [You] let us know what hill you 
want, we capture it and we report progress…I expect visibility and stability…at the moment they 
[leadership team] aren’t delivering that.  I need strategic direction.  We are getting it but it’s not clear or 
consistent; it’s confused.  So I just go where I want until someone stops me….providing it’s not too far to 
the left or the right’.  Middle manager in a business unit discussing the problems with internal and external 
connectivity. 
Many of the strategies employed to ensure effective connectivity with external stakeholders are also 
discussed in Section 5.2.3.2; communications and relationships. 
5.2.3 Adaptive Capacity 
Adaptive capacity includes the elements that make up the culture of an organisation and that allow it to 
make decisions in both a timely and appropriate manner in a crisis and to identify and maximise 
opportunities. The indicators of adaptive capacity identified in this study are discussed below. 
5.2.3.1 Silo Mentality (AC1) 
The concept of silo mentality is not new. It has been widely recognised in the literature (for example see 
Gill, (2006), Davidson, (2005), and Hasanali, (2002)) and in organisations often represents a decentralised 
structure, an individualistic approach to achieving goals, and a limited understanding of the overall vision 
of the organisation. Typically, silo mentality is viewed as a feature of organisations that experience 
considerable growth (Cote, 2002), but in this study, silo mentality was observed in all of the case-studies 
irrespective of their size.  The field of knowledge management has contributed significant advances on 
understanding the causes of silo mentality.  Researchers in knowledge management recognise that the 
culture, organisational infrastructure and creativity all contribute to reducing silo mentality (Goh, 2002, 
Nonaka, 1994, Senge 1990).  Another considerable factor in the development of silo mentality for 
organisations is the ability of groups of people, as well as individuals, to see the bigger picture, and relate 
this to the overall organisational vision (Senge, 1990).  These ‘mental models’ often serve to tie people, and 
organisations as a whole, into a pattern of behaviour that can be destructive. 
‘I don’t think we are too silo like…Head Office people do need to get out of Head Office though…they 
don’t appreciate that getting out to the regions and sites, that’s when we really get some traction.  Working 
away here [in isolation], that may be related to us, but that would lead to more silo mentality.  But [the 
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organisation’s] policies around travel are adequate to allow people to get out and about…’  Senior 
manager talking about their perceptions of internal silo mentality in their organisation. 
Another feature of silo mentality appears to be related to Groupthink.  Several of the organisations in this 
study exhibited varying degrees of this kind of thinking that may have influenced, in part, the levels of silo 
mentality.  One of the most important factors in the development of groupthink in an organisation is 
cohesiveness (Janis, 1982); where the closer the members of the group are, the less likely they are to raise 
questions and issues that will challenge the thinking of the group.  However, traditional thinking states that 
groupthink will not eventuate from a cohesive group unless specific situations occur: 
• Structural issues and deficiencies in the organisation including overbearing leadership, isolation and 
insulation of group members and a lack of normative processes, or 
• Situations where there is high stress present from external threats, problems relating to decision making 
and recent organisational failures. 
The incidence of silo mentality in organisations was not unexpected. However, the degree to which silo 
mentality appears to underpin many critical aspects of organisational resilience was a significant feature of 
this study. The occurrence of silo mentality is something that organisations are both unable and unwilling 
to remove. It is an intrinsic feature of the autonomous decision making structures that feature in modern 
organisations, and is important for ensuring loyalty and pride, as well as competition, into an organisational 
framework.  
I don’t work for [parent organisation]; I work for [business unit].’  Senior manager in one business unit 
talking about the loyalty that they, and many other staff, feel for their part of the organisation rather than 
identifying with the larger organisation as a whole. 
However, the negative aspects of silo mentality appear to be poorly identified and largely misunderstood by 
the organisations in this study. These effects include: 
• Poor knowledge of roles and responsibilities of others in the organisation (Section 5.2.1.1),  
• poorly understood and utilised communications pathways (Section 5.2.3.2),  
• destructive and detrimental relationships developing both internally and externally (Section 5.2.3.2),  
• non-transparent governance and decision making structures (Section 5.2.3.5), and  
• low levels of trust and loyalty from staff and others. 
‘…certainly my perception is that there is a bit of a silo approach out there at the moment… people 
perceive that they work in the [department] rather than [the organisation] as a whole…and I think that's a 
shame and we have to be very careful about that, because one of the things strategically…staff in the 
[departments] are not doing the same thing.  Some pieces might work but some of them are either 
contradictory to other [departments] or not in line with what the [organisations] procedures are perceived 
to be’.  Comments from the risk manager in one organisation dealing with the perceptions in a number of 
different business units within the organisation. 
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It is important therefore to realise the impact of silo mentality on the overall resilience for organisations.  
For example, one organisation had identified the negative impacts that silo mentality was having on staff 
and on the overall work environment. Decision makers chose to address this at executive levels, hoping that 
the positive spin-offs would filter down to other levels in the organisation. This approach was not 
apparently successful and the negative effects of silo mentality were having a profound impact. Other 
organisations claimed that silo mentality had no great influence on operations and on decision making. 
However, the symptoms of negative silo mentality were evident, particularly during the REDS and other 
crisis exercises. These manifested in an observed lack of respectful communications, poorly understood 
roles and responsibilities, unrealistic expectations of key stakeholders, to name a few. 
‘…at the macro level there is a thing called [specific term that employees in this unit use to identify 
themselves]…that’s a big silo…the people in [the parent organisation] don’t know about this thing.  There 
is a distinct disconnect between the two as they are two different businesses’.  An executive manager in a 
large business unit highlighting the gaps between knowledge in the business unit and within the parent 
company. 
‘I inherited a leadership team that did operate from a silo basis.  If you look at my leadership team it is 
very open plan office, there’s only one person that has an office at this business.  But that did not break 
down silos.  Sales ran sales, marketing ran marketing and IT ran IT.  Much friction was a result of people 
not working together and not communicating.  I have worked hard to break those silos down because silos 
like marketing and sales must work close together and marketing and IT.  People would ask me if this is a 
sales lead organisation or marketing lead and I would say why does that matter?  I don't think that's 
important.  I have worked with my leadership team, many of who I have changed now.  Inside of the culture 
was a silo mentality…they had lived that for a long time.  If you don't have that team environment at the 
leadership level you will never get it working down beneath the organisation… one of the core dysfunctions 
was that people didn't trust each other.  Unless you can build trust at the leadership level you will never get 
rid of some of that silo mentality.  We’re on a journey.  We are nowhere near where we need to be’.  Senior 
decision maker discussing his perceptions of silo mentality in the organisation. 
5.2.3.2 Communications and Relationships (AC2) 
As mentioned in Section 5.2.3.1 above, the effectiveness of communications and relationships in an 
organisation is somewhat dependent on the negative aspects of silo mentality. The importance of creating 
effective communications pathways based on mutually respectful relationships is apparent to all 
organisations in this study.  
‘Lot of travel, phone calls…keeping communication channels open.  Key people get out to site a lot; 
possibly need to do so a bit more.  Press the flesh, names to faces… [it] makes telephone conversations 
more effective’.  General Manager of one site in a large organisation, distant from the organisation’s head 
office location. 
However, while most of the organisations recognise that these communications and relationships issues are 
a problem, the full extent of their potential impact on the organisation in a crisis is largely unrecognised. 
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There were some exceptions, mainly those organisations that experience small scale crises on a relatively 
regular basis but even these organisations had a limited understanding of the potential impact in a large 
scale emergency. 
Internal communications and relationships internally were viewed as problematic, particularly for general 
staff seeking to communicate upwards in the organisation. Typically, between senior and executive staff, 
communications and relationships were viewed as healthy and effective. These senior staff also viewed 
their communications to general staff as effective.  Those that did recognise problems in communication 
strategies at different levels of the organisation were doing very little to encourage engagement and ensure 
a better understanding of staff expectations and limitations. One exception was observed. The senior 
decision makers in this organisation clearly understood the need to engage with the general staff, and were 
endeavouring to break down the silo mentality perceived as a barrier to effective communications. One way 
to achieve this was to ensure staff at all levels in the organisation had breaks in the same cafeteria.  A 
previous arrangement of one cafeteria for general staff and one for administrative staff was viewed 
negatively by most in the organisation.  Therefore, a larger single café was being built to accommodate all 
staff on site. This was seen as a key action to improve relationships, enhance communications and begin to 
break down the negative impacts of silo mentality. 
‘…while crises are going on, we have a meeting once a day at least…it’s not one person calling the 
shots…and this time [CEO] not directly involved.  He was informed and invited to comment and he is 
aware of what’s going on.  Recognising the different roles that we all play and making those decisions and 
for the most part it seems to work.  We have a mature group despite some of the ages…’  Senior Manager 
discussing how crisis communications work, and have evolved in the organisation. 
This type of phenomena has been comprehensively observed in other organisations.  For example Perrow 
(1999) discusses the concept of ‘incomprehensibility’; a situation whereby communications between the 
top and the bottom of an organisational hierarchy are limited.  The ‘top dogs’ have very little or no real 
information about a particular situation while those at the bottom of the hierarchy only have protocols, the 
last orders given and their own instinct and intuition to deal with the same situation. 
The influence of a clear awareness of roles and responsibilities in an organisation is also a substantial 
influence on the development of effective communications and relationships. Several organisations in this 
study had offices and sites distributed throughout New Zealand and internationally.  In several instances, 
staff do not move between offices and therefore an understanding of the key issues, roles and 
responsibilities for different sites is limited. From a communications perspective, and more specifically 
from an emergency management perspective, this has a negative impact on organisational resilience. 
Further, this barrier to resilience is not limited to geographically distributed offices; it is also an observable 
feature between departments in some organisations. One organisation offered a clear example of this issue. 
Employees in different parts of the organisation had developed communications strategies and established 
clear relationships internally, but had great difficulty in communicating across groups. The main reason 
behind this problem was silo mentality, but also because there were no common or reciprocal strategies 
linking groups in the organisation.  The systems that were in place were either misunderstood or mistrusted 
by staff. Employees were not confident that their communications needs would be met by these systems. 
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Thus, independent systems had developed, further isolating groups in the organisation from other groups 
and perpetuating silo mentality.  Another organisation also illustrates this problem.  Strategies for 
emergency management were well established in one department (information technology) but these were 
not communicated throughout the organisation. Therefore, valuable management strategies were not being 
utilised as effectively as possible across the organisation. Additionally, staff outside the IT department had 
little knowledge of the communications pathways within, reducing their ability to interact with staff in this 
department. 
‘Information sharing is something that happens quite well, in general, but there it is still in silos in some 
areas.  Definitely silos in some places.  Communications?  [CEO] states that he doesn’t believe you should 
communicate!  But communications at a one-on-one level work very well.  But we don’t communicate from 
corporate level as a leadership team as [well as] other companies do…so the feedback is that we don’t 
always communicate well with our directions [to other staff].’  Senior manager in one organisation 
discussing the problems associated with internal communications and information sharing in the 
organisation. 
The phenomenon of ‘groupthink’ is an important consideration.  Although the term is originally attributed 
to Whyte (1952), considerable work has since been done by Janis (1972, 1982); groupthink is ‘a mode of 
thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group, when the members’ 
strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise alternative courses of action’.  
Turner (1994) also discusses the problem of communications in an organisational setting.  He claims that 
while failures in communications are likely to contribute to almost all disasters, these failures are almost 
endemic in organisations; that most organisations actually operate with a degraded communications system 
as the norm (after Weir, 1991). 
Clearly there is a link between effective communications pathways, respectful relationship development 
and the ability to acquire, transfer and retain critical information in a crisis. Most of the organisations had 
difficulty in addressing this problem. Effective information acquisition and transfer in a crisis is vital, but 
can only be effective if all employees appreciate who will need what information, in what type of format, 
and in an appropriate time frame. In the absence of clearly defined and efficient communications pathways 
most of the organisations in this study struggled with the successful flow of information in a crisis 
situation. Some of the case study organisations were working towards addressing this problem however. 
One strategy being used to minimise the negative effects of silo mentality on communications and 
information flow was to encourage a more personal approach to communications; one organisation is 
actually quite dismissive of email communications. These case-study organisations generally have a wide 
distribution of offices and sites throughout New Zealand, and their senior staff members travel extensively 
to ensure that personal contact and communications are made. 
Communications and relationships with external stakeholders were also observed to be an issue for 
adaptive capacity. Some of these problems stem from organisations having an inaccurate perception of 
their importance in the community post disaster.  This may be partially linked to the concept of Groupthink 
(Janis, 1982; Turner, 1994) as discussed in Section 5.2.2.5. but also an organisation’s awareness of itself 
(including the broadly defined roles and responsibilities of the organisation as a whole).  Several of the 
92 
 
organisations consider that their relationships and day-to-day communications with external stakeholders 
(customers, suppliers, consultants etc) are excellent.  These organisations and individuals are expected to 
offer preferential service or be accommodating as customers in the event of a disaster. However, few case-
study organisations have engaged in discussion with these stakeholders specifically about emergency 
response and recovery, and even less have any sort of agreement or memorandum of understanding in this 
regard.  Some of the organisations have not even considered how they may communicate with customers 
and clients in a crisis, or what sort of information would need to be communicated. Further, relationships 
and communications with the media are often overlooked from an emergency perspective. Two 
organisations are notable in their poor understanding of clients and media relationships. For both 
organisations this appears to originate in their perceptions of the organisational vision, and strategic 
purpose. However, other organisations in this study have specific policies in place for these stakeholders 
employing communications consultants to ensure that appropriate messages are created for particular 
stakeholders, and also to deal with media exposure. These organisations view this as a positive way to 
maintain good relationships with external stakeholders. 
5.2.3.3 Strategic Vision and Outcome Expectancy (AC3) 
The importance of the organisational vision for resilience was shown to be significant. All of the 
organisations in this study had some form of defined purpose or vision statement that underpinned their 
operations. Some organisations were driven by service to customers; some by supporting the community 
and some driven by improving the success of key stakeholders.  However, the operational reality and the 
communication of this vision throughout the organisation were less successful. One organisation had two 
distinct groups representing two different organisational visions. The result was one group always feeling 
isolated and excluded from the decision making process because they don't perceive that process as 
representative of their organisational vision. One organisation had such a strong vision, and was so 
structured around this vision that it was seen to have significantly reduced flexibility and creativity in 
decision making structures.  
‘I see that there is an element of ‘this is the way it is in this organisation, this is the way I have seen it, and 
this is how it will continue to be’… a lack of definition between the frontline staff, and the 
management…there is no-man’s land between…causes us lots of trouble in terms of both upwards and 
downwards communications…its very rubbery…things get lost in the middle…and at the end no one know 
who said what.’  Middle manager in an organisation discussing the problems that an inflexible strategic 
vision has in terms of communications internally. 
No matter what degree of organisational vision each case study had, there were three critical aspects to 
consider from an adaptive capacity perspective. Firstly, how well is the vision articulated and 
communicated through the organisation?  Secondly, how well do the day-to-day operations represent that 
organisational vision? Thirdly, how well does the organisation look towards that vision for direction when 
engaging in emergency situations?   
For those organisations with a clear sense of their purpose and vision, the ability to articulate and 
communicate this throughout the organisation was evident in their day-to-day operations. The impacts of a 
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heightened situation awareness around the organisational vision was also an important factor; several of the 
case study organisations were very clear about their roles in the aftermath of a crisis in terms of the wider 
community of stakeholders. Other organisations were much less clear about their overall purpose and their 
role in response, and also recovery for key stakeholders. These organisations also had very high levels of 
silo mentality which impaired their ability to communicate any sort of vision to staff and external 
stakeholders. The use of the organisational vision as a critical crisis response tool was also not widely 
understood. Many of the organisation commented that their approach to emergency management was one 
of 'fighting fires'; an approach observed in several REDS and other exercises.  These types of response 
appeared to be impacted by the decision maker's ability to make sense of large amounts of information in a 
relatively short period of time. For those decision makers without the ability to look towards the 
organisational vision, and identify where the organisation should be heading in a crisis, fire fighting is the 
alternative. For example when faced with a crisis that impacted on essential services for an extended period 
of time, the key decision maker in one organisation claimed that they would all just go home.  After some 
coaching and strong suggestions by facilitators, this organisation began to use its organisational vision for 
customer service as a motivating force and help determine the emergency response, also creating an easier 
transition to recovery.   
‘Family companies have less strategic outlook.  Have a lower governance focus (corporate), more caviller 
approach to risk.  Give it a lot less consideration and back themselves to deal with it on the day.  That’s the 
mindset’.  Perception of one group manager from a large organisation regularly working with smaller, 
family run organisations. 
Senge (2006) identifies similar characteristics in organisations where the long-term strategic thinking of an 
organisation is more accurately described as short-term and reactive thinking.  He quotes Hamel and 
Prahalad (1989) ‘Although strategic planning is billed as a way of becoming more future oriented, most 
managers, when pressed, will admit that their strategic plans reveal more about today’s problems than 
tomorrow’s opportunities’.  Senge proclaims the importance of building a shared vision in an organisation 
and that these shared visions must come from personal visions in order to derive and maintain the energy 
and commitment that is required to be successful. 
‘It’s impossible to create a culture across that [size of the business unit] entire workforce.  I don’t believe 
that you can or should create a company wide culture.  You can create one set of values or standards, but 
you still need to have the framework to be yourself within that framework.  It’s about engagement with the 
staff’.  A senior manager discussing the problems associated with strategic visions and cultural styles in an 
organisation created by the parent corporation on behalf of all business units and sites. 
5.2.3.4 Information and Knowledge (AC4) 
Building on the issues already discussed regarding communications and relationships, and roles and 
responsibilities is the potential impacts from the flow of information and knowledge in organisations.   
There is a larger amount of literature on the pitfalls surrounding the acquisition and the transfer of 
knowledge particularly in relation to learning organisations (O’Dell and Grayson, 1999; Senge, 1990; 
Nonaka, 1994; Turner, 1994; Murray, 2002).  Goh (2002) for example describes the results of a survey of 
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1,500 employees in 12 organisations where the ability to transfer information scored consistently lowest as 
an attribute of organisational learning.   
As previously mentioned, the strict adherence to set roles and responsibilities, and little motivation or 
expectation for staff to step outside these roles has a potentially negative impact on the effectiveness of 
communications pathways, and on the quality of the information being communicated. This is evident in 
day-to-day situations for many of the organisations in this study, and was significantly exacerbated during 
exercises and for organisations experienced in emergency management. Two organisations in this study 
have a policy of encouraging staff to move around the organisation and to gain experience in a variety of 
roles and with a variety of responsibilities. For one, many members of the leadership team had entered the 
organisation as general staff and worked their way up to executive positions; this was encouraged in other 
staff in the organisation. The broad knowledge of the organisation held by these decision makers was 
evident. Even in these organisations, however, there were still some individuals that held a large amount of 
specialised knowledge that was not readily accessible for others in the organisation unless those individuals 
were available.   
‘You did what was necessary, and you filled the role of the job that was required at the time.  You didn't 
stop and think that's not my job.  It's not about little boxes.  The other thing is that we found that the 
knowledge at the decision-making power was vested in only a few heads.  And that put those of us with the 
heads under a lot of stress.’  A general manager in an organisation which had recently experienced a crisis 
situation discussing the link between roles and responsibilities and knowledge. 
Research into the link between co-operation and knowledge transfer reveals some interesting observations.  
Goh (2002) discusses the need for groups in organisations to share information and knowledge and 
collaborate in order to create successful knowledge transfer processes.  Another essential element is trust 
(Smith et al, 1995) which is a pre-requisite for co-operation as well as transparent and open decision 
making by managers.  This is complimented by the fact that breaking down of rigid hierarchies in 
organisations can help foster effective knowledge transfer (Nonaka, 1994; Goh, 2002) which in turn assists 
in the removal of silos (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1998). 
All organisations in this study were somewhat adverse to the introduction of additional systems and 
procedures to capture the information held by these individuals, and the availability of staff to participate in 
a mentoring program for the continuation of specialist information was difficult to facilitate.  
Another aspect of information and knowledge sharing for organisational resilience was the problem of the 
nature and format of information to be shared. Very few organisations in this study had considered the sort 
of information that would be required to maintain an emergency response and ensure a successful recovery. 
These organisations had also given little thought to how information would be transferred to key people in 
the absence of traditional communications networks. An illustrative example was during one of the 
emergency exercises. This particular organisation needed to share information usually contained in maps 
and plans, however with the loss of telecommunications the fax and internet were largely unavailable.  This 
case-study organisation had not considered any alternative means for communicating this essential 
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information in an emergency. The dependence on traditional telecommunications networks is a significant 
barrier to ensuring resilience of information and knowledge sharing during a crisis. 
‘Perhaps the best way I can describe it as, if you haven't been through one of these before.  It was like 
sitting in a submarine.  The only thing you've got is the electronic Communications that are coming in to 
the submarine.  You can't see anything outside, and all you get his reports from the sonar or whatever.  
And in the morning, we might be able to surface and put a periscope up and actually see something.  But 
you only see that much [indicates].  You don't see the whole picture.  And so it's very hard to get a whole 
picture during the disaster of what is going on.’   Comments on the difficulty of communications and 
knowledge acquisition during a crisis event. 
5.2.3.5 Leadership, Management and Governance Structures (AC5) 
One of the most important features for adaptive capacity and overall resilience in organisations is the way 
in which organisations are lead and managed both in day-to-day and crisis situations. Organisations in this 
study all clearly understood the link between developing resilient day-to-day operations as a way to 
improve the resilience for emergencies and crisis situations. All except one organisation expressed a strong 
preference for ensuring high levels of autonomy and decentralised decision making for day-to-day 
operations.  However, most of these organisations had not considered or planned for the changed 
circumstances that an emergency would present from a decision making perspective; even those 
organisations that have experience of significant events. There are several contributing factors. 
Firstly, organisations in this study had little awareness and understanding of the consequences of events 
that encompass a large geographic area (multi regional) or affect a very large number of people (pandemic, 
war, civil disruption etc). Generally, their expectations for decision making in a crisis is that individual 
offices or sites (even down to the scale of departments within an organisation) can continue to operate 
autonomously in these types of events, reflecting a focus on small scale and more discrete events rather 
than events that encompass either a significant period of time or large scale consequence (in terms of 
people affected, geographic area, economic disruption).  Murray (2002) identifies that the current thinking 
in organisational settings often forms a boundary to decision making which, in turn, alters and distorts an 
organisation’s understanding of its environment both in terms of perception and interpretation.  Similarly, 
the environment that organisations find themselves operating in also influences this decision making and 
related perceptions of hazardous events.  McCann (2004) identifies that organisations are facing a shift, 
over the past 30 years, from periods of episodic change to a more disruptively changing environment.  The 
development of the organisational ‘network’ and the vast inter-dependencies has meant increased capacity 
for dynamic decision making ultimately leading to increased growth and opportunity for those 
organisations that embrace the change (D’Aveni, 1994). 
‘I think we are slow to change. I think that’s part of the culture of the organisation; we really have been 
slow to change…it’s partly to do with the New Zealand culture and it’s partly to do with [this 
organisation].  A significant part of the strategy in development, for example, and in marketing was to 
bring in overseas personnel.  But having done that, we have changed but we changed remarkably 
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slowly…the old tanker in full reverse would be a good example’.  The CEO in one organisation reflecting 
on the ability and willingness of the organisation to face change. 
Secondly, many organisations displayed inadequate emergency communication systems, both the physical 
network and from an information sharing and relationships perspective with staff and other stakeholders. 
The need to co-ordinate and communicate, not only with emergency services and civil defence 
organisations, but also with other offices, departments and decision makers within the organisation, is often 
not clearly appreciated. Critical decisions and their expected outcomes have not been considered, and 
communications and decision making structures have not been tested.  As expressed by Khan and Burnes 
(2007) managers and decision makers need to balance the various interests of a wide range of potential and 
actual stakeholders. 
Thirdly, many organisations do not have a clear view of their response and recovery priorities, minimum 
operating requirements or the support structures that are required to ensure these are achievable. There 
were some exceptions to this in the study. Two organisations working together in an emergency exercise 
displayed a much clearer understanding of these requirements, but one had yet to translate this into 
emergency decision making structures. Another organisation in the study had not explored the realities of 
how decision making in an emergency could continue to be successful if communication pathways broke 
down, or even if key individuals were absent. Yet another of the organisations was largely unaware of its 
minimum operating requirements other than in isolated pockets within the organisation. One of the other 
organisations believed that it had a clear mandate to make decisions for some specific external stakeholder 
groups because of the history of good relationships and communications built up over time.  However, this 
organisation seemed to be unaware of the expectations this bought from those stakeholders; that all key 
decisions could and would be deferred to the case-study organisation rather than the stakeholders taking 
responsibility in a crisis. This is likely to break down extensively if the physical communications network 
was compromised, as there is no clear decision making structure for this eventuality.  
‘If we looked purely at dollars and cents, we could have a much leaner and meaner ship by running things 
from corporate but what we found, and that includes the finance and infrastructure side, is that there is a 
huge benefit from having people in the regions because you get that regional flavour and feel.  We’ve 
become a lot more aware of the local issues…you end up with more people as a result of that you end up 
with people who can react quicker because they’re closer to the coalface and know what's going on.  I 
would agree with that.  It does mean at times there are differences of opinion, because you get the local 
perspective, rather than what we want from a corporate perspective.’  A discussion with the Chief financial 
Officer in one organisation discussing the problems associated with centralised and decentralised 
organisational structures. 
The link between decision making, organisational structure and communications and relationships is clear 
(see also Section 5.2.3.2).  There seems to be a paradox here; the balance that needs to be achieved between 
a decentralised organisational model and the ability of people at all levels and locations in an organisation 
to be leaders (Senge, 2006).  There is a need to clearly identify the diversity of leadership roles for various 
situations and at a number of levels within the organisation.  Developing this depth of leadership allows for 
sustained change to be accommodated, and possibly even benefited from. 
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‘…the empowerment to manage things well.  When people are empowered and you have a crisis situation 
at any time no matter how big that may be...they [staff] tend to be better prepared to act and also, they are 
better prepared to accept the authority and those of the situations.  It comes to authority; they are 
authorised to do what they are doing and…empowerment gives them that authority.  It was really a cultural 
zone of personal responsibility and a general feeling of empowerment, and probably one of our biggest 
concerns is where people go.  Sometimes they take that empowerment too far and are too enthusiastic 
about what they do… [but] they are always well-intentioned.’  The CEO in one organisation that has a 
number of regional offices. 
Also related to communications and relationships, the importance of leadership visibility and availability, 
and decision making transparency has a marked impact on adaptive capacity.  Senge (2006) advocates the 
old adage of ‘actions speak louder than words’ in relation to organisational leadership, particularly for 
those leaders who are the most visible. The case study organisations which had the highest degree of 
adaptive capacity all showed excellent visibility of the leadership and decision making team, and all staff 
were able to communicate directly with these individuals if required.  Furthermore, the decision making 
process was relatively transparent, and was supported with good communications internally to all staff. 
Conversely one case study with the least adaptive capacity in this study had a very rigid hierarchy for 
decision making, and the ability to communicate with the leadership team was not equal for all employees. 
Additionally, this organisation had a very poor decision making transparency. For this organisation staff 
commented that they are often frustrated because the degree of accountability they have for decisions and 
the input they have into making those decisions are not comparable, nor do decision makers adequately 
communicate to all staff why decisions are made. Other organisations in this study reflected this feeling, 
some comments originating from experience in real world crises, and other coming from day-to-day 
operations.  
‘There is progress…improvement that [new CEO] is driving in building a team.  This is just my 
opinion…he is succeeding in building a team.  He realized that he can’t make changes down the 
organisation if he doesn’t change leadership’.  Comments from a senior manager in one organisation 
reflecting on recent changes in leadership of the business unit. 
5.3 Synthesis 
Each of the organisations in this study was assessed according to their performance in all of the above indicators of 
organisational resilience. Table 8 shows the results of this process, and presents the individual ratings of situation 
awareness, identification and management of keystone vulnerabilities and adaptive capacity for each organisation. 
These ratings were used to produce the composite scores for the individual resilience profiles presented in Chapter 
6. Further details of individual organisations performance are presented in Appendix C. Chapter 4 details how these 
composite scores were calculated. The discussion in this chapter regarding integration of the case-study information 
also addressed the original research questions and proposition in Chapter 3.  Additionally, this discussion presents 
the emergency information that arose from the case-studies which was not necessarily foreseen as relevant in the 
original research questions and propositions. 
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5.4 Summary and Conclusions 
A number of indicators of organisational resilience have arisen from the case study organisations.  These 
organisations were specifically selected to represent the widest range of organisations possible to investigate the 
hypothesis that there are likely to be generic resilience indicators common to all organisations. From the set of 10 
organisations studied in this work, a number of common factors have been identified which have been categorised 
according to which aspects of resilience they impact most; situation awareness, keystone vulnerabilities or adaptive 
capacity. These factors have been subsequently summarised into a set of 15 resilience indicators: this set is intended 
to provide organisations with an effective overview of the key resilience issues that they are likely to face. The case-
study organisations have been given a relative rating for each indicator; comparing individual organisations with the 
others in this study. The individual ratings have then been collated to give an overall relative rating for the degree of 
situation awareness, the identification and management of keystone vulnerabilities, and the extent of adaptive 
capacity for each organisation. The link between some of these indicators is apparent. For example, the degree of 
awareness for roles and responsibilities has an impact on the effectiveness of communications and relationships 
within an organisation which in turn impacts on the success of strategies for the acquisition, transfer and retention of 
information and knowledge. Additionally, an organisations awareness of the range and impacts of hazard events 
influences its recovery priorities, its commitment to planning and engagement with emergency exercises, and has a 
significant impact on the development of relationships with key stakeholders. 
Chapter 7 explores the strategies for resilience management and tools for implementation that could be used to 
address some of these resilience issues for organisations and examines the work that needs to be done in the future 




Table 8. The relative ratings of case study organisation for each resilience indicator identified. 
 
  CASE STUDY ORGANISATIONS 
  Label CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4 CS5 CS6 CS7 CS8 CS9 CS10 
Roles and Responsibilities SA1 Mod Low Mod Mod V.Low Mod V.Low Low V.High V.High 
Hazards and consequences SA2 V.Low Low V.High High Mod Mod Low Low V.High Mod 
Connectivity Awareness SA3 High Low High Mod V.Low Low Low V.High High V.High 
Insurance SA4 Low Mod Low V.High Mod Mod Low V.Low High Mod 




















SUMMARY SA comp Mod Low High High Low Mod Low Mod V.High High 
Risk mgmt and Planning KV1 High Mod High V.High Mod High V.Low V.Low V.High Low 
Exercises KV2 V.Low High V.High V.High Low Mod V.Low Low V.High Low 
Internal Resources KV3 Mod V.High High High Mod High Mod Low V.High Mod 
External Resources KV4 Mod High High Mod Low High Low Mod High High 

























SUMMARY KVcomp Mod High V.High V.High Mod High Low Mod V.High Mod 
Silo Mentality Management AC1 Low V.Low Mod Mod V.Low V.High Mod Mod Mod V.High 
Communications and 
relationships 
AC2 V.Low Low High Low Low V.High Low V.High V.High V.High 
Strategic Vision AC3 V.High Low Mod Mod V.Low V.High Mod High High Mod 
Information and knowledge AC4 Mod Low High Mod V.Low V.High Low Mod V.High V.High 



















SUMMARY ACcomp Mod Low High Mod Low V.High Mod High V.High V.High 












6 THE CASE-STUDY ORGANISATIONS 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter is structured to provide a comparative overview of the case-study information.  Each organisation is 
briefly described, key issues reviewed and a resilience profile presented (Chapter 4 details the creation and 
interpretation of resilience profiles). The resilience profile is a qualitative assessment of the overall resilience of an 
organisation based on the relative degree of situation awareness, management of keystone vulnerabilities and 
adaptive capacity for each organisation.  The resilience profiles are relative representations and individual profiles 
are created in relation to the other organisations in this study. A detailed discussion of how to interpret the resilience 
profile is given in Chapter 4.  The resilience information from each case study organisation is used in Chapter 5 to 
identify generic issues of resilience for organisations in New Zealand. These generic resilience issues provide the 
basis of the qualitative resilience assessment and the generation of the relative resilience profiles in this chapter. At 
the end of this chapter the resilience profiles are compared and organisational resilience is analysed in relation to 
case- study selection criteria described in Chapter 3. Future applications of the resilience assessment process and 
uses of the resilience profile are explored in Chapter 7.  Complimenting the following discussion of resilience for 
each organisation a detailed discussion of resilience issues is presented in Appendix C. Appendix C outlines more 
specifically the key strengths and weaknesses identified for each organisation in this study. 
The discussion of resilience in each of the case study organisations that follows is structured to represent the three 
attributes of organisational resilience: situation awareness, identification and management of keystone 
vulnerabilities and adaptive capacity and summarised by the resilience profiles. The profiles (Figure 9 to Figure 18) 
are presented with the discussion for each case-study organisation. 
6.2 CS1 - Private Manufacturer 
The pilot case-study organisation (CS1) is involved in the manufacturing industry in New Zealand with both 
domestic and international markets. CS1 approached the researcher to take part in this study, and was an enthusiastic 
participant. This organisation offered the research project an ideal pilot study with a view from a large private 
organisation in the manufacturing industry (Secondary sector) and which has a widespread customer base 
(nationally, internationally and, to a lesser extent, locally). CS1 also relies heavily on both human resources and 
machinery and has both locally based and international offices. 
Figure 9 shows the resilience profile for CS1 which is given a moderate overall resilience relative to the other case 
study organisations based on moderate rankings for situation awareness, identification and management of keystone 











Figure 9. The resilience profile for CS1, the Private Manufacturer. 
Overall, situation awareness is moderate for CS1. While CS1's situation awareness in relation to its competitors and 
the supply chain is good the organisation has a more limited awareness of the community of stakeholders outside of 
its immediate operating environment. CS1 also has a limited understanding of some common hazards and their 
potential consequences as well as the wider social and economic networks in New Zealand. 
CS1 exhibits a moderate rating for its identification and management of keystone vulnerabilities. Generally CS1 has 
identified many of its key risks and internal vulnerabilities and is working towards managing them appropriately. 
Critical exceptions include the loss of electrical services and a focus on managing the causes of events rather than 
managing its own response to crises. 
“electrical…probably the thing we have the least control over. If the power cable got severed outside the building, 
or the sub-station went down then there’s not a lot we can do about that. We don’t have backup generation...” 
comments from senior manager in CS1. 
Overall, CS1 is given a moderate ranking on the resilience profile. In terms of its adaptive capacity, CS1 has 
difficulty with the flow of communications and development of relationships internally and is a symptom of a 
negative silo mentality. Also in a crisis CS1 may have a limited ability to respond and recover because of ineffective 
transfer of critical information. CS1 is influenced by a strong organisational vision of the purpose and future 
direction of the business but, this may have a negative impact on CS1. Decision makers appear to be impaired both 
in their flexibility and creativity for problem solving, and also the ability to make decision in a timely manner due to 
the rigour with which CS1 adheres to this vision. 
“And another problem I have here [at CS1] is that there isn’t management support for health and safety. We might 
talk the talk…but you need leadership right from the CEO. It needs to be a very important aspect and he needs to be 













“The other main key risks for us [that] I see, is the loss of key information. So, if something happens to our 
information technology systems, we have obviously a hell of a lot of intellectual property stored on those networks 
that has taken years to develop…if something was to go wrong there that’s a huge risk there…if we were to have a 
significant network failure we would come to a standstill basically.” Senior manager in CS1 commenting on key 
risks in the organisation. 
6.3 CS2 - Local Authority 
The researcher was approached by CS2 who expressed a strong interest in taking part in the study after reading the 
Resilient Organisations website. CS2 is a relatively small local authority organisation consisting of less than 40 full 
time staff, serving a predominantly rural community. In terms of its inclusion in this study, CS2 offered significant 
value and was a good contrast to the pilot study CS1. As a local government organisation CS2 is responsible for 
civil defence responses and this was an important facet to study, particularly given CS2’s recent experiences with 
natural disaster. This provided an excellent opportunity to test the interview technique and adjust as outlined in 
Chapter 3. CS2 services the tertiary sector and has only one office. As with most local government organisations in 
New Zealand, CS2 has contracted out much of its physical services (road works, rubbish collection etc) and 
therefore has only a moderate dependence on resources. CS2 does have a high dependence on its human resources 
including staff and its association with community groups and organisations. 
CS2 has a moderate overall resilience based on a low ranking for both situation awareness and adaptive capacity, 
but a high rank for its identification and management of keystone vulnerabilities. The resilience profile for CS2 is 









Figure 10. The resilience profile for CS2, the Local Authority. 
When considering situation awareness CS2 displays a poor understanding of staff roles and responsibilities and also 
in terms of CS2's role in the community. Furthermore, CS2 has a poor knowledge of the range of hazards and events 














“Generally, people had to find their own jobs [during the emergency response], and I felt as though I was floating a 
lot and not being given clear directions. I feel it's important that the controller should take charge and give specific 
instructions as to who should be doing what.” Comments from senior manager at CS2. 
Typically CS2 has most of its keystone vulnerabilities clearly identified, although management of several significant 
issues is more limited. They include a lack of human resources in an emergency, breakdown of communications due 
to failure of telecommunications and electricity supply.  However, CS2 has established an emergency operation 
centre separate from the main offices, and provided for the continued use of that space in future crises. 
In terms of adaptive capacity, CS2 has an advantage in its ability to gain support and resources from other local 
government and national government sources, but this is a restricted resource and is likely to be only appropriate for 
some types of crises. CS2 also has a substantial resource available to it in the form of the community it serves.  
However, poor communications and a breakdown of relationships with the community (volunteer groups, 
emergency services, support agencies etc) were influential in past events and there is evidence for a strong silo 
mentality culture at CS2 impairing its adaptive capacity. 
Researcher: I have read the regional plan, and you have the hazards [addressed in there]. But it doesn't address 
[this organisation specifically]. I was just wondering if [this organisation] have their own plan for continuity of its 
own business.  
Interviewee: No, we haven't. if this building was taken out by an earthquake or something then we haven't got 
anything. I acknowledge we need to do something.” Comments by senior manager in CS2. 
6.4 CS3 - Private Contractor 
CS3 is a large private contracting firm that has offices throughout New Zealand. Interviews were conducted in both 
the corporate offices and in regional offices. CS3’s inclusion in this study was valuable because it offered the 
viewpoint of a large private organisation in a contracting environment and in an industry (both primary and 
secondary industry sectors) that deals with small-medium scale crises on a relatively regular basis. In addition, CS3 
provided the opportunity to study an organisation that has a distribution of regional offices around a central 
corporate hub as well as an international influence (this was one of only three organisations in this study with the 
same characteristic). CS3 provides services and products from its operations in New Zealand throughout the 
country, but international operations remain separate in terms of supply distribution. Further, the organisation was 
confirmed as being highly dependent on both human and physical resources.  
Following the issue of the final report to CS3, this organisation has actively pursued the learnings from the 5-Step 
process and extended the concept of resilience. CS3 are developing a regional emergency management plan with a 
view that it may become a template for the rest of the organisation. They have also engaged in additional workshops 
at a variety of levels in the organisation. 
Overall CS3 has a very high level of resilience bought about by its high rankings for both situation awareness and 
adaptive capacity and a very high degree of identification and management of keystone vulnerabilities. This is 
illustrated in Figure 11 below. 
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In relation to situation awareness there are some issues with the knowledge of roles and responsibilities throughout 
the organisation, most notably between head office and the regional offices as well as between offices in different 
regions. Additionally, CS3 has a clear understanding of a handful of crisis events although planning for emergencies 
is dominated by its experience of previous crises. While this highlights a somewhat reactive approach to emergency 
management the organisation does have effective planning small to medium sized events that do not involve a multi 
region response. 
In general, CS3 has clearly identified many of its keystone vulnerabilities and is working towards appropriately 
managing them. CS3 has identified alternative sites for emergency co-ordination, has a good understanding of the 
limitations of its various buildings and has considered the impacts of the loss of key services. CS3 has also begun to 
engage with other organisations regarding the availability of specialised equipment and essential supplies. 
“Interviewee: We have all the phone numbers and we know all the sub-contractors to [contact]. I know who call 
before we need to get [to a level of a] civil defence [emergency]. We had a civil defence emergency last year with 
the trouble in the Park at [specific location]. 
Researcher: How did he chain of command work in the event [at specific location]? 
Interviewee: It did [breakdown] when we had the big one. They [critically linked organisation] didn't know about 
any contact details…and all it needed was communication. 
Researcher: So, it wasn't a physical communication breakdown…the network was still there, but people didn't know 
how to use it? 
Interviewee: Yep, that's exactly right…but that's been sorted out and it works really good now.” Discussion with 
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CS3 typically has a high adaptive capacity based on an organisational culture of responsibility, autonomy and 
empowerment.  There are generally good communications at CS3 within regions although communications are less 
robust between the regional offices. However, the ‘hands-off’ approach of head office to the regional management 
of crises and emergency planning is potentially limiting for CS3. 
6.5 CS4 - Public Utility Provider 
CS4 is a moderately sized public utility organisation with regional offices in numerous centres throughout New 
Zealand. The organisation was selected as a case-study organisation because of its size, as well as its status as a 
public life-line organisation (the only one in the study). In addition, this organisation was the only organisation 
which had a relatively low dependence on physical resources, while being highly dependent on its human resources 
(this includes critically linked organisations). The widespread nature of the organisation’s offices was also an 
important element is CS4 being included in this study.  
While interviewing with this organisation went smoothly, a workshop date was not forthcoming and the researcher 
was unable to collect survey and vulnerability data or observe CS4 in a REDS. However, the researcher was given 
the opportunity to observe CS4 in a large scale simulated national disaster exercise, Capital Quake and this proved 
very valuable for data collection and verification of information from interviews. 
The resilience profile for CS4 is presented in Figure 12 and shows a high overall relative resilience based on a high 











Figure 12. The resilience profile for CS4, the Public Utility. 
In terms of situation awareness there are some issues with the understanding of roles and responsibilities at CS4, 
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externally (between CS4 and other linked organisations). However CS4 has a very clear understanding of its 
recovery priorities, for itself as an organisation and from the perspective of its community of stakeholders. 
Although the vulnerability assessment wasn't able to be completed in this case-study, those that have been 
highlighted appear to be generally well managed and identified. While those keystone vulnerabilities that have been 
identified in this investigation do have the potential to significantly impact the organisation, they are relatively few 
in number.  Prominent vulnerabilities identified include the fragility of the communications network, protocols for 
succession in a crisis, and the transfer of information throughout the organisation. CS4 has also taken part in several 
training exercises for emergencies. 
“…when we ran the exercise, there had already been a couple of exercises beforehand where [this organisation] 
had sat on the outside…but the last exercise…it was a desktop exercise and essentially what I did was take the 
operation’s next scenario, and I grabbed all our troops in the room and said ‘right this has just happened, what do 
we do?’…and we spent half a day going through how we might automate that response from here [regional office]. 
That gave us a framework to work with.” Regional manager commenting on past experiences with exercises. 
Adaptive capacity is enhanced by CS4's clear vision of its role in an emergency, although this is not always well 
communicated between offices internally. Governance and leadership issues within the organisation reflect a 
strongly autonomous culture, but it is one that has a limited strategic outlook in a crisis. This also illustrates 
problems with the negative impacts of silo mentality, showing up prominently in communication and relationship 
difficulties for CS4. 
We need an integrated approach, and we need a hierarchy of response. We need to understand the major different 
types of scenario that might affect us, the hierarchy of response and the major risks that we face…understanding the 
major risks we face regionally, nationally and so forth. In some way, we need to bring all that stuff together and 
communicate it well to everyone…so that everyone has a good understanding of what needs to happen, when, where 
and why. It sounds very waffly but that's where we're at with it…” Senior manager in head office. 
6.6 CS5 - Education Provider 
CS5 is an education provider. It is a large employer for the local community and has an established reputation both 
within the New Zealand context and internationally. CS5 has followed up on some of the resilience issues and 
recommendations to arise from this study and the organisation is currently engaged in writing and implementing a 
disaster response and recovery plan. CS5’s inclusion in this study is justified because of its moderate size and 
because it services the quaternary sector (the first one in this study). In addition, CS5 was thought to have a high 
dependence on its human resources and a low dependence on physical resources. The organisation’s dependence on 
physical resources is more appropriately categorised as moderate. Additionally, CS5 provides services for local, 
national and international customers but has a very localised distribution. Finally, CS5 has a high value as a case 
study because of the relationship that it has with its community of stakeholders and the linkages of the organisation 
through to the wider community. 
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The resilience profile for CS5 is presented in Figure 13 below showing a low overall ranking relative to the other 
organisations in this study. CS5 scores low in both situation awareness and adaptive capacity with a moderate 










Figure 13. The resilience profile for CS5, Educational Organisation 
Situation awareness is low at CS5 is shows that there are substantial differences of opinion among groups of 
employees as to the organisations priorities in terms of customers and principal stakeholder groups in the event of a 
crisis. A considerable contributing factor is a poor understanding of other people's roles and responsibilities at CS5. 
There are also problems with a poor understanding of the likely expectations of some stakeholder groups and what 
this may mean for CS5's in terms of reputation impacts. 
“The staff welfare issue also arose during the REDS. At no time did any of the groups adequately consider the needs 
of the staff to have better information regarding the situation at CS5 in a crisis. Additionally there was not adequate 
consideration given to staff pay, leave entitlements or even continuing employment if CS5 was forced to close for an 
extended period of time. Interestingly, this lack of consideration was driven by the staff themselves, suggesting that 
the conceptual change in thinking about staff as a liability or asset is very pervasive at CS5. The staff may see 
themselves as being entirely expendable in a significant crisis.” Extract from final report to CS5 
The identification of keystone vulnerabilities is relatively advanced at CS5 from an operational perspective. Some of 
the most significant vulnerabilities include the relationships and communications between some key groups, the 
physical communications network and communications pathways internally and externally in a crisis. CS5 has a 
poor understanding of the less operational vulnerabilities, a limited application of planning as exercises and training 
for all staff, together with some significant physical vulnerabilities for buildings, structures and equipment. 
From the perspective of adaptive capacity, the most significant issue for CS5 is the negative impact of a strong silo 
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some pockets of employees within CS5 where adaptive capacity is high, but the organisation has no systems and 
procedures in place to integrate these initiatives and improve adaptive capacity overall. There is also perceived to be 
a lack of transparency in decision making, particularly where an employee's ability to make decisions and their 
accountability for the results of those decisions are perceived to be at odds. 
“I found it quite astonishing coming from the public sector, because the public [service in this particular part of the 
organisation] had a lot of continual change in the last 10 years…and almost change for changes sake which can be 
just as harmful…but they were very forward thinking and had already moved to significant structural changes. 
[But] coming here was like taking…well, [this organisation] can be a world in itself, and it can be quite insular.” 
Deputy manager in discrete part of the organisation. 
6.7 CS6 - Private Wholesale Distributor 
CS6 is a large private wholesale distribution organisation operating in the tertiary sector. This organisation was 
important to the study because of the relationships that this organisation had with other linked organisations. In 
addition, the organisations local and national distribution networks were an important consideration for its inclusion 
in this study. The organisation had a reputation among its workforce as a family oriented working environment. 
CS6’s high dependency on its staff as a resource was a key factor as well as the importance of the products that the 
organisation is responsible for distributing. While not classified as a lifeline organisation, CS6 had previously 
argued with local authorities about its possible role in the aftermath of a major community wide disaster. This 
internal perception of the organisation’s importance was a critical factor in CS6’s inclusion in this study. 
Additionally CS6 operates as a large central hub which services a number of additional offices nationwide. 
The resilience profile for CS6 shows it to have a high relative resilience derived from its moderate situation 
awareness, its high degree of identification and management of keystone vulnerabilities as well as a very high 
ranking for adaptive capacity. This profile is reflected in Figure 14 below. 
CS6 has a somewhat limited situation awareness of what key stakeholders may expect of the organisation in a crisis 
response and recovery including both internal (staff) and external (customers, suppliers etc.) stakeholders. A limited 
awareness also contributes to knowledge of the consequences of various hazards CS6 may be exposed to. 
CS6 has made some very good progress on identifying its keystone vulnerabilities and managing them accordingly. 
This success is linked to the longevity of key decision makers in the organisation and their detailed knowledge of 
the business. However, there were some significant vulnerabilities highlighted in this study including the 
implications of the loss of electricity and the reality of a breakdown in the telecommunications network on a 
regional scale. In addition the organisation has some very vulnerable buildings and equipment to some types of 
hazard and has not considered alternative plans for continued operations. 
Typically CS6's adaptive capacity is a significant strength, supported by the structure of the organisation and the 
inherent trust of key customers that provides the mandate to make decisions quickly and authoritatively. Barriers to 
improving adaptive capacity at CS6 include an apparent inability to acquire appropriate information to support 
decision making in a crisis and a lack of specific strategies to disseminate this information throughout the 
organisation, and to key stakeholders. 
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“…we have moved through different departments on our career paths…we have a pretty good understanding of the 
business…when you work long enough with these people they also become friends. You work with these people and 
we just seem to click and it has always been the case. I’ve been here more than 15 years…you don't make an 
appointment to go and see these guys, you just go and see them. We know each other and how we work. It’s not all 
clear sailing but it we’re a very close team…it’s not the ivory tower and we don't like to think of it as set away from 










Figure 14. The resilience profile for CS6 - Private Wholesale Distributor. 
6.8 CS7 - Private Utility Provider 
CS7 is a discrete business unit within a large private organisation that has a widespread distribution of offices 
throughout New Zealand. Although the organisation as a whole is considered to be a lifeline utility, the business unit 
studied did not fall under that classification. However, the implications of the status of the whole organisation as a 
lifeline organisation on the operations and performance of the business unit were an important area of consideration 
when selecting CS7 for this study.  The selection of CS7 was appropriate for the research because of its relationship 
with its parent company, its nation wide distribution and its status as a utility provider. This was also one of the few 
organisations in the study that were perceived to have less dependence on people than on physical resources. The 
organisation operated with a large central hub and many regional centres throughout New Zealand. Although the 
organisation as a whole has international offices and sites, CS7 as a business unit within this organisation did not.  
The Resilience profile for CS7 presented in Figure 15 below shows a moderate overall resilience. This resilience 
profile reflects a low degree of situation awareness as well as the identification and management of keystone 
vulnerabilities, and moderate adaptive capacity. 
When considering situation awareness at CS7 roles and responsibilities are well known within individual business 
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Additionally, situation awareness is weakened by a poor understanding of the potential impacts of some key hazards 
and the ability of the organisation to effectively respond to them. Recovery priorities are limited but CS7 does have 
a clear understanding of its market, and of its competitors. It is also acutely aware of the capability and capacity of 
key external stakeholders and shows a weakness is in its connection to customers, having no ability to map customer 
movement or demands. 
“We are in a very unique position…I think it would be difficult to kill it [this business unit] overnight, even if bad 
decisions are made…but, in saying that, its more like death by a thousand cuts really…so, we treat the cuts. I think 
that crisis is wrong word for it [the types of events that impact the organisation]...” Comments from a strategy 
manager. 
In terms of the management and identification of its keystone vulnerabilities, CS7 has made some attempt at 
planning, but there is a significant reliance on the parent company to perform this task. CS7 has some significant 
assumptions about its ability to operate remotely, but it has not developed any plans around this eventuality, or 
attempted to test the validity of this assumption. CS7 has some key vulnerabilities in terms of the loss of key 
services and also buildings and equipment, the loss of telecommunications services, poor staff welfare systems as 
well as the potential loss of intellectual property and security of databases and critical information. CS7 has an 
experienced team of people available through its parent company but due to the very autonomous nature of the 









Figure 15. The resilience profile for CS7, Private Utility Provider 
For CS7, considering its degree of adaptive capacity, there are some significant problems with silo mentality that 
has become entrenched in the organisational structure over time. However, the greatest weakness in CS7 is the poor 
ability to make decisions in an appropriate and timely manner. This is primarily because the organisation does not 
currently have the necessary systems in place to ensure that the information it is gathering (either in day-to-day 














in its decision making in-house, it is limited by the decision making ability of its parent company; a reflection on the 
size and structure of the parent organisation. 
“Observations during the REDS suggest that there is limited cohesion in the Leadership Team with regards to 
leadership roles and how to transfer those leadership roles over, if necessary, in a crisis. In the absence of the GM 
[general manager], one individual was observed to take on a strong leadership role for this crisis. This is a very 
positive development for [CS7]. However when the GM returned to the group he was only given a cursory update 
on the situation and there was no apparent consideration given within the Leadership Team as to his further 
leadership role for this crisis. While some individuals showed themselves to be very clear and effective leaders in 
their own right the issue of leadership succession was not clearly addressed either before the discussion group 
convened or following the return of the GM.” Excerpt from final report to CS7 
“Staff…also need to understand how destabilising comments about the dispensability of particular groups of staff 
can be to the entire organisation. Immediately upon hearing the details of the proposed scenario, one staff member 
was overheard to say that it didn’t matter if [CS7] lost sales or IT staff to a competitor because they could be easily 
replaced.” Excerpt from final report to CS7.  
6.9 CS8 - Private Retailer 
CS8 is a medium sized retail operation (operating in both the secondary and tertiary sectors) that services a rural 
community in New Zealand and is also part of a group of other branded organisations throughout New Zealand.  
CS8 is serviced by a wide range of organisations and is a significant social and information hub for the local 
community. This organisation was chosen because of its size; up till this point in the research the case-studies were 
over-represented by large organisations. Additionally, CS8’s location in the retail industry, as well as the small, rural 
based community that it serves, were important selection factors for this organisation. CS8 was only one of two 
organisations in this study that were locally based; although CS8 has significant linkages with other organisations 
both nationally and internationally it only services it’s local community. Additionally, the organisation has an 
owner/operator structure that previously had not been explored in the research. 
The resilience profile for CS8 presented in Figure 16 indicates that CS8 has a high resilience based principally on 
the organisations high adaptive capacity, and also a moderate rating for both situation awareness and its 
identification and management of keystone vulnerabilities. 
Internally CS8 has a good situation awareness, particularly of individual roles and responsibilities, but there is 
almost no movement of staff between departments. There is also a clear lack of understanding and awareness 
regarding hazards and impacts, both those affecting CS8 and those that affect the community CS8 serves. While 
CS8 has a good awareness of its importance to the community and to its customers and of its recovery priorities, this 
awareness of the importance to the community may be overly positive, with CS8 seemingly unaware of the potential 
negative impacts of rumour and gossip. 
“…most of the staff tend to stick to themselves and to the departments that they work in. Once they begin working in 













Figure 16. The resilience profile for CS8, Private Retailer 
The self assessment of keystone vulnerabilities at CS8 indicates that the organisation may be significantly 
overestimating its preparedness and underestimating both susceptibility and criticality of organisational components. 
This seems to be due to the relationship with the wider organisational network of branded operations of which CS8 
is a member. As a retail operation keystone vulnerability is the integrity of the transportation network, both from a 
customer and staff access perspective, but also from a supplier viewpoint. CS8 has not engaged in any planning 
independent from its organisational network, and has never participated in emergency exercises other than for fire 
evacuation. 
CS8’s strength lies in its adaptive capacity. The organisation is relatively flexible, has the capacity for creative 
decision making, the support of a large organisational network and positive, hands-on leadership. This organisation 
also favours a substantial degree of autonomy in the workplace for decision makers, but this resulted in senior 
management being unaware of some key issues because staff believed they had responsibility for decision making. 
6.10 CS9 - Private Primary Producer 
CS9 represents the New Zealand operation of a large primary producer with international markets and a strong 
relationship with its parent company. The New Zealand side of the organisation is large and has a wide distribution 
throughout New Zealand with approximately 35 centres serviced by a central hub. Although the study already had 
several large organisations represented, CS9 was selected on the basis of its role in the primary sector; only the 
second organisation in the study as such. CS9 was not the organisation initially selected for this position in the 
study. However, the organisation approached before CS9 were unable to take part within the time-frames that the 
research demanded. A key contact came forward after being approached by another member of the resorgs research 
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The resilience profile for CS9 is presented in Figure 17 showing very high overall resilience relative to the other 
organisations in this study. This is due to its very high ranking for all attributes of resilience: situation awareness, 
identification and management of keystone vulnerabilities and adaptive capacity. It is very important to note that 
although CS9 has a very high resilience in this study this can only be compared to the other case study organisations 
and is not intended to represent the highest possible resilience for organisations in general. 
Typically CS9 has a very high degree of situation awareness of its operating environment, its reputation in that 
environment, its key stakeholders and its risk profile.  Overall, the only weaknesses for CS9 in situation awareness 
are related to its lowered knowledge of the impacts of large scale events on critical regional networks like electricity 
and telecommunications. 
While CS9 has identified some significant keystone vulnerabilities most of these are already being actively managed 
at the present time. These include the fragility of the telecommunications network and changes to the legislative 
environment in New Zealand.  This organisation conducts extensive risk management programs on a regular basis 
and also engages regularly in emergency scenario exercises, based predominantly on emergency communications. 










Figure 17. The resilience profile for CS9, the Primary Producer. 
From an adaptive capacity perspective, CS9 has significant flexibility in decision making due to the financial, 
logistical and technical support of the parent organisation. The other side of this coin, however is that for very large 
events, the distal nature of the parent organisation may impact on effective and timely communications and 
consequently on the resilience of CS9. Silo mentality is an issue, but improving communications and awareness of 
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“[We are] a bit of a closed mind, even at relatively senior level to the potential of the org to do better. Perhaps a bit 
too analytical…almost to the extent of paralysis by analysis.” Middle manager, CS9 
‘[The organisation has] become more able to cope with unexpected things in last 4-5 years because we had more of 
those kind of things…we now look at totally new way to do things. People move out of their comfort zone. We have 
developed greater levels of management judgement, contingency planning and our awareness of the environment 
has grown, at corporate and at site level in most cases. Most sites [regional offices in New Zealand] have had a lot 
of change in the last few years.’ Senior manager, CS9 
6.11 CS10 - Private Technology Provider 
CS10 is the smallest organisation involved in this study with just eight full time employees and was selected 
primarily because small organisations were under-represented in the study. The organisation is a private business 
that operates in the supply of technological services to clients (Quaternary sector; one of only three organisations to 
do so in this study). In addition, CS9 has an owner/operator governance structure and this offered a chance to look 
more deeply into this type of structure; a different perspective to most of the other organisations in this study. 
Furthermore, CS10 was only the second organisation in this study to only have a single office and hence an entirely 
localised operation; an important selection criterion. 
The resilience profile for CS10 in Figure 18 shows a high overall resilience. CS10 shows a very high adaptive 
capacity, high situation awareness and a moderate ranking for the identification and management of keystone 
vulnerabilities. CS10 has a good situation awareness of its operating environment and how its place in that 
environment may change quickly. The organisation is limited in its ability to prioritise customers in terms of 
recovery because it doesn't adequately understand the requirements and dependencies of its customer base. 
Additionally, the organisation is only just beginning to appreciate the range of hazards that it may face and their 
potential ongoing consequences for the business. 
“During the workshop it became apparent to the participants that [CS10] has limited knowledge regarding the 
prioritisation of services to customers…Currently, if [CS10] were faced with the partial restoration of services to 
customers, the organisation has no systems in place to do this task effectively…” Excerpt from final report to CS10. 
Despite some significant keystone vulnerabilities, most notably the telecommunications and electricity services, 
CS10 generally identifies and manages its keystone vulnerabilities well. This is due in large part to the organisations 
understanding of its operating environment. The organisations principal keystone vulnerabilities include the 
availability of fuel for its generator and the ability for maintenance for the generator as well as the limited 
communication of strategic direction throughout the company.  The organisation has not yet engaged in planning 















Figure 18. The resilience profile for CS10, the Private Technology Provider. 
CS10 has a very high adaptive capacity based around the culture of the organisation, a strong balance sheet and 
financial stability as well as excellent communications internally, and good communications externally. CS10 does 
identify a lack of a strategic direction being clearly articulated in the organisation, leading to a 'fighting fires' 
mentality when dealing with crises. 
6.12 Results of the Case Study Organisations 
The results of each case study have been introduced in this chapter and each organisation has been assigned a 
resilience profile that summarises its relative overall resilience at the time of the study. A simple ranking system has 
been used in conjunction with the resilience profiles to give each organisation in the study a composite resilience 
score. Table 9 shows the composite scores for each organisation and the results are discussed below. 
It is important to note here that detailed final reports were sent to all of the case-study organisations, other than those 
who did not participate in the workshop processes before the production of this thesis. These reports highlighted the 
resilience issues to arise from the 5-Step process and were specifically tailored to each organisation. In addition, a 
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Table 9. A summary table showing the relative rankings and associated scores for each organisation in this study, 
together with a composite ranking of total resilience. 
Case-Study 
Organisation 
Level of    Situation 
Awareness 
Management of  
Keystone 
Vulnerabilities 
Degree of  
Adaptive Capacity 
Overall Resilience 
CS1 Moderate Low Moderate Moderate 
CS2 Low High Moderate Moderate 
CS3 High Very High High Very High 
CS4 High Moderate Moderate High 
CS5 Low Low Low Low 
CS6 Moderate High Very High High 
CS7 Low Very Low Moderate Low 
CS8 Moderate Moderate High High 
CS9 Very High Very High Very High Very High 
CS10 High Moderate High High 
The organisations were analysed for patterns of resilience by looking at the different organisation selection criteria 
previously discussed in Chapter 3 and comparing relative overall resilience scores for each category (Appendix F).  
The categories included the distribution of the organisation's offices (local, national, international), the distribution 
of the supply/customer network (local, national, international), the size of the organisation (number of full time 
employees), the expected relative dependence on people or other resources, the type of organisation (private, public, 
lifeline, government) and the sector (primary, secondary, tertiary, quaternary). Unsurprisingly, given the small 
sample size of organisations in this study and the intention to select organisation as diverse as possible, there were 
no observable patterns in the resilience information.  It is beyond the scope of this study to look in depth at 
particular types of organisations or industries or business sizes etc and determine relative resilience. However it may 
be possible to apply this methodology to a larger sample size within an organisational group and possibly establish 
some quantifiable metrics for assessing resilience. The merits of this will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
6.13 Summary and Conclusions 
Each organisation in this study was investigated individually to discover the key resilience issues relevant to that 
organisation. This information has been summarised in this chapter and the results presented as a relative overall 
resilience profile, comparing each organisation against the others in the study. Comparison of the profiles shows no 
observable pattern in overall resilience for a variety of categorisations; number of employees, industry sector, size, 
geographic distribution etc. This is no surprise as the organisations were selected to represent the greatest diversity 







7 IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGIES AND FUTURE WORK 
7.1 Introduction 
A set of 15 resilience indicators have been identified from the case study information.  Each of these indicators 
relates specifically to one of the attributes of resilience: situation awareness, keystone vulnerabilities and adaptive 
capacity.  The description of the indicators is presented in Chapter 5. 
A key point to note regarding the resilience indicators is that they should not just be considered in isolation.  Several 
indicators are intrinsically linked and highlight the relationship between situation awareness, keystone 
vulnerabilities and adaptive capacity in addressing overall resilience in organisations.  Identifying some of the 
relationships between the indicators is the first step to developing effective implementation strategies for 
organisations seeking to improve their resilience.  Table 10 shows a matrix of the resilience indicators and illustrates 
which indicators appear to be influenced by, or have influence over other indicators.  A full statistical analysis of 
this information was outside of the scope of this research given the largely qualitative nature of the data.  Future 
work would ideally investigate these relationships more definitively using factor analysis and verification. 
Table 10. A matrix showing the relationships between each of the resilience indicators. 
 SA1 SA2 SA3 SA4 SA5 KV1 KV2 KV3 KV4 KV5 AC1 AC2 AC3 AC4 AC5 
SA1 ?   ?    ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? 
SA2  ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?      ? 
SA3   ?  ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?  ?  
SA4    ? ? ?  ? ? ?   ?   
SA5     ? ? ? ? ?   ? ? ? ? 
KV1      ? ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? 
KV2       ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? 
KV3        ?  ? ? ?   ? 
KV4         ? ? ? ?  ?  
KV5          ? ? ?  ?  
AC1           ? ?  ? ? 
AC2            ? ? ? ? 
AC3             ? ? ? 
AC4              ? ? 
AC5               ? 
In developing strategies for addressing organisational resilience it is important to provide tangible, economic and 
effective outcomes.  A key issue in this study was engaging organisations and making the concept of resilience an 
attractive and attainable goal, not just another imposed process that involves a lot of time, effort and, critically, 
human resources.  Another important point to communicate to organisations is that developing resilience in day-to-
day business will improve the performance in the event of a crisis or emergency.  For example, the ability of 
organisations to develop effective communications structures, increase their awareness of stakeholders limitations 
and expectations, invest in emergency exercises and planning, together with clarifying recovery priorities and 
enhancing the effectiveness of governance structures.  An organisation investing in developing these is very likely to 
improve its ability to conduct business in both crisis and non-crisis times.  This is somewhat of a paradox because 
the way that organisations operate in response to a crisis is different to that for business as usual situations.  The 
strategies included in this chapter are designed to improve the ability of an organisation to respond to a crisis by 
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improving the performance of critical areas of the business that will impact on the effectiveness of its emergency 
response and thereby increasing overall resilience.  Additionally, this chapter discusses the use of the 5-Step process 
as a vehicle for beginning the resilience process and encouraging its development in organisations over the longer 
term.  This chapter also explores some of the future work identified as a result of this study and its outcomes. 
7.2 Strategies for Improving the Management of Organisational Resilience 
At the end of each case-study, a set of resilience recommendations were produced; partially created in conjunction 
with organisations during the workshops.  These are called Action Plans and indicate where the greatest issues for 
organisations lie in terms of developing resilience.  The Action Plans form the basis of the resilience management 
strategies suggested in this study.  Table 11 shows which of the resilience indicators are addressed in each of the 
following strategies and highlights that by using all of the strategies proposed below, an organisation can effectively 
target each of the resilience indicators. 
7.2.1 Communications Strategy 
A communications strategy for organisations targets the creation and maintenance of effective and 
respectful communications and relationships with all stakeholders, internally and externally.  This strategy 
is broken down into units that address selected resilience indicators namely SA
1
, SA3, KV3, and AC1-5. 
7.2.1.1 What Do Others Here Do? 
In order to address issues relating to roles and responsibilities, improve the negative aspects of silo 
mentality and improve communications, relationships and the flow of information, it is important to 
understand who does what in the organisation and who might replace them.  This includes identifying those 
employees with key skills and specialist knowledge who are likely to be important for a range of different 
crisis types, and ensure the maintenance of those skills and knowledge over the long term. 
Organisations can create semi-formal succession plans based on the sharing of roles and responsibilities 
between departments and even offices.  These may take the form of short term secondments or the 
inclusion of identified key staff in emergency planning and crisis communications exercises (see Section 
7.2.3) to facilitate sharing of knowledge. 
7.2.1.2 Leadership and Governance 
An important part of leadership in a crisis is the ability for all key decision makers to have an equal voice. 
This research showed that having an equal voice does not always come naturally for organisations and 
teams and individuals can use emergency exercises to help develop this ability.  Different members of the 
decision making team can take on the primary communications and leadership roles and practice 
succession of leadership and governance in an organisation.  This also helps to break down silo mentality 
across departments and between decision makers. 
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7.2.1.3 Keep in Mind the Bigger Picture 
For all staff, it is critical to clearly delineate the organisational goals and objectives, how the organisation 
intends to achieve these in various crises and what are the organisations minimum operating requirements. 
These then need to be communicated to all employees to ensure they essentially have the same goals and 
vision for the organisation.  Staff engagement surveys and regular exercises can be used to help decision 
makers target groups that may not have an adequate understanding of the organisational vision, and also 
encourage staff to consider their own roles in achieving this in an emergency. 
7.2.1.4 Stakeholder Welfare 
An organisation should continue to develop a clear understanding of the expectations, obligations and 
limitations for both itself and of key stakeholders.  This can be achieved by employing staff surveys, 
encouraging the development of discussion groups across the organisation, and engaging in specific pre-
crisis communications with key customers, suppliers, consultants etc.  As part of the communications with 
external stakeholders, an organisation may consider discussing preferential service agreements with 
consultants and suppliers, or engage in performance guarantees with key customers or clients.  Creating 
clear and effective communications pathways with stakeholders will improve relationships, improve 
information flow and the quality of information and break down negative impacts of silo mentality.  It will 
also increase the awareness of stakeholder groups throughout the organisation and improve loyalty and 
commitment to the organisation. 
Table 11. A table showing which of the resilience indicators are targeted by the proposed resilience management 
strategies. 
 Resilience Management Strategies 
Indicator Communications Business Resources Emergency Planning 
SA1 ?  ? 
SA2  ? ? 
SA3 ? ? ? 
SA4  ? ? 
SA5  ? ? 
KV1   ? 
KV2   ? 
KV3 ? ? ? 
KV4  ? ? 
KV5  ? ? 
AC1 ?  ? 
AC2 ?  ? 
AC3 ? ? ? 
AC4 ? ? ? 
AC5 ?  ? 
7.2.2 Business Resources Strategy 
A key part of developing resilience is for organisations to have a clear understanding of what resources 
they have available to them and what is required to meet minimum operation functions.  In order to achieve 
this, an organisation must also develop its awareness of the range of events and the potential consequences 
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it is exposed to.  The business resources strategy addresses this from a physical and human resources 
perspective and targets resilience indicators SA 2-5, KV 3-5, and AC3 and AC 4. 
7.2.2.1 What could hit us and how bad could it be? 
Often looking at hazard events from a traditional risk viewpoint creates an incomplete picture of the threats 
to organisations.  There are always going to be events that cannot be prepared for because they have not 
been identified.  Or there are hazards that are of paramount importance because, despite their low 
probability of occurrence, the outcomes are entirely unacceptable for organisations.  Additionally, some 
events occur together, or one event triggers another resulting in cascading failures which may not even 
originate with the organisation in question.  Therefore, it is critical that organisations engage in identifying 
the range of hazards that pose a potential threat and their consequences together with identifying the 
opportunities that may arise.  Additionally, looking at resilience from a consequence based perspective 
rather than looking at individual hazards enables organisations to address specific outcomes when 
developing planning strategies.  These outcomes may arise from a wide range of hazards which can 
simplify the planning process. 
7.2.2.2 What are we all about? 
It is critical for organisations to accurately spell out what their strategic vision for the future is, and if 
possible, how it intends to achieve this broadly speaking.  Not only is this important for day-to-day 
decision making in a complex environment, but in crises it is the ability to look forward and have 
something to work towards that assists an effective response.  This is only achievable if all employees, and 
even critical external stakeholders, also have a clear view of where that organisation is intending to head. 
This is crucial for effective leadership and decision making, particularly in an emergency situation.  In 
addition, an organisation must then clearly identify its principal business functions and its minimum 
operating requirements.  This is likely to include recovery priorities. 
7.2.2.3 What do we have at our disposal? 
Once an organisation has a good awareness of the range of threats and their expected consequences and has 
established its essential functions, it can then identify the resources needed to maintain those functions in a 
crisis.  Essentially this involves a business impact assessment looking at buildings and other structures, 
contents and security issues, critical services and where the organisation would conduct an emergency 
response from.  This also involves what would be required to facilitate and maintain operations from a 
remote location if this was desired or required.  Physical resources may also involve an inventory of what 
services and equipment could be provided by external stakeholders and considering how to secure those in 
a crisis.  This is likely to include insurance issues. 
In identifying minimum operating requirements it is critical to also identify the individuals and groups who 
are responsible for achieving these.  Organisations should be aware of what staff limitations may be in a 
crisis, what additional human resources may be available, as well as how to engage with employees and 
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with external stakeholders to assist in meeting minimum operating requirements.  Many of the points 
already highlighted in the communications strategy can also be employed to assist here. 
7.2.3 Emergency Planning Strategy 
Developing resilience in an organisation goes hand in hand with developing some emergency planning 
strategies to assist in getting over the trauma of an event and quickly towards recovery.  This strategy 
incorporates the most important aspects of emergency planning for organisations and it addresses all of the 
resilience indicators. 
7.2.3.1 Response to Crises 
Organisations need to consider some basic principals when developing emergency plans.  Firstly they need 
to identify key individuals who might be required in different types of emergencies, ensure that contact 
details for these people are readily available and updated and that they are aware of their potential input. 
There should also be a system in place for the rostering of staff and broad knowledge of stand- down 
periods. Secondly, a pre-arranged meeting place and an alternative should be selected.  Organisations 
should also establish a protocol so that staff know who should meet, when, and where and what alternatives 
will be available.  Thirdly, organisations should ensure that all staff have some degree of personal 
preparation both at home and at the workplace.  Finally, an effective protocol for deciding what 
information to communicate to stakeholders is required together with alternative strategies for how this 
may be achieved in different events. 
7.2.3.2 Recovery from Crises 
As organisations move into a recovery phase there is a different set of requirements that will be critical. 
Firstly, organisations should consider how they stand-down from an emergency response, what the 
leadership structure will be and how stakeholders will be informed.  Secondly, there should be an ongoing 
survey of the organisation, its operating environment and markets to see if the organisational vision and 
strategic plan are still applicable moving forward into recovery.  Thirdly, organisations should have a good 
understanding of what external assistance may be available, and the details of business interruption 
insurance.  This also involves a clear awareness of the limitations of external organisations to provide 
assistance following a large scale event in a time frame that is appropriate for the organisation.  Finally, 
there is often going to be long term, ongoing issues in terms of stress and trauma for employees following a 
crisis and the organisation should consider how it can monitor the health of its workforce and meet ongoing 
requirements of assistance. 
7.2.3.3 Exercises 
Planning for emergencies is only effective if the plans actually work.  It is critical that organisations engage 
in training and informing all staff of what is expected in a crisis.  Exercising enables an organisation to test 
its plan, identify aspects that do or don't work as well as expected and raise the level of employee 
awareness of both hazard consequences and organisational obligations.  Developing a working plan and 
training and educating staff can also be a significant marketing tool for organisations. 
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7.3 The 5-Step Process as an Implementation Tool 
The 5-Step process detailed in Chapter 4 has been created both as an assessment tool and as a resilience 
management and development tool.  This process can therefore assist organisations to implement the above 
resilience management strategies.  In addition, the scaleable nature of the 5-Step process means that organisations 
can use it to analyse different departments, groups within the organisations, leadership teams, and even individuals 
if required.  Further, an organisation can use the process to address resilience issues between itself and its key 
external stakeholders by applying the tools at a multi-organisational scale.  The details of how various parts of the 5-
Step process may be used to achieve this are discussed below. 
7.3.1 Consequence Scenarios 
A significant issue for organisations in this study has been the poor awareness of the range of hazards an 
organisation is likely to be exposed to, and the consequences that result from these hazards.  Further, 
organisations do not have a clear understanding of the relationships between events, or the possible 
opportunities that could arise.  The Consequence Scenarios are a valuable tool when used in conjunction 
with the above strategies for communications, business resource prioritisation and emergency planning.  As 
previously mentioned above, often organisations find it difficult to approach planning from an all-hazards 
approach.  This is somewhat contrary to how many organisations identify risks and is often an onerous task 
to consider planning for all possible events, or even engaging in planning for the top 10 identified risks. 
Therefore approaching planning from a consequence perspective, in conjunction with traditional risk 
identification and management practices, is valuable.  Organisations can still engage in traditional risk 
management and conform to current risk management standards.  However, they can also look at these 
risks from the perspective of their broad consequences and then create resilience management strategies to 
address these rather than plan for every possible risk.  This also enables organisations to address the 
consequences of events that they may not have previously identified.  Often a range of hazards will have 
similar consequences therefore planning on a consequence based platform can be more economical and 
practical for organisations. 
7.3.2 Keystone Vulnerabilities and Matrices 
The value of identifying keystone vulnerabilities and the use of the vulnerability matrix is also important 
for the implementation of the resilience strategies outlined above.  Organisations can utilise the above 
strategies to identify the most important components for various types of events and consequences, and 
then isolate those that present the greatest threats and opportunities.  At present the vulnerability matrices 
are only produced on a qualitative basis and in order to provide more value there is a need to quantify this 
process.  This is explored in Section 7.4.1.2. Additionally, as mentioned in Chapter 4, the vulnerability 
matrices are potentially valuable for organisations wanting to plan for particular events such as a pandemic 
or as demanded by clients, for example.  The use of the susceptibility information from the self assessment 
can be used to clearly identify the keystone vulnerabilities for a particular event, and provide the 
organisation with a more specific target for planning.  This technique can also be used as a marketing 
strategy to illustrate to (potential and existing) clients and customers the advanced ability of the 
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organisation to identify and address its keystone vulnerabilities.  Finally, the vulnerability matrices and 
assessment process can spark considerable debate regarding the prioritisation of issues, and this can be 
viewed as a positive step to improving communications pathways, the flow of knowledge and the break 
down of silo mentality in an organisation. 
7.3.3 Readiness Exercises and Disaster Simulations (REDS) 
During this study, the value of the REDS was significant for organisations in improving their situation 
awareness, allowing the identification and experience of keystone vulnerabilities together with advancing 
adaptive capacity.  The simple structure of the REDS is a strength and it is a technique that is flexible 
enough to meet an organisations time limitations and still provide value.  The importance of exercising was 
highlighted as a resilience indicator (KV 2, See Chapter 5) and REDS offers an effective tool to help 
organisations facilitate this.  REDS can be used at all stages of the resilience management process, from 
planning, through testing of the plan, and then to implementation and ongoing training of staff.  REDS can 
also be used to assist the management of resilience issues at a variety of scales, and explore team dynamics 
and leadership qualities within specific teams of individuals.  They can also be used to increase the 
awareness and shared objectives of different organisations that require a close working relationship in day-
to-day situations and in crises. 
7.4 Future Work 
This research has highlighted some areas for future work to further improve the knowledge of resilience in 
organisations and develop better strategies for implementation and some suggested areas for future research are 
discussed below. 
7.4.1 Quantification of Resilience Measures 
A potential weakness of this study is that it only offers a qualitative assessment of resilience for 
organisations.  The following discussion explores how the information from this study could be modified to 
offer organisations a semi-qualitative or fully quantitative assessment of resilience.  The reasons for 
organisations seeking such an assessment is for a more standardised assessment of their operations and 
strategies against other organisations, possibly in the same industry, for a competitive advantage as well as 
for corporate social responsibility.  The value of this is significant from the perspective of individual 
organisations, but also from a wider community perspective; this would potentially encourage 
organisations to become more resilient and increasingly resilient organisations are likely to contribute to 
more resilient communities. 
7.4.1.1 Benchmarking of Resilience Indicators 
The identification of resilience indicators in this study is significant.  Benchmarking of these indicators is 
the next step to increasing the applicability and robustness of this process, and providing organisations with 
a standardised measure of resilience.  Future work is likely to include a detailed analysis of the components 
for each resilience indicator and establish metrics for assessing them across organisational boundaries.  
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This would include a better understanding of the range of performance for each indicator; what does a top 
performing organisation in each indicator look like compared to a poorly performing organisation? 
7.4.1.2 Quantification of Keystone Vulnerabilities  
As outlined in Section 7.3.2, there is a need to quantify keystone vulnerabilities for organisations. 
Organisations that identify their keystone vulnerabilities are likely to need a more structured approach to 
prioritising them, and a quantifiable model would assist in this process.  Additionally, it is important that 
the process is standardised across an organisation (between groups or departments or offices) and this may 
also allow comparison of keystone vulnerabilities for organisations in the same industry or sector. 
Potentially, this may present a way for organisations to highlight industry wide problems, and offer a way 
to measure any policy implemented to address them. 
7.4.2 Resilience Maturity Models 
In order for resilience management techniques to work on a wider scale than in this study, there needs to be 
a more detailed understanding of how these techniques lead to more mature organisations in terms of 
resilience.  The case-studies offer an insight into what a highly resilient organisation may look like 
compared to an organisation that has low resilience.  However, for resilience management strategies to be 
appealing to organisations there needs to be a measure of improvement.  Organisations need tangible 
evidence that they are moving forward in their resilience management strategies, and be able to promote 
this as an organisational strength.  It is likely that resilience will need to be assessed in organisations that 
have had experience with managing large scale disasters both successfully and not so successfully.  Given 
that the New Zealand context is relatively devoid of any such events in the recent past, this will need to be 
done from an international perspective.  This will have the added benefit of increasing the knowledge of 
how cultural differences impact on organisational resilience and may have relevance given the multi-
cultural nature of New Zealand society. 
7.4.3 Communication of Resilience 
One of the biggest problems for the implementation of resilience management strategies into organisations 
is effectively communicating the need for the strategies.  Additionally, for those organisations that do 
choose to engage in resilience management, ensuring that the strategies are adequately communicated 
within the organisation is important.  Future work could include research into how to best ensure that 
resilience management is implemented and what the barriers are likely to be to this process. 
7.4.4 Resilient Sectors 
This research has concentrated on a number of different industries and organisational types to identify 
common resilience indicators.  As seen in Chapter 6 and in Appendix D, there are presently no apparent 
patterns to the degree of resilience for different industry sectors of types and sizes of organisation.  Future 
work could address this by looking at various sectors, for example critical infrastructure, and determining 
what is the range of resilience in these organisations.  Sectors could be compared against one another to 
identify which sectors are likely to need more attention in terms of resilience management from a policy 
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perspective.  Additionally, a strength of the methodology developed in this study is that it can be scaled to 
meet the requirements of the assessment.  Therefore, it is possible to use this methodology to look 
downwards into individual sectors, or upwards to look across sectors, and potentially to look at governing 
bodies and agencies.  
7.4.5 Resilient Leadership 
Another key area of organisational resilience is the influence of leadership, both in times of crisis and 
during day-to-day business.  This may be more relevant for smaller organisations where the resilience of 
the owner/operator may constitute the majority of the organisations resilience.  Some interesting questions 
arose during the case-studies that have relevance in future work on resilient leadership.  How heavily does 
an organisation lean on a highly resilient leader, and what happens to that organisation if this leader is 
removed?  What influence does the leadership have on the 'personality' of the organisation?  How can 
engagement between leadership and staff be improved to enhance overall organisational resilience?  What 
is the link between a resilient individual and a resilient organisation?  As discussed in Section 7.4.4. the 
methodology developed in this study is scalable, and therefore could be used to assess the resilience of 
individuals or small leadership teams within organisations. 
7.5 Summary and Conclusions 
The identification of resilience indicators that are common to all of the organisations in this study has been used to 
propose resilience management strategies and approaches for implementing them.  Three resilience management 
strategies are proposed; a communications strategy, a business resources strategy and an emergency planning 
strategy.  Table 8 illustrates which of the resilience indicators is addressed by each strategy.  The tools with which to 
assist implementation of these strategies are also discussed.  The value of the 5-Step process (Chapter 4) is 
considered, particularly the consequence scenarios, the vulnerability assessments and matrices and the Readiness 
Exercises and Disaster Simulations (REDS).  Finally, a discussion of future work explores how further research can 
be targeted to address some of the key issues to arise from this study.  These include a need for a more standardised 
measurement of resilience by benchmarking resilience indicators and quantifying keystone vulnerability 
assessments.  Additionally, future work could target resilient leadership, resilience maturity models, communication 






8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 Overview 
This research project has investigated the resilience of organisations in New Zealand.  The following chapter 
outlines this study, and offers a synthesis of the information included in the previous chapters.  This chapter looks at 
the definitions developed during this project and upon which much of this research is based.  The methodology is 
introduced and how that methodology has been used to gather information is explained.  The organisations that 
participated in this study are briefly described and the resilience indicators generated from the case study 
information are also described.  Finally, there is a short discussion of the proposed strategies for addressing the 
resilience indicators in organisations and possible methods of implementation. 
8.2 Definitions 
The definition of organisational resilience developed in this study is specific for organisations, and has originated as 
the result of a detailed review of relevant literature and from discussions with the case study organisations. 
Organisational resilience is defined as a function of the situation awareness, keystone vulnerabilities and adaptive 
capacity of an organisation in a complex, dynamic and interdependent system. 
The attributes of resilience introduced in this definition also warrant some clarification.  Situation awareness is a 
measure of an organisations understanding and perception of its entire operating environment.  This is the ability of 
an organisation to look forward for opportunities, identify crises and their consequences accurately and also 
understand the trigger factors for crises.  It also includes the organisations awareness of the resources it has 
available, its minimum operating requirements and the expectations, obligations and limitations in relation to its 
community of stakeholders, both internally (staff) and externally (customers, suppliers, consultants etc). 
Keystone vulnerabilities define those aspects of an organisation, operational and managerial, that have the potential 
to have significant negative impacts in a crisis situation.  These may relate to specific tangible organisational 
components such as buildings, computers and individual managers but these may also be less tangible components 
such as relationships between key groups, communications structures, and perception of the organisational strategic 
vision.  The impacts of keystone vulnerabilities may be either catastrophic (occur suddenly and take the failure of 
only one component to have a significant negative impact) or insidious (small failures of key components lead to a 
large scale cascading failure).  It is important for organisations to also have a clear understanding of the links 
between components and the vulnerabilities that may arise from these also. 
Adaptive capacity is a measure of the culture of the organisation that allows it to make decisions in a timely and 
appropriate manner both in day to day business and also in crises.  Adaptive capacity considers aspects of an 
organisation such as the leadership and decision making structures, the flow of information and knowledge and the 





The methodology used in this research follows that of a multiple case study analysis.  The main research question 
forming the basis of this study is 'what are the key resilience indicators that are common to all organisations'?  Ten 
case-study organisations have been selected to represent the widest possible diversity in terms of organisational size, 
sector, market distribution, type and location including private and public utilities, an education provider, a small 
technology provider and a rural local authority.  The organisations were studied individually using a 5-Step process 
developed during the study and designed in conjunction with the organisations themselves.  Table 12 outlines the 5-
Step process. 
A Grounded Theory method has been used to analyse the information for each case-study organisation and also used 
to assist in collating information across the organisations. 
A resilience profile was developed to assist organisations in visualising their overall resilience and to help identify 
the location of any weaknesses and the prioritisation of resources for further resilience management.  The resilience 
profile is assessed on qualitative scales of measurement, ranging from none to very high.  Collation of qualitative 
data is performed by giving each increment of resilience a numerical value (none = 0, low = 1…very high = 5) 
which are then multiplied to give an overall resilience rating.  Figure 19 shows two sample vulnerability profiles; 
profile (a) shows a very resilient organisation which rates very highly for all three attributes of resilience while 
profile (b) shows an organisation with less resilience.  Table 13 shows the relative levels of situation awareness, 
identification and management of keystone vulnerabilities and adaptive capacity, together with overall resilience for 
each of the case-study organisations. 
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Table 12. Details of the 5-Step process and the attributes of resilience that are addressed by each step. 
Step Details 
Step 1 
Interviews, Surveys and Reports 
Open ended interviews with key staff to gain a detailed understanding of the organisation in question.  
Interview data is collated and a discussion document issued together with an anonymous survey to 
help validate the information.  A final report is also issued. 
Consequence Scenarios 
A set of four scenarios that help organisations to visualise the types of events and the expected 
consequences they may be exposed to.  These are also used to encourage organisations to look at the 




The collation of a set of components that broadly represent the organisation at a pre-selected scale of 
study.  This is a quick systems mapping exercise and helps the organisation to identify its key 




The organisational components in Step 2 are assessed by the organisation according to their criticality 
for continued operations and the degree of preparedness the organisation believes it has in the event 
of their failure.  Assessments are performed initially from an all-hazards perspective for both the 
response phase and recovery phase of a crisis.  Additionally, an assessment for susceptibility may be 




A visual tool modelled on traditional risk matrices (AS/NZS 4360: 2004) that enable organisations to 
identify their keystone vulnerabilities and determine priorities regarding which components should be 
addressed first from a mitigation perspective. 
Step 5 
Readiness Exercises and Disaster Simulations (REDS) 
A desktop exercise whereby key employees participate in a simulated crisis event and develop 
tangible action plans to address critical issues.  This exercise also improves situation awareness and 
allows participants to experience keystone vulnerabilities in a simulated situation, as well as 









































(a) Resilience profile 
for Organisation X 






































(b) Resilience profile 
for Organisation X 
which has very low 
overall resilience 
Figure 19. Resilience profiles highlighting the difference between an organisation that is very highly resilient 














































CS1 Private Manufacturer Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
CS2 Rural Local Authority Low High Low Moderate 
CS3 Private Contractor High Very High High Very High 
CS4 Public Utility High Very High Moderate High 
CS5 Education Provider Low Moderate Low Low 
CS6 Private Wholesale Distribution Moderate High Very High High 
CS7 Private Utility Low Low Moderate Moderate 
CS8 Private Retail Moderate Moderate High High 
CS9 Primary Producer and Manufacturer Very High Very High Very High Very High 
CS10 Private Technology Provider High Moderate Very High High 
* Represents the identification and management of keystone vulnerabilities in the organisation 
**Overall resilience is determined relative to the other organisations in this study. 
8.4 Resilience Indicators 
A set of 15 resilience indicators have been identified in this study.  These indicators identify common issues of 
resilience for all of the 10 organisations in this study.  Each of the indicators is related to one of the three attributes 
of resilience that are described in Section 8.2 above; situation awareness, keystone vulnerabilities and adaptive 
capacity.  Each organisation has been analysed to provide a relative estimate for each indicator which are in turn 
collated (see Section 8.3) to provide the overall estimate of relative overall resilience presented in Table 13.  Table 
14 shows each of the resilience indicators, their governing resilience attribute and a brief description of what 
features in the organisations contribute to them.  It is important to note that there are several intrinsic relationships 
between resilience indicators, just as there are key relationships between the attributes of resilience.  For example, 
indicator SA
1
, roles and responsibilities are governed by the attribute of situation awareness.  However, there 
appears to be a link between SA
1
 and other indicators, for example KV
5
: organisational connectivity, AC1: silo 










Table 14. A summary of the resilience indicators representing key issues for all organisations in this study. 
Attribute Resilience Indicator Description 
Roles & Responsibilities SA1 Awareness of roles and responsibilities of staff internally in an 
organisation and the roles and responsibilities of the 
organisation to its community of stakeholders 
Hazards & Consequences SA2 Awareness of the range of hazard types and their consequences 
(positive and negative) that the organisation may be exposed 
to. 
Connectivity Awareness SA3 Awareness of the links between the organisation and its entire 
community of stakeholders, internally (staff) and externally 
(customers, local authorities, consultants, competitors etc.) 
Insurance SA4 Awareness of the obligations and limitations in relation to 
business interruption insurance and other insurance packages 












Recovery Priorities SA5 Awareness of the minimum operations requirements and the 
priorities involved in meeting those requirements, together with 
expectations of key stakeholders. 
Planning KV1 The extent to which the organisation has participated in 
planning activities including risk management, business 
continuity and emergency management planning. 
Exercises KV2 The extent to which the organisation has been involved in 
external emergency exercises or created exercises internally for 
staff and stakeholders. 
Internal Resources KV3 The capability and capacity of physical, human and process 
related resources to meet expected minimum operating 
requirements in a crisis.  Includes economic strengths, 
succession and structural integrity of buildings. 
External Resources KV4 The expectations of the organisation for the availability and 














Connectivity KV5 The extent to which the organisation has become involved with 
other critical organisation to ensure the availability of expertise 
and resources in the event of a crisis. 
Silo Mentality Management AC1 The degree to which the organisation experiences the negative 
impacts of silo mentality and the occurrence of strategies in 
place for mitigating them. 
Communications & 
Relationships 
AC2 The effectiveness of communication pathways and 
relationships with all stakeholders, both internally and 
externally in day-to-day and crisis situations. 
Strategic Vision AC3 The extent to which the organisation has developed a strategic 
vision for the future operations and the degree to which that is 
successfully articulated through the organisation. 
Information & Knowledge AC4 The degree to which information and knowledge is acquired, 
retained and transferred throughout the organisation and 











Leadership & Management AC5 The degree to which leadership and management encourage 
flexibility and creativity in the organisation and how successful 






8.5 The Case-study organisations 
A total of 10 organisations have been analysed in this study.  All organisations have had the opportunity to review 
the information pertaining to them in this research to ensure their complete anonymity.  Interviews were conducted 
with up to three employees at a time, typically over a one hour period and most interviews were digitally recorded. 
Between four and 21 interviews were conducted with each organisation depending on their size and the availability 
of participants.  A discussion report followed the interviews to present this information to the organisations, together 
with a proposed set of organisational components for review.  A workshop date was determined and all but two of 
the organisations chose to participate in this part of the research (negotiations are still proceeding with one of these 
organisations to participate in a workshop at a later date).  The workshop ranged from between two hours to 
approximately four hours depending on the availability and willingness of participants.  Workshops provided an 
opportunity to present and test the 5-Step process and were valuable from a participant observation perspective. 
Workshops typically involved between 50% and 100% of interviewees. 
The data collected for each organisation was analysed and presented to the organisations as a final report, including 
a set of tangible action plans that were partially developed at the end of the workshop with participant involvement. 
The information from each organisation regarding resilience is presented in Chapter 6.  Resilience profiles were 
generated for the organisations upon integration of all the data to offer a picture of resilience relative to the other 
organisations in the study.  Table 10 (page 108) shows the overall information relating to resilience in each of the 
case study organisations together with a brief description of the organisations for comparison. 
8.6 Strategies for Resilience Management 
During work with all of the case study organisations a set of tangible action plans were developed with workshop 
participants forming the beginnings of a strategy for improved resilience management.  All of these plans have been 
collated and the information is presented as three generic resilience management strategies for organisations.  They 
include a resilient communications strategy, a business resources strategy and an emergency planning strategy.  
They are designed to target all of the resilience indicators in Table 11.  The three proposed strategies are described 
below. 
8.6.1 Resilient Communications Strategy 
What Do Others Here Do?  Identification of key employees and external stakeholders with specialist 
knowledge and/or skills.  Involves a plan of knowledge sharing and awareness building of who has what 
knowledge and who will replace them if required.  This may involve short term secondments or semi 
formal succession plans to build knowledge and awareness. 
Leadership and Governance.  Develop the ability of all key decision makers to have an equal voice in a 




Keep in Mind the Bigger Picture.  Provide clear delineation of the organisations strategic goals and 
establishing effective means for articulating this vision to all employees.  Also, provide further monitoring 
and ongoing involvement in exercises to ensure that the message is reaching all target groups. 
Stakeholder Welfare.  Encourage the development and maintenance of policies to ensure a clear and 
enduring understanding of the expectations and limitations of all stakeholders, internally and externally. 
8.6.2 Business Resources Strategy 
What could hit us and how bad could it be?  Allows a deeper understanding of the range of potential events 
that the organisation may be exposed to and the expected consequences.  This can involve brainstorming 
exercises, risk identification strategies and scenario creation to build awareness. 
What are we all about?  Identification of the key business functions, minimum operating requirements and 
the long term organisational strategy and vision.  This is linked to the resilient communications strategy. 
What do we have at our disposal?  Ensuring that the resources the organisation has available are adequately 
prepared to meet the requirements of the organisation in a crisis.  This may involve an inventory of internal 
and external resources and their potential limitations. 
8.6.3 Emergency Planning Strategy 
Response to crises.  Crises differ significantly from day-to-day business.  Organisations need to develop 
business as usual resilience which is in turn complimented by emergency response principles for different 
types of crises.  This will include rostering of staff, personal preparedness measures, establishing 
emergency operations centres and alternatives for crisis communications networks. 
Recovery from crises.  Recovery is rarely a discrete time frame, so organisations must consider how to 
stand down from an emergency, what external assistance may be available, how to assess the applicability 
of the strategic vision for potentially changed markets and environments and ongoing trauma for staff and 
external stakeholders. 
Exercises.  Testing plans is vital as is adequately informing and training staff about expectations during a 
crisis.  Exercises can be used to test and modify plans, train employees and engage with key external 
stakeholders. 
8.7 Implementation Issues 
The 5-Step process was designed as a resilience management tool as well as being a methodology to assess 
organisational resilience.  The use of the consequence scenarios could provide organisations with a valuable tool to 
further knowledge and awareness of the range and consequences of events that may be a threat.  This is critical for 
organisations developing the business resources strategy.  The consequence scenarios are also useful for the 
development exercises as suggested in the emergency planning strategy.  The consequence scenarios are a useful 
tool to prompt discussion and debate regarding the degree of impact of particular types of events.  This can help the 
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level of awareness of roles and responsibilities by improving understanding of how badly impacted the organisation 
may be in different types of emergencies. 
The use of vulnerability assessments and matrices together with appropriate selection of organisational components 
is another valuable tool for organisational resilience.  These tools together assist organisations in seeing where their 
principal weaknesses lie, the vulnerability of the links between organisational components and help to determine 
management priorities for keystone vulnerabilities.  This is important from a communications perspective because 
different people and groups are likely to have different perceptions about what issues should be addressed first.  It 
also has value from a resources perspective by helping organisations to focus their attention, time and resources on 
the issues that matter the most.  Finally from a planning perspective, it is important that organisations identify their 
keystone vulnerabilities for both response and recovery. 
Readiness Exercises and Disaster Simulations (REDS) offer significant value to organisations for the 
implementation of the suggested resilience strategies.  These encourage participants to broaden their understanding 
about the skills and knowledge of others in the organisation, help to facilitate successful emergency 
communications, allow the experience of keystone vulnerabilities in a simulated event and assist in developing 
decision making skills. 
8.8 Future Work 
Further development of the methodology would include a more standardised approach to both keystone vulnerability 
prioritisation and for the measurement of the resilience indicators in organisations.  This is likely to require a more 
quantifiable methodology than is currently available.  Further, the extent of resilience in this study is limited to the 
case-study organisations.  Because the researcher did not know prior to this study what a resilient organisation 
would look like, it is impossible to say if any of the case-studies represent the most or least resilient organisations 
possible.  Future work would include expanding the methodology to look at organisations that have significant 
experience with large scale disasters, as well as organisations from other countries to investigate the importance of 
cultural issues in resilience.  This also means that further work needs to be done to create maturity models of 
resilience; organisations need to have tangible and achievable goals in becoming more resilient in order to maintain 
their engagement with the process. 
8.9 Synthesis 
The creation of more resilient organisations has some significant implications for improving resilience of entire 
communities.  This study has highlighted a set of 15 resilience indicators that are common to 10 case study 
organisations, selected to offer a wide representation of organisations in New Zealand.  In addition, this study has 
developed a resilience assessment and management methodology, the 5-Step process.  This process has been created 
in conjunction with the case studies to provide a real world context and offer tangible, achievable goals for 
organisations seeking to become more resilient.  This is hoped to have implications on developing more resilient 








Adger, W. N. (2000) "Social and Ecological Resilience:   are they related?"   Progress in Human Geography 24: 
347-364.  
 
Adger,  W.  N., Brooks,  N.,  Kelly,  M.,  Bentham,  G.,  Agnew,  M.,  and  Erikson,  S.  (2004)  New Indicators  of 
Vulnerability  and  Adaptive  Capacity.   Tyndall  Centre  for  Climate  Change  Research,  Technical  Report  7. 
University of East Anglia, Norwich. 
Alesch, D. J. and Holly, J. N. (1998). “Small business failure, survival and recovery: lessons from the January 1994 
Northridge Earthquake”. NEHRP Conference and Workshop on Research on the Northridge, California Earthquake 
of January 17, 1994. 
Alesch D. J., Holly, J. N., Matter. E., and Nagy, R. (2001).  Organisations at Risk: what happens when small 
businesses and not-for-profits encounter natural disasters?  Public Entity Risk Institute, Fairfax. 
AS/NZS. (2004). AS/NZS 4360: 2004: Risk Management Standard.   Standards Australia/ Standards New Zealand. 
Bahora, A.S., Collins, T.C., Davis, S.C., Go knur, S.C., Kearns, J.C., Lieu, T.N., Nguyen, T.P., Zing, J.S., Horopito, 
B.M. and Pâté, S.D. (2003). “Integrated Peer-to-Peer Applications for Advanced Emergency Response Systems.  
Part 1: Concept of Operations”.  Proc., Systems and Information Engineering Design Symposium, IEEE, 
Charlottesville, VA. 
Barabasi, A.-L. (2003). Linked: The new science of networks. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Peruses Publishing. 
Bartlett, C. A. and Ghoshal, S. (1998) Beyond strategic planning to organizational learning: lifeblood of the 
individualized corporation.  Strategy and Leadership, Jan-Feb: 34 – 39. 
 
Berggen, P. (2005). Observing Situational Awareness: when difference in opinion appear. In Montgomery, H., 
Lipshitz, R., and Brehmer, B. (Eds), How professionals make decisions.  Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, 
NJ. pp233-241 
Blaikie, P., Cannon, T., Davis, I. and Wisner, B. (1994) At Risk:  Natural Hazards, People’s Vulnerability, and 
Disasters.  New York, NY:  Rutledge. 
Bierly, P. E. and Spender, J. C. (1995).  Culture and high reliability organizations:  the case of nuclear submarines.  
Journal of Management. 21(4): 639-656 
Borneman, J. (2005).  “Recognizing the power of resilience”.  Textile World. 155(6), 28-30. 
Bourrier, M. (1996).  Organising maintenance work at two American nuclear nuclear power plants.  Journal of 
Contingencies and Crisis Management.  4(2): 104-112. 
Britton, N. R. and Clark, G. J. (2000).  “From response to resilience: emergency management reform in New 
Zealand”.  Natural Hazards Review.  1, 145-150.  
Brooks, N. (2003) Vulnerability, Risk and Adaptation:  A Conceptual Framework.  Tyndall Centre for Climate 
Change Research, Working Paper 38. University of East Anglia, Norwich. 
Brooks, N., Adger, W. N. and Kelly, P. M. (2005) The Determinants of Vulnerability and Adaptive Capacity at the 
National Level and the Implications for Adaptation.  Global Environmental Change 15(2): 151-163. 
Brunsdon, D. R. and Dalziell, E. P. (2005).  “Making organizations resilient: understanding the reality of the 
challenge”.  Resilient Infrastructure Conference.  Rotor 8-9 August, 2005. 
Bryant, A. (2002). Re-grounding grounded theory.  Journal of information technology theory and application. 2(1): 
25-42. 
 140
Buchanan, M. (2004). Power Laws & the New Science of Complexity Management. Strategy+Business, 
www.bah.com. 2004. 
Buckle P., Mars, G. and Smile. S. (2000). “New approaches to assessing vulnerability and resilience”. Australian 
Journal of Emergency Management, 15(2), 8-15. 
Cannon-Bowers, J.  A., Salas,  E. and Converse, S. (1993) Shared Mental Models  in Expert Team Decision Making.  
In  Individual  and  Group  Decision  Making:   Current  Issues.   N.  J.  Castellan  Jar  (ed.).   Hillsdale NJ:  
Lawrence Erlbaum. 
Carroll, J.M. (2006).  Scenario Based Design.  In. Karwoski, W (Ed) International Encyclopedia of Ergonomics and 
Human Factors. CRC Press.  Pp 198-211 
CDEM. Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act: 2006.  
Centre for Advance Engineering. (1991). Lifelines in Earthquakes:  Wellington Case-Study:  Project Report.  
Christchurch, New Zealand. 
Chang, S. and Falit-Baiamonte, A. (2002).  “Disaster vulnerability of businesses in the 2001 Nisqually earthquake.” 
Environmental Hazards 4. 59-71. 
Charmaz, K. (2000) Grounded theory: objectivist and constructivist methods.  In Denzine, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.E. 
(Eds). Handbook of qualitative research (2nd ed).  Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA. 
 
Charmaz,  C  (1990)    'Discovering  Cronic  Illness:  using  grounded  theory'.    Social  Science  and  Medicine. 
30:1161-1172 
 
Chernyshenko, O.S., and Stark, S. (2005). Measurement in Organizational Psychology. Encyclopedia of Social 
Measurement, Vol. 2, 957-963. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. 
Coates, J. (2006).  “Anticipating disaster from research, or putting the fear of God into top management”.  Research 
- Technology Management. 49(1), 6-9. 
Comfort, L., Wisner, B., Cutter, S., Pulwarty, R., Hewitt, K., Oliver-Smith, A., Wiener, J., Fordham, M., Peacock, 
W. and Krimgold, F. (1999) Reframing Disaster Policy: The Global Evolution of Vulnerable Communities.  
Environmental Hazards. 1(1): 39-44. 
Coombs, M. G., Green, A. E. and Owen, D. W. (1988) Substantive Issues in the definition of ‘Localities’:  Evidence 
from Sub-group Local Labour Market Areas in the West Midlands.  Regional Studies. 22: 303-318. 
Cote, M.  (2002)  A matter of trust and respect. http://www.camagazine.com/index.cfm/ci_id/6798/la_id/1.htm.  
(accessed January 20, 2007). 
Coutu, D. L. (2002).  “How resilience works”.  Harvard Business Review. 80(3), 46-55. 
D’Aveni, R. (1994) Hypercompetition: the dynamics of strategic maneuvering.  New York, Free Press. 
Daft, R. L. and Weick, K. E. (1984).  Toward a model of organizations as interpretation systems.  Academy of 
Management Review.  9: 284-295. 
Dalhamer, J.M. and Tierney K.J. (1996) winners and loosers: predicting business disaster revovery outcomes 
following the Northridge Earthquake.  University of Delaware, Disaster Research Centre, Preliminary Papers 243.  
http://dspace.udel.edu:8080/dspace/bitstream/19716/651/1/PP243.pdf (accessed 22 January, 2006). 
Dalziell, E. P. (2005).  “Understanding the vulnerability of organisations”.  The 1855 Wairarapa Earthquake 
Symposium.  Te Papa, Wellington, September 2005. 
Dalziell, E. P., and McManus, S. T. (2004) Resilience, Vulnerability and Adaptive Capacity; Implications for 
Systems Performance.  International Forum for Engineering Decision Making (IFED); Switzerland.  December 
2004. 
 141
Davidson, K.   (2005)   Towards and integrated sustainability indicator framework.   International Journal of 
Environment, Workplace and Employment. 1(3-4): 370 - 382. 
Denevan, W. M. (1983) Adaption, Variation and Cultural Geography.  Professional Geographer. 35(4): 399-406. 
deVries, J. (1985) Historical Analysis of Climate-Society Interaction. In Kates, R. W., Ausubel, J. H. and Berberian, 
M. (eds.), Climate Impact Assessment.  Wiley, New York. 
Dooley, K. (1996), "A Nominal Definition of Complex Adaptive Systems," The Chaos Network, 8(1): 2-3. 
Dooley, K. (1997). A complex adaptive systems model of organizational change.  Nonlinear Dynamic, Psychology 
and Life Science.  1(1): 69-97. 
Dooley, K. (2002), “Organizational Complexity,” International Encyclopedia of Business and Management, M. 
Warner (ed.), London: Thompson Learning, p. 5013-5022. 
Dovers, S. and Handmer, J. (1992) Uncertainty, Sustainability and Change.  Global Environmental Change. 2:262-
276. 
Durkin, M. E. (1984). “The economic recovery of small businesses after earthquakes; the Coalinga experience”. 
International Conference on Natural Hazards Mitigation Research and Practice, New Delhi, India., 
El Sawah, S, Abbas, H A., and Sarker, R. (2006).  Risk in interdependent systems:  a framework for analysis and 
mitigation through orchestrated adaption.  The artificial life and adaptive robotics laboratory.  University of New 
South Wales, Report TR-ALAR-200611013. 
Endsley, M. R. (1995).  “Towards a theory of situation awareness in dynamic systems”.  Human Factors. 37, 32-64. 
Endsley, M. R., Bolté, B. and Jones, D. G. (2003) Designing for Situation Awareness:  An Approach to User-
Centered Design.  London: Taylor & Francis 
Espinosa, J. A., Lerch, F. J. and Kraut, R. E. (2004) Explicit versus Implicit Coordination Mechanisms and Task 
Dependencies:  One Size Does Not Fit All. In Team Cognition.  E. Salas and S. M. Fiore (eds.). 107-129. 
Washington DC:  American Psychological Association. 
Etkin, D. (1999). “Risk transference and related trends: driving forces towards more mega-disasters.” Environmental 
Hazards. 1: 69-75. 
Flin, R. (1996).  Sitting in the hot seat: leaders and teams for critical incident management.  Wiley, Chinchester. 
Folke, C., Carpenter, S., Elmqvist, T., Gunderson, L., Holling, C.S., Walker, B., Bengtsson, J., Berkes, F., Colding, 
J., Danell, K., Falkenmark, M., Gordon, L., Kasperson, R., Kautsky, N., Kinzig, A., Levin, S., Maler, K. G., 
Moberg, F., Ohlsson, L., Olsson, P., Ostrom, E., Reid, W., Rockstroem, J., Savenije, H., Svedin, U. (2002).  
“Resilience and sustainable development:  building adaptive capacity in a world of transformations”.  
Environmental Advisory Council to the Swedish Government, Stockholm, Sweden. 
Folke, C. (2006) Resilience:  The Emergency of a Perspective for Social-Ecological Systems Analyses.  Global 
Environmental Change. 16(3): 253-267 
Freudenberg, W.R., 1988. Perceived risk, real risk: social science and the art of probabilistic risk assessment. 
Science 242, 44±49. 
Fussel, H. (2005) Vulnerability in Climate Change Research:  A Comprehensive Conceptual Framework.  
eScholarship Repository, University of California http://repositories.cdlib.org/ucias/breslauer/6 accessed 3 January 
2007. 
Gallopin, G. C. (2006) Linkages between Vulnerability, Resilience and Adaptive Capacity.  Global Environmental 
Change. 16(3): 293-303 
 142
Gell-Mann, M. (1994). The Quark and the Jaguar.  W. H. Freeman, New York. 
Gill,  T.  (2006)    Countering  the  economic  effects  of  bird  flu  through  teleworking.    Journal  of  Business 
Continuity and Emergency Planning. 1(1): 27-36. 
 
Glasner, B. G. and A. L. Strauss (1967) The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for 
Qualitative Research, Chicago, Illinois, Aldine. 
 
Glasner, B. G. (1978). Theoretical Sensitivity: advances in the methodology of grounded theory.  Sociology Press, 
Mill Valley, CA. 
 
Glasner, B.G. (1992). Basics of grounded theory analysis: emergency vs. forcing.  Sociology Press, Mill Valley, 
CA. 
 
Glasner, B. G. (2001). Grounded Theory Perspective 1:  Conceptualization contrasted with description.  Sociology 
Press. 
 
Goh, S. C. (2002) Managing effective knowledge transfer.  Journal of Knowledge Management, 6(1): 23-30. 
Gorman J. C., Cooke, N. J. and Winner, J. L., (2006) Measuring Team Situation Awareness in Decentralised 
Command and Control Environments.  Ergonomics. 49(12-13): 1312-1325 
Goulding, C. (2005). Grounded theory, ethnography and phenomenology: a comparative analysis of three qualitative 
strategies for marketing research.  European Journal of Marketing. 39(3/4): 294-308. 
Grabowski, M and Roberts, K (1996) Human and organizational error in large scale systems.  IEEE Transactions on 
Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Part A, 26(1) 2-16 
Gregoriades, A. and Stucliffe, A. G. (2006) Automated Assistance for Human Factors Analysis in Complex 
Systems.  Ergonomics. 49(12-13): 1265-1287 
Grootjen M., Neerincx, M. A. and Veltman, J. A. 2006 Cognitive Task Load in a Naval Ship Control Centre: from 
identification to prediction.  Ergonomics. 49(12-13): 1238-1264 
Gunderson, L. H. (2000). "Ecological Resilience - In Theory and Application." Annual Review of Ecology, 
Evolution and Systematics. 31: 425-439. 
 
Gunderson,  L.  H.,  Holling,  C.  S.,  Pritchard  Jr.,  L.  and  Peterson,  G.  D.  (2002)  Resilience  of  Large-Scale 
Resource Systems.  In. Gunderson, L. H. and Pritchard Jr., L. (Eds.) Resilience and the Behaviour of Large- Scale 
Systems Washington DC, Island Press. p3-18. 
Gutwin, C. and Greenberg, S. (2004) The Importance of Awareness in Team Cognition in Distributed Collaboration.  
In. E. Salas and S. M. Fiore (Eds.) Team Cognition. 177-201. Washington DC:  American Psychological 
Association. 
Hagevik, S. (1998).  “Resilience required (adaptability as a desirable factor in a changing environment)”.  Journal of 
Environmental Health. 60(10). 37-39. 
Haig, B.D. (1995) Grounded theory as a scientific method.  Philosophy of education 1995: current issues. Urbana, 
Il, University of Illinois Press: 281-290 
 
Hamel, G. and Prahalad C. K. (1989) Strategic Intent.  Harvard Business Review, May-June 1989. 
 
Hasanali, F.  (2002)  Critical Success Factors of Knowledge Management. 
http://www.providersedge.com/docs/km_articles/Critical_Success_Factors_of_KM.pdf.    (accessed  January 20, 
2007). 
Heimann, C. F. L. (1993).  Understanding the Challenger disaster:  organisational subculture and the design of 
reliable systems.  American Political Science Review.  87(2): 421-438. 
 143
Holland, J.H., 1995. Hidden Order. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA. 
Holling,  C.  S.  (1973).  "Resilience  and  stability  of  ecological  systems."  Annual  Review  of  Ecology  and 
Systematics. 4: 1-23. 
 
Holling,  C.  S.  (1996).  Engineering  Resilience  vs.  Ecological  Resilience.  Engineering  Within  Ecological 
Constraints. P. C. Schulze. Washington DC, National Academy: 31-43. 
Holling, C. S., Berkes, F., and Folke, C. (1998) Science, Sustainability and Resource Management.  In:  Berkes, F., 
Folke, C (Eds.) Linking Social and Ecological Systems:  Management Practices and Social Mechanisms for 
Building Resilience.  Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, p 342-362. 
Hollnagel, E., Woods, D. D. and Leveson, N. (Eds.) (2006) Resilience Engineering: Concepts and Precepts.  
Ashgate Publishing Ltd, Aldershot, England. 
Horne, J. F. I. (1997). “A New Direction: The Coming Age of Organisational Resilience.” Business Forum. 22(2/3): 
24-28. 
Human Ethics Committee (2001) Guidelines, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand 
Janis, I.L. (1972) Victims of Groupthink.  Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company. 
Janis, I. L. (1982) Groupthink.  Little, Brown.  Boston. 
Jex, S. M. and Bliese, P. D. (1999). “Efficacy beliefs as a moderator of the impact of work-related stressors: a multi-
level study”.  Journal of Applied Psychology. 84, 349-361. 
Kasperson, J. X. and Kasperson, R. E. (2005) The Social Contours of Risk, Volume 1.  Earthscan, London. 
Keanini, T. (2003). “Vulnerability Management Technology: A Powerful Alternative to Attack Management for 
Networks”. Computer Technology Review. 23(5), 18-19. 
Kelle, U. (2005). ‘Emergence’ vs. forcing of empirical Data? A crucial problem of grounded theory reconsidered.  
Forum qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: qualitative social research 6(2):art 27.  http://www.qualitative-
research.net/fqs. 
Kelly, P. M. and Adger, W. N. (2000) Theory and Practice in Assessing Vulnerability to Climate Change and 
Facilitating Adaptation.  Climate Change. 47: 325-252 
Kendra, J. M. and T. Wachtendorf (2003). “Elements of Resilience after the World Trade Centre Disaster: 
Reconstituting New York City's Emergency Operations Centre.” Disasters. 27(1): 37-53. 
Kennedy, R. and Kirwan, B. (1998) Development of a hazard and operability-based method for identifying safety 
management vulnerabilities in high risk systems.  Safety Science. 30(3):249 – 274. 
Kerfoot, K. (2005).  “Building confident organizations by filling buckets, building infrastructures, and shining the 
flashlight (on leadership)”.  Dermatology Nursing.  17(2), 154-157. 
Khan, O. and Burnes, B (2007).  Risk and supply chain management: creating a research agenda.  The International  
Journal of LogisticsManagement 18(2):197-216. 
 
Klein, R. L., Bigley, G.A. and Roberts, K H (1995).  Organizational culture in high reliability organizations: an 
extension.  Human Relations 48(7):771-793. 
Klein, R. J. T., Nicholls, R. J. and Thomalla, F. (2003).  “Resilience to natural hazards: how useful is this concept”.  
Environmental Hazards. 5, 35-45. 
 144
La Porte, T. R. (1982).  On the design and management of nearly error-free organizational control systems.  In D. L. 
Sills, C. Wolf, and V. B. Shelanski (Eds).  Accident at Three Mile Island: the human dimension.  185-200.  
Westview Press, Boulder, CO. 
La Porte,  T. R. and Thomas, C. W. (1995).  Regulatory compliance and the ethos of quality enhancement:  surprises 
in nuclear plant operations.  Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory.  5(1):  109-138. 
La Porte, T. R. (1996).  High reliability organisations: unlikely, demanding and at risk.  Journal of Contingencies 
and Crisis Management. 4(2): 60-71. 
La Porte, T. R. and Consolini, P. M. (1991).  Working in practice but not in theory: theoretical challenges of high 
reliability organizations.  Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory.  1(1): 19-47. 
Lewis, D. W. and McConchie, D. M. (1994).  Practical Sedimentology.  Chapman and Hall, New York. 
Luers, A.L. and Lobell, D.B. (2003). “A method for quantifying vulnerability, applied to the agricultural system of 
the Yaqui Valley, Mexico”. Global Environmental Change.  13, 255-267. 
Luo Carlo, J., Lyytinen, K. and Boland, R. (2004). Systemic Risk, IT Artifacts, and High Reliability Organizations: 
A Case of Constructing a Radical Architecture, Sprouts: Working Papers on Information Environments, Systems 
and Organizations, 4, Article 4. 
Mallak, L. (1998). “Putting Organisational Resilience to Work.” Industrial Management. 40(6): 8-13. 
Marais, K., Dulac, N. and Leveson, N. (2004).  Beyond normal accidents and high reliability organizations: the need 
for an alternative approach to safety in complex systems.  Paper presented at the Engineering Systems Division 
Symposium, MIT, Cambridge, MA. (March 29-31). 
McCann, J. (2004) Organizational effectiveness: changing concepts for changing environments.  Human Resource 
Planning 27(1):42-51 
MCDEM.  Civil Defence and Emergency Management Plan 2006. 
McDonald, N. (2006)   Organizational Resilience and Industrial Risk.   In. Hollnagel, E., Woods, D. D. and 
Leveson,  N.  (Eds.)  Resilience  Engineering:   Concepts  and  Precepts.   Ashgate  Publishing  Ltd,  Aldershot, 
England. 
McEntire, D.A. (2001). “Triggering agents, vulnerabilities and disaster reduction: towards a holistic paradigm”. 
Disaster Prevention and Management. 10(3), 189-196. 
Mileti (1999). Disasters By Design: a reassessment of natural hazards in the US. Washington DC, Joseph Henry 
Press. 
Morse, J.M. (1994). Emerging from the data: the cognitive process of analysis in qualitative enquiry. In Morse, J.M. 
(Ed.) Critical Issues in Qualitative Research Methods, Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA. 
Murray, P (2002) cycles of organisational learning: a conceptual approach.  Management Decision. 40(3): 239-247. 
Nonaka, I (1994) A dynamic theory of organizational knowledge creation.  Organizational Science 5(1):14-37 
Norman, S., Luthans, B. and Luthans, K. (2005).  “The proposed contagion effect of hopeful leaders on the 
resilience of employees and organizations”.  J. Leadership and Organizational Studies. 12(2), 55-65. 
Ntuen, C. A., Balogun, O., Boyle, E. and Turner, A. (2006) Supporting Command and Control Training Functions 
in the Emergency Management Domain Using Cognitive Systems Engineering.  Ergonomics 49(12-13): 1415-1436 
O’Dell, C. and Grayson, C.J. (1999) knowledge transfer; discover your value proposition.  Strategy and Leadership 
March-April 10-15 
 145
Oomes, A. H. J. (2004). “Organization Awareness in Crisis Management: Dynamic organigrams for more effective 
disaster response”.  Proceedings, ISCRAM 2004, Brussels, May 3-4, 2004. 
Paine, R.T. (1995) a conversation on refining the concept of keystone species. Conservation Biology. 9(4): 
Paraskevas, A. (2006) Crisis Management or Crisis Response System:  A Complexity Science Approach to 
Organisational Crises.  Management Decision. 44(7): 892-907. 
Paton, D. and Jackson, D. (2002). “Developing disaster management capability: an assessment centre approach”.  
Disaster Prevention and Management. 11(2), 115-122. 
Paton, D.  (1999).  “Disaster Business Continuity: promoting staff capability”.  Disaster Prevention and 
Management. 8(2), 127-133. 
Paton, D. (1996). “Training disaster workers: promoting wellbeing and operational effectiveness”.  Disaster 
Prevention and Management. 5, 11-18. 
Pearson, C. & Mitroff, I. (1993), "From crisis prone to crisis prepared:  A framework for crisis management," 
Academy of Management Executive. 71, 48-59. 
Pelling, M. (1999). "The political ecology of flood hazard in urban Guyana." Geoforum 30: 249-261. 
Pelling, M. and J. I. Uitto (2001). “Small Island developing states: natural disaster vulnerability and global change.” 
Environmental Hazards. 3: 49-62. 
Penguin Publishers.  (2000). “The New Penguin English Dictionary”.  Allen, R (ed.). Penguin Books, 
Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England. 
Penrose, J. M. (2000). “The Role of Perception in Crisis Planning”.  Public Relations Review. 26(2), 155. 
Perrow, C. (1984) Normal Accidents:  Living with High-Risk Technologies.  Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
New Jersey. 
Perrow, C. (1999).  Normal Accidents:  Living with High Risk Technologies.  Princetown University Press. 
Pidgeon, N.F., 1994. Environmental emergencies and the social attenuation of risk. Paper presented at International 
Congress of Applied Psychology, Madrid, July. 
Pidgeon, N and K, Harwood (1996) 'Grounded Theory: practical Implementation'. Handbook of Qualitative 
Research: Methods for Psychology and the Social Sciences. J.T.E. Richardson (Ed), Leicester, British Psychological 
Society, Brooks. 
Pidgeon, N (1998) safety culture: key theoretical issues. Work and Stress. 12(3): 202-216. 
Pidgeon, N. and O’Leary, M. 2000. man-made disasters: why technology and organizations (sometimes) fail.  Safety 
Science, 34(1-3): 15-30 
Quanjel, M. M. H., Willems, A. J. and Talen, A. N. (1998). “Crisislab: evaluation and improvement of crisis 
management through simulation/gaming”.  Simulation and Gaming. 29, 450-455. 
Reason, J. (1990)  Human Error.  Cambridge, UK.  Cambridge University Press. 
Reinmoeller, P., and van Baardwijk, N. (2005) The Link Between Diversity and Resilience.  MITSloan Management 
Review. 46(4): 61-65. 
Resilient Organisations (2007) www.resorgs.org.nz (accessed 10 Jan, 2007) 
 146
Riolli, L. and V. Savicki (2003). “Information system organisational resilience.” Omega The International Journal 
of Management Science. (31): 227-233. 
Roberts, K. H. and G, G. (1989).  Managing a high reliability organisation: a case for interdependence.  In M. A. 
von Glinow and S. A. Mohrman (Eds.) Managing complexity in high technology industries: systems and people:  
147-159.  New York: Oxford University Press. 
Roberts, K. H., Rousseau, D. M. and La Porte, T. R. (1994).  The culture of high reliability:  quantitative and 
qualitative assessment aboard nuclear powered aircraft carriers.  Journal of High Technology Management 
Research.  5(1): 141-161. 
Roberts, K. H., Stout, S. K. and Halpern, J. J. (1994) Decision dynamics in two high reliability military 
organizations.  Management Science. 40(5): 614-624. 
Robrecht, L. (1995). Grounded theory: evolving methods. Qualitative Health Research. 5:169-177 
Rochlin, G. I. (1999).  Safe operation as a social construct.  Ergonomics.  42(11): 1549-1560. 
Rochlin, G. I., La Porte, T. R. and Roberts, K. H. (1987)  The self-designing high reliability organisation:  aircraft 
carrier flight operations at sea.  Naval War College Review. 40(4): 76-90. 
Rognin, L., Salembier, P. and Zouinar, M. (2000) Cooperation, Reliability of Socio-technical Systems and 
Allocation of Function.  International Journal of Human-Computer Studies. 52: 357-379 
Rosenberg, M. T.,  (1998).  The Handy Geography Answer Book.  Visible Ink Pr. 
Roth, E. M., Multer, J., and Raslear, T. (2006) Shared Situation Awareness as a Contributer to High Reliability 
Performance in Railroad Operations.  Organization Studies. 27(7): 967-987 
Runyan, R. C. (2006) Small Business in the Face of Crisis:  Identifying Barriers to Recovery from a Natural 
Disaster.  Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management. 14(1): 12-26 
Salas, E., Prince, C., Baker., P. D. and Shrestha., L. (1995). “Situations awareness in team performance”.  Human 
Factors. 37(1), 123-126. 
Salas, E., Fowlkes, J. E., Stout., R. J., Milanovich., D. M. and Prince., C. (1999). “Does CRM training improve 
teamwork skills in the cockpit?  Two evaluation studies”.  Human Factors. 41, 326-343. 
Salmon, P., Stanton, N., Walker, G. and Green., D. (2006). “Situation awareness measurement: A review of 
applicability for C4i environments”.  Applied Ergonomics, 37(2). 225-238. 
Schatzman, L. (1991). Dimensional analysis: notes on an alternative approach to the grounding of theory in 
qualitative research. In Maines, D. R. (Ed.). Social organisation and social processes: essays in honor of Anselm 
Strauss. New York, Aldine. Pp 303-314. 
Schein, E. (1980) Organizational Psychology, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. 
Schein, E. (1996).  Three Cultures of management: the key to organizational learning.  Sloan Management Review. 
38(1): 9-20. 
Schulman, P. R. (1993).  The negotiated order of organizational reliability.  Administration and Society.  25(3):  
353-372 
Seaman, A. L. and Williams, J. (2005).  “The perils of the plan”.  CMA Management. 79(1), 14-16. 
Selden, L. (2005).  On grounded theory – with some malice.  Journal of Documentation. 61(1):114-129. 
Senge, P. (1990).  The leader’s new work:  building learning organizations.  Sloan Management Review, Fall. 
 147
Senge, P. (1994). The leader’s new work: building learning organizations.  In C Maeby and P Iles. Managing 
Learning.  Cengage Learning EMEA, Routledge, London. 
Senge, P. (2006).  The Fifth Disclipline:  The art and practice of the learning organization.  Double Day, New 
York. 
Sheffi, Y. (2001).  Supply chain management under the threat of international terrorism.  Internal Journal of 
logistics Management 12(2):1-11 
Sheffi, Y. (2005).  “Building a culture of flexibility”.  World Trade. 18(12), 26-29. 
Sheffi, Y. (2006a).  “Manage risk through resilience”.  Chief Executive. 214, 28-29. 
Sheffi, Y. (2006b). “Waiting for the next ‘big one’”.  Boston Globe, Feb 19, p11. 
Shrivastava, P. (1992)  Bhopal: anatomy of a crisis. Chapman, London 
Slovic, P. (1986). “Informing and educating the public about risk.” Risk Analysis. 6(4): 403-415. 
Smallman, C. (1996). Risk and organizational behaviour: a research model.  Disaster prevention and management.  
5(2): 12-26. 
Smallman, C. (2004) A grounded theory of hazard priorities in British organizations.  Risk, Decision and Policy. 
9(1):55-74 
 
Smith, K.G., Carroll, S. J. and Ashford, J. A. (1995) intra and inter organizational cooperation: towards a research 
agenda.  Academy of Management Journal 38(1):7-23 
Smit, B. and Wandel, J. (2006) Adaption, Adaptive Capacity and Vulnerability.  Global Environmental Change. 
16(3):282-292. 
Stanton, N. A. and Baber, C. (2006)  The Ergonomics of Command and Control.  Ergonomics. 49(12-13): 1131-
1138. 
Stanton, N. A., Stewart, R., Harris, D., Houghton, R. J., Baber, C., McMaster, R., Salmon, P., Hoyle, G., Walker, 
G., Young, M. S., Linsell, M., Dymott, R. and Green, D. (2006) Distributed Situation Awareness in Dynamic 
Systems:  Theoretical Development and Application of an Ergonomics Methodology.  Ergonomics. 49(12-13): 
1288-1311 
Starr, R., Newfrock., J. and Delurey, M. (2004). “Enterprise Resilience: Managing Risk in the Networked 
Economy”. Strategy+Business, 30, 1- 10. http://www.bah.com.  (Jan. 30, 2005). 
Stephenson, H. (2007) Strategies for managing business vulnerability to electricity failure.  Student Research Report 
2007/01. Resilient Organisations programme.  http://www.resorgs.org.nz/Hannan%20Stephenson%20-
%20final%20report.pdf (accessed 23 April 2007) 
 
Strauss. A.L. and J. Corbin (1994)  Grounded Theory methodology: An overview, Handbook of Qualitative 
Research, Denzin, N.K. and Y.S. Lincoln, Thousand Oaks, California, Sage 
 
Thomas, G. and James, D. (2006). Reinventing grounded theory: some questions about theory, ground and 
discovery.  British Educational Research Journal. 32(6):767-795 
Tierney, K. J. (1997).   “Business Impacts of the Northridge Earthquake.” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
Management 5(2). 87-97. 
Tierney, J.K. and Dahlhamer, J.M. (1997) Business disruption, preparedness and recovery: lessons from the 
Northridge Earthquake.  University of Delaware, Disaster Research Centre, preliminary paper 257.  
http://dspace.udel.edu:8080/dspace/bitstream/19716/657/1/PP257.pdf. 
 148
Tierney, K. J. and Nigg, J. M. (1995) Business vulnerability to disaster-related lifeline disruption.  University of 
Delaware, Disaster Research Centre.  Preliminary papers; 223.  http://udel.edu: 8080/dspace/handle/19716/631 
(accessed 30 May, 2006). 
 
Tierney, K. J and Webb, G.R. (2001) Business vulnerability to earthquakes and other disasters.  University of 
Delaware, disaster research centre, preliminary paper 320.  
http://dspacde.udel.edu:8080/dspace/bitstream/19716/729/1/PP320.pdf (accessed 21 October 2006). 
Timmerman, P. (1981) Vulnerability, Resilience and the Collapse of Society. Environmental Monograph 1, Institute 
for Environmental Studies, Toronto University 
Titan Systems Corporation. (2002). “Arlington County After-action Report on the Response to the September 11 
Terrorist Attacks on the Pentagon”.  http://www.co.arlington.va.us/fire/edu/about/pdf/after_report.pdf.  (June. 5, 
2005). 
Tobin, G. and Montz (1997). Natural Hazards: explanation and integration. New York, Guilford Press. 
Tobin, G. (1999). “Sustainability and community resilience: the holy grail of hazards planning?” Environmental 
Hazards. 1(1): 13-25. 
Trist, E. A. and Bamforth, K. (1951).  Some social and psychological consequences of the longwall method of coal-
getting.  Human Relations 4: 6-38. 
Turner, B.A. (1978) Man-Made Disasters, London, Wykeham Press. 
 
Turner, B.A. (1983) "The Use of Grounded Theory for the Qualitative Analysis of Organizational Behaviour." 
Journal of Management Studies 20(3):333-348. 
Turner, B. A. (1994).  Causes of disaster.  Sloppy Management.  British Journal of Management.  5: 215-219. 
Turner, B. A., and Pidgeon, N. F. (1997).  Man-Made Disasters (Second ed.). Butterworth-Heinnerman, London. 
Turner, B. L., Kasperson, R. E., Matsone, P. A., McCarthy, J. J., Corellg, R. W., Christensene, L., Eckley, N., 
Kasperson, J. X., Luers, A., Martello, M. L., Polsky, C., Pulsipher, A., Schiller, A. (2003) A Framework for 
Vulnerability Analysis in Sustainability Science.  Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 100(14): 8074-
8079 
Urquhart, C. (2002). Regrounding Grounded Theory – or reinforcing old prejudices?  A brief reply to Bryant.  
Journal of Information Technology Theory and Application. 4(3):43-54 
Van Den Eede, G., and Van de Walle, B. (2005).  Operational risk in incident management:  a cross-fertilisation 
between ISCRAM and IT Governance.  Operational Risk Management in Incident Management. Proceedings of the 
ISCRAM Conference, Brussels, Belgium, April 2005. 
Vaughan, D., 1996. The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA. Chicago 
University Press, Chicago. 
Villagrán De León, J. C. (2006)  Vulnerability: A Conceptual and Methodological Review.  United Nations 
University – Institute for Environmental and Human Security (UNU-EHS).  Source 4/2006. 
Vogelsang, J. (2002?) Futuring: A Complex Adaptive Systems Approach to Strategic Planning.  Support Center for 
Non-Profit Management. http://www.supportctr.org/images/futuring.pdf.  Accessed 11 January 2007. 
Vogus, T. J. and Welbourne, T. M. (2003).  Structuring for high reliability: HR practices and mindful processes in 
reliability seeking organizations.  Journal of Organizational Behaviour.  24(7): 877 
Walker, B. H., Ludwig, D., Holling, C. S. and Peterman, R. M. (1981) Stability of semi-arid savannah grazing 
systems. Journal of Ecology. 69(2): 473-498. 
 149
Walker, B. H., Gunderson, L. H., Kinzig, A. P., Folke, C., Carpenter, S. R. and Schultz, L. (2006) A Handful of 
Heuristics and Some Propositions for Understanding Resilience in Social-Ecological Systems.  Ecology and Society. 
11(1): 13.  http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss1/art13.  Accessed 11 January 2007. 
Watts, M. J. and Bolhe, H. G.  (1993)  The Space of Vulnerability: the Causal Factor in Hunger and Famine.  
Progress in Human Geography. 17(1): 43-67 
Watts, D. J. (2003) Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age.  W. W. Norton & Company, New York. 
WBCSD (2004). Running the Risk: Risk and sustainable development: a business perspective, World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development. 
Webb, G., Tierney, K. and Dahlhamer, J. (2003) “Predicting long-term business recovery from disaster: a 
comparison of the Loma Prieta earthquake and Hurricane Andrew.” Environmental Hazards. 45-58. 
Weichselgartner, J. (2001). “Disaster mitigation: the concept of vulnerability revisited”. Disaster Prevention and 
Management. 10(2), 85-94. 
Weick, K. E. (1989). Mental models of high reliability systems.  Industrial Crisis Quarterly, 3(2): 127-142. 
Weick, K. E. (1993) The Collapse of Sensemaking in Organizations: the Mann Gulch Disaster.  Administrative 
Science Quarterly. 38(4):628-653 
Weick, K. E. (2006) The Role of Imagination in the Organizing of Knowledge.  European Journal of Information 
Systems. 15(5): 446-452 
Weick, K. E. and Sutcliffe, K. M. (2001). Managing the Unexpected: assuring high performance in an age of 
complexity.  Jossey-Bass, San Francisco. 
Weick, K. E., Sutcliffe, K. M. and Obstfield, D. (1999).  Organizing for high reliability:  processes of collective 
mindfulness.  Research in Organizational Behaviour. 21:  18-123. 
Weir, D. 1991.  Hazard Management and Transport.  ESRC Seminar Series on Institutional Design and Systems 
Failure.  London School of Economics. 
WELG. (1994).  “Section 1. Interdependence and response planning”.  Wellington Engineering Lifelines Group. 
New Zealand. 1994. 
Westrum, R. (2006) A Typology of Resilience Situations.  In, Hollnagel, E., Wooods, D., and Leveson, N. (Eds.) 
(2006) Resilience Engineering: Concepts and Precepts.  Ashgate Publishing Limited, Aldershot, England. 
Westrum, R (2004) Corporate Cultures as Precursors to Accidents.  In V.M. Bier, J.R. Phimister and H Kunreuther  
(Eds) ‘Accident Precursor Analysis and Management’.  National academe of engineering, national Academies Press, 
Washington DC. 
Whyte, W.H. (1952).  Groupthink.  Fortune 45.  March: 114-117. 
Wildavsky, A. (1988).  Searching for Safety. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ 
Wisner, B. (2005) Remarks made at United Nations University-Institute for Environment and Human Security 
UNU-EHS. Vulnerability Workshop, Kobe, Japan. 
Yin, R. K. (2003) Case Study Research:  Design and Methods.  Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, California. 
Zohar, D. and Luria, G. (2003).  Organizational meta-scripts as a source of high reliability:  the case of an army 






APPENDIX A Summary of interview prompt questions 
• What level of knowledge do staff have of their own individual roles and responsibilities in the organisation? 
• What level of knowledge do staff have of other’s roles and responsibilities in the organisation? 
• How much flexibility do staff have in their roles and responsibilities in the organisation? 
• What sort of hazards do you think this organisation is exposed to? 
• What do you think the consequences of these events would be on the organisation? 
• How well can you manage these events and what level of control do you think the organisation has over this? 
• What degree of connection does this organisation have with its wider community of stakeholders? 
• How well does the organisation engage with and seek to understand its staff? 
• What level of business interruption insurance or external aid is available to the organisation? 
• How suitable is this for the expected range of hazards and their consequences on the organisation? 
• How well do you understand what the wider community is likely to expect of this organisation in a crisis 
situation? 
• How well do you think that other organisations will be able to meet your requirements and demands in the 
aftermath of various crises? 
• How well do you understand this organisation’s importance to the community in the aftermath of a disaster 
relative to other organisations? 
• Does this organisation engage in 
o Risk management planning 
o Business continuity planning 
o Crisis management planning 
• And is this from an all-hazards or a hazard specific perspective? 
• How well integrated are existing planning strategies in the organisation? 
• Who or what primarily drives this type of planning in the organisation? 
• What does, or should, an emergency management plan look like for this organisation? 
• What level of emergency management exercises does this organisation engage in?  How frequently? 
• What are the principle barriers to participation in exercises in this organisation? 
• Are there any plans for alternative offices/space if your main premises are not able to be used? 
• How well equipped is your emergency management office if you have one set up? 
• How well prepared is this organisation for the loss of internal services such as power, telecommunications, 
water, sewerage etc.? 
• How easy/difficult is it likely to be to engage/retain/recruit or support staff in the aftermath of a crisis? 
• How well prepared is this organisation for the impacts on staff during and following a major crisis? 
• How easy/difficult is it to retain/recruit staff at present? 
• To what extent does this organisation engage in succession planning? 
• How well prepared are staff for an emergency where day-to-day operations must continue while the crisis is 
dealt with? 
• To what extent does the organisation have effective organisation wide systems and procedures?   
• How do staff feel about using these systems and procedures? 
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• What is the general financial situation of the organisation? 
• What sort of relationships does this organisation have with external organisations, including suppliers, service 
providers, emergency management organisations etc? 
• What are the organisation’s expectations of these same organisations in a crisis? 
• How much has the organisation thought about the loss of external services and also the restoration of these 
services following any major outages? 
• What specific preparations have been made to maintain and develop good relationships with critical stakeholders 
in this organisation? 
• To what extent does this organisation experience the negative impacts of silo mentality and where does is 
primarily come from? 
• How easily can staff communicate upwards and downwards through the organisation? 
• How effective are communications and relationships between: 
o departments, business units, regional/national offices etc? 
o External stakeholders? 
• Does the organisation have a strategic vision/mission statement? 
o How clearly is this articulated through the organisation? 
o How closely do day-to-day operations reflect this vision/mission 
o To what extent is this vision likely to impact on the performance of the organisation during and 
after a crisis? 
• What does recovery mean to the organisation? 
• Describe the prominent decision making style in the organisation?  How effective is this? 






APPENDIX B  Evolution of the 5-Step Process 
The information in this appendix supports the detailed discussion of the 5-step process for assessing and developing 
organisational resilience presented in Chapter 4. The following discussion outlines how the 5-Step process has 
evolved and been modified over the course of this study, and how it has changed from CS1 to CS10. This discussion 
analyses how these steps have been modified and the tools used with each step have developed. 
B.1 Step 1: Building Situation Awareness 
The consequence scenarios have altered little since the pilot study. The first conception of the scenarios proved to be 
very successful with the pilot case-study organisation. While there have been no significant iterations of the 
consequence scenarios since the beginning, there have been some subtle changes in thinking around their application 
with organisations. 
Originally these were called event scenarios or hazard scenarios. It quickly became apparent that this terminology 
was misleading and did not represent the direction of the research. Consequence scenarios as a name arose from 
trying to find ways to make the 5-step process attractive to organisations of all sizes and descriptions; including 
those organisations who have limited resources. As previously mentioned in this chapter, the idea behind looking at 
consequences rather than events is twofold. Firstly, more than one event type can cause the same or similar 
consequence for an organisation; likewise different events will necessarily have the same effect for different 
organisations. Secondly, in terms of providing value for money/time/resources, it is useful to consider how to 
mitigate the consequences of a number of hazards that have the same effects than trying to curb individual hazard 
situations. 
In addition, there was a time during the study when the structure of the consequence scenarios was debated. Each 
scenario was looked at from the perspective of what it would 'test' from an organisational perspective. The focus of 
the scenarios was critically debated and there were/are two schools of thought; 
The consequence scenarios represent different scales of consequences for the organisational network whereby the 
focus ranges from a global influence (scenario 4 - distal) to a local influence (scenario 3 - localised).  
The consequence scenarios represent impacts to different aspects of the organisation ranging from physical 
structures and services (scenario 1 - regional) to human resources (scenario 2 - national).  
It became apparent that using the scenarios to 'test' aspects of the organisation specifically was inappropriate; it did 
not allow for enough flexibility with the variety of organisations that this study included and would not add as much 
value to organisations in terms of improving resilience. Therefore the approach of using the consequence scenarios 





B.2 Step 2: The Organisational Components 
The variety of organisational components used in this study has increased in detail since the pilot case study. The 
reason for this change has ultimately been from a subtle change in focus of the research; from dominantly 
operational to a more cultural focus. In addition, following the pilot study, and after interviewing with CS2, it 
became apparent that there were two distinct categories of components. The difference between internal and external 
components bought a greater complexity to the analysis, but this distinction also highlighted the importance of 
organisational connectivity. Further, with the first 2 case studies, the level at which the investigation was pitched 
was still relatively unknown. While the participants in the workshop for CS1 were all senior department managers, 
CS2 was represented by people in a greater variety of positions in the organisation. Hence organisational 
components were selected to represent that variety somewhat. By CS3 it was apparent that the scale of the 
assessment was critical to the investigation, and from this point onwards, the organisational components were 
relatively consistent between organisations; while the details varied between case studies, the categories of 
components remained the same. This enabled, also, a continuity of assessment with each organisation because the 
level of the investigation was similar for each case-study. 
B.3 Step 3: The Vulnerability Assessments 
The need for both preparedness and criticality in the vulnerability assessments was identified from the outset of this 
study. As the study progressed the entirely qualitative measures of criticality and preparedness were questioned. It 
became apparent that if a metric of resilience was going to be achieved (as part of the Resilient Organisations 
project) then it a more quantitative measure would eventually be required. The scale of measure for criticality was 
briefly changed to represent time as a semi-qualitative measure and used with one case study organisation. However, 
the development of metrics for assessing vulnerability and, more broadly, resilience were seen to be outside the 
scope of this project. The qualitative measures described in Section 4.4 were therefore favoured over the semi-
quantitative measure for criticality.  
It also became apparent during this study that some organisations may require a more specific context for the 
vulnerability assessment. Participants in one case-study organisation found it difficult to visualize the preparedness 
and criticality of components for the whole range of situations presented in the consequence scenarios; different 
scenarios could result in different vulnerability assessments. Also, several of the organisations in this study were 
embarking on planning programs that were targeting specific hazards and some measure of the vulnerability of the 
organisation to specific events or types of events was needed. The component susceptibility was therefore 
introduced. In one workshop participants were asked to perform the entire vulnerability assessment, including 
susceptibility, after the REDS. It quickly became apparent that this offered little in the research as results between 
organisations could not be compared unless the same event was used in each REDS. Therefore, remaining 
organisations were asked to perform the criticality and preparedness assessments prior to the REDS and consider an 
all-hazards perspective. Following the REDS a susceptibility assessment was performed. The changes to the 
workshop accommodating a more context driven vulnerability assessment are detailed in Chapter 3. 
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B.4 Step 4: The Vulnerability Matrix 
As the method for vulnerability assessment changed, so too did the vulnerability matrix. Initially the vulnerability 
matrix represented the intersection of criticality and preparedness and followed the broad structure of traditional risk 
matrices such as ANZS 4360 (2004). With the introduction of susceptibility as an assessment category for 
vulnerability, it was necessary to change the vulnerability matrix to reflect this context. This change occurred 
relatively late in the study and was applied with just the final three case- study organisations. While there has been a 
relatively short period of time in which to test this new structure for the vulnerability assessment and matrix, the 
response from case-study organisations has been positive. The visual presentation of 'holes' in the matrix, 
particularly in the higher vulnerability areas of the matrix is a powerful and seemingly instinctual way to 
conceptualise vulnerability. Additionally, the applicability of the susceptibility assessment to identify keystone 
vulnerabilities for specific types of events, ones that are currently on the agenda in terms of public pressure, health 
and safety and/or governmental concerns, is valuable.  
With the pilot study the facilitators tried to compile and present a finished vulnerability matrix to the organisation 
before the discussion of resilience issues in the workshop. This involved a large volume of work in a limited time 
frame, even for the three facilitators present, and was ultimately unsustainable if only one person was available to 
facilitate the workshop. In remaining workshops, the vulnerability matrix was presented as indicative only; selected 
organisational components were assessed and plotted onto the matrix to illustrate the value of the method. 
B.5 Step 5 Building Adaptive Capacity 
B.5.1 Development of the REDS Methodology  
During the pilot study, the concept of crisis exercises was not well developed. At the conclusion of the 
vulnerability self-assessment the crisis exercise began as a discussion about electricity failure in the 
organisation. This discussion did not have any predefined structure or plan. Therefore the outcomes of this 
discussion were more difficult to interpret than for the remaining case study organisations. Prior to the 
workshop for the second case study, the REDS were developed, much in their present form. The reasons 
for the development of REDS include: 
• To provide the organisations with a practical closure for the resilience workshop.  
• To provide the organisations with practical tools for achieving improved resilience outside of this study.  
• To allow workshop participants the opportunity to experience some of the key resilience issues 
identified.  
• To provide validation of data collected during the research by means of participant observation. 
B.5.2 Participant Selection for REDS 
It became apparent during the first REDS that selection of participants for the exercise was very important 
to the success of the exercise. Additionally, during CS-5 the value of adequately selecting appropriate 
teams for the REDS became apparent. It is important that facilitators of resilience management consider 
REDS groupings early on in the process and decide how much they want to challenge the organisation 
during the REDS. With some of the organisations (CS5 and CS7 in particular) it was difficult to gain buy-
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in for the process with some of the workshop participants. With CS5 these people were split up among the 
groups in the REDS, while in CS7 they were not. In CS5 the participants who were overtly negative about 
the process quickly engaged with their group and ultimately became very important contributors to overall 
resilience development in the REDS. In CS7, however, this did not happen and the participants with a 
negative perspective actually blocked the flow of ideas and information for the group. Therefore the 
division of participants in the REDS into groups is a critical aspect of the success of the process and 
facilitators must be very aware of the personalities of individuals and how they might react under pressure, 
even the simulated pressure of a REDS situation. This was an important development of the REDS for this 
study. 
B.5.3 Flexibility in the REDS Methodology 
As the case-study organisations came on board and participated in the study, the flexibility of the process, 
and in particular the REDS became critical. Because REDS is so important to developing improved 
resilience in organisations, it was critical that it could be modified and adjusted to fit in with the 
requirements of the organisations. Examples include: 
REDS with CS6 involved a small group of senior executives and it was not possible to split the participants 
up into separate groups. In this instance, the key decision maker (the CEO) was removed from the exercise 
and asked to provide the external perspective for the group. 
In CS8, the room used for the REDS was too small to enable the group to be broken up, and therefore the 
REDS was completed with one larger group. 
In CS4 and CS9 REDS were not able to be conducted at all; however the researcher was able to directly 
observe these organisations in their own emergency exercises and use this as a substitute REDS. 
In CS10, the smallest of the case-study organisations, the entire workshop including the REDS was cut 
down in duration to just two hours and this organisation was informed of the scenario event in advance. 
This was to enable the greatest use of the exercise without using valuable time on a scenario briefing. 
For several of the organisations, key decision makers were able to come and go from the exercise, 
primarily to attend to important business away from the REDS. While this was initially considered a 
negative for the research, it actually simulated the movement of key individuals in many types of events 
and was therefore a valuable addition to the exercise. 
B.5.4 Alternative Perspectives in REDS 
A significant part of the REDS role in increasing situation awareness was addressed by encouraging 
participants to look at the situation from a different perspective. During the REDS one or two members 
from each group (depending on the size of the groups) were taken out of the exercise (in accordance with 
some development in the scenario) and asked to consider the current emergency situation as if they were 
another stakeholder. Examples of these included; general staff, suppliers, customers, contractors, the Board, 
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shareholders etc. At the conclusion of the exercise, the findings and expectations of these pseudo-groups 
were presented. 
B.5.5 Advance Knowledge of the Scenario Event 
For most of the case-study organisations the actual event used in the REDS was not known to them until 
the REDS began. The reason for this was to simulate the urgency and panic that accompanies many 
emergency situations these organisations are likely to face. In CS7, the nature of the event was such that it 
required some specialist knowledge from the organisation to ensure the scenario was as realistic as 
possible. Two of the interviewees were consulted to create the scenario. For CS10, due to significant time 
constraints for the workshop, the event was made known to the organisation in advance. The reason for this 
was to give the organisation as much time to actually participate in the exercise. CS10 was sent the briefing 
document of the event prior to the workshop and participants were asked to ensure that they were familiar 
with the scenario in advance of the REDS. 
B.5.6 Selecting Appropriate Events for REDS  
One of the biggest challenges for successful REDS is ensuring that the event/s chosen are appropriate for 
the organisation. It is important to extend the decision makers in the REDS and therefore it is not 
recommended that events are chosen that replicate previous events. REDS can however be used to simulate 
events that the organisation is currently planning for; for example it is a powerful way for organisations to 
test their planning for avian flu in New Zealand. CS7 was the only organisation where the event selected 
for the REDS was inappropriate, but only for some of the participants. The REDS event for CS7 was 
developed in conjunction with two staff members in the organisation. However, the event chosen had 
actually been previously considered by the two most influential decision makers in the organisation, 
unbeknown to any of the other staff members or to the researcher. Therefore, the engagement of these 
decision makers in the REDS was limited, and they proved to be somewhat negative and obstructive based 







APPENDIX C The Case Study Organisations 
C.1   Introduction 
The  information  presented  in  this  Appendix  details  the  findings  from  each  case  study  organisation  and 
supports  the  discussion  in  Chapter  5.    For  each  of  the  organisations  the  discussion  is  centred  on  the  key 
issues  to  arise  in  terms  of  situation  awareness,  keystone  vulnerability  and  adaptive  capacity.    Supporting 
vulnerability matrices for each organisation where applicable are to be found in Appendix E.   It should be noted 
that information pertaining to each case study organisation is relevant to the organisation at the time of the study.   
Several  of  the  case  study organisations  have  since  advanced  their  resilience  beyond  what  is represented in 
this study. 
C.2   Case-Study Summaries 
C.2.1      CS1 - Private Manufacturer 
The pilot case-study organisation (CS1) is a large organisation in the manufacturing industry with both 
domestic and international markets. 
C.2.1.1   Resilience Issues for CS1 
Situation Awareness 
The  knowledge  of  roles  and  responsibilities  of  staff  in  different  departments  is  limited and   because   
of   specialised   skills   for   departmental   staff,   there   appears   to   be   little movement of staff between 
departments.   More concerning is that senior management do not   see   any   need   to   know   what   is   
happening   in   other   departments.      While   each department  has  a  (typically informal)  succession 
plan,  this  knowledge  is  not  extended  to other  departments,  nor  is  there  an  organisation  wide  
understanding  of  how  others  are likely or expected to act in a crisis. 
CS1  has  a  perception  that  from  an  internal  perspective  it  is  a  low  risk  organisation although   its   
perception   of   its   external   markets   and   community   of   stakeholders   is different;  the  external  
business  environment  for  CS1  is  perceived  to  be  high  risk.    CS1 sees that its internal systems and 
procedures are adequate to cope given the perception of low risk.   There  is  also  poor  understanding  of  
hazard  events  impacting  the  organisation; one  comment  from  a  senior  decision  maker  about  an  
earthquake  affecting  the  area  was that   'everything   would   turn   to   liquid   anyway   and   we   would   
be   toast'.     Typically discussion  about  the  likelihood  of  events  showed  significant  variation  in  
opinion.   Also, some  of  the  most  senior  decision  makers  in  the  organisation  perceived  that  there  
were some events that were entirely un-manageable but this was not a perception that extended to  
departmental  leaders.   The  organisation appeared  to  be  very focused  on  managing the causes  of  
hazards  (including  natural  hazards  like  earthquakes)  and  had  considerably less focus on managing its 
own response to events occurring. 
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From a business continuity perspective, there is a poor understanding of the organisations business 
interruption insurance policy.    CS1 decision makers were largely unaware of what length of cover the 
organisation had, and at what scale of interruption the insurance would take effect.    This  can  impact  on  
the  ability  of  the  organisation  to  adapt  to  crisis situations;  not knowing when  or how to  move  
forward, and  what  would be contractually appropriate in an emergency. 
While  CS1  has  an excellent  understanding  of the  contracts  it  currently holds,  it  does  not appear   to   
have   a   clear   perception   of   prioritising   these   contracts   in   a   crisis.      The organisations  
relationship  with  local  authorities  and  emergency  services  (other  than  the fire department) is  
understandably limited as  CS1 is  neither  a critical service provider or has experienced a major disaster.   
However CS1 has a limited awareness of the potential needs  of  limitations  of  these  organisations  in  a  
crisis,  particularly  in  terms  of  what specialised skills, machinery or products that CS1 has at its disposal. 
External communications are a critical component for CS1.    The  organisation  does  not fully  appreciate  
that  communication  links  between  existing  key  stakeholders  are  not  the same during day-to-day 
business as in a crisis.   Nor does CS1 fully appreciate that it may have to communicate and work with 
organisations in a crisis that it would never deal with in   day-to-day   business.      Further,   there   is   a   
tendency   for   decision   makers   in   the organisation to look at potential crisis relationships from the 
perspective of 'what can we get  from  this  relationship'  rather  than  approaching  it  from  a  mutual  
benefit  perspective. The   organisation   has   not   clearly   identified   which   of   its   stakeholders   
(customers, suppliers,  competitors  etc)  are  likely  to  cause  the  greatest  impact  on  the  organisation  if 
they  were  to  collapse  or  were  significantly  impaired  by  a  crisis  situation.   Currently  the 
organisation  looks  at  its  external  communications  during  business  as  normal  conditions and assumes 
that this will be adequate for any crisis that it may face. 
Keystone Vulnerabilities 
The   loss   of   electricity   was   identified   as major keystone vulnerability   for   the organisation.    
Further,  consideration  of  the  loss  of  electricity  prompted  thinking  about what  the  impacts  would  be  
if  CS1  also  lost  other  critical  services  such  as  water  and telecommunications.       While    the    
organisation   had   looked   at   the    cost/benefits   of purchasing a backup generator it had been 
disregarded.   However,  management  appears to  be  very  internally  focused  and  tended  to  look  at  
hazards  that  would  only  affect  CS1, not the organisational network.   Hence the perception is that the 
loss of electricity would cause   fewer   problems   than the   loss   of   machinery and   specialised   
technology.     The organisation appears  to  have  a  limited  awareness  of  the  implications  of regional  
damage to  the  electricity  (and  other  critical  services)  network,  and  the  length  of  time  this  could 
potentially  affect  them.   Combined with this, the organisation, as previously mentioned, tend to see such 
large scale events as entirely unmanageable. 
A  key  resilience  issue  for  CS1  is  the  perception  of  what  an  emergency  or  crisis  plan should look 
like for the organisation.   Several interviewees confirmed that they believe it should  be  a  'magic  box'  
that  contains  all  the  answers;  a  manual  of  how  to  deal  with  a crisis   in  a   step-by-step   format.     
Other   interviewees   considered   that   it   should   be   as minimal   as   possible,   listing   names   and   
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contact   numbers   of   key   individuals   and organisations together with some basis protocols and 
procedures for how to respond in an emergency.    This  disagreement  between  some  of  the  key  
decision  makers  in  CS1  as  to how to plan (in addition to what to plan for) is a major obstacle to forward 
progress in the planning   process.      Further,   the   drivers   for   the   organisation   to   produce   
emergency planning  were  identified  and  also  create  some  division  among  decision  makers.    There 
are a significant proportion of key people in CS1 who recognise that their current drive to create  a  crisis  
and  business  continuity  plan  derives  from  wanting  to  reduce  insurance premiums.   However, others 
believe that this external driver is inappropriate for creating a   working   emergency   management   plan   
and   that   it   should   be   initiated   by   internal demands and drivers. 
Adaptive Capacity 
The senior decision makers display some negative silo-mentality tendencies and there is a suggestion that 
this extends throughout the organisation.   General staff report difficulties in communicating with key 
decision makers at CS1.   These difficulties, combined with the   lack   of   understanding   regarding   the   
roles   and   responsibilities   of   staff   in   each department,   have   the   potential   to   cause   problems   
in   gathering   and   disseminating appropriate   information   in   a   crisis.      Because   the   different   
departments   all   work independently,  and  there  is  little  overlap  between  staff  and  decision  makers  
between departments, there is the potential for decision makers in these departments to be working against  
one  another  in  a  crisis.    In some ways, however this is mitigated by the strong organisational vision at 
CS1. 
Further,   the   communications    with   some   external   organisations,   including   clients, suppliers  and  
consultants  have  different  redundancy  depending  on  the  department  that manages them.   One 
department in particular is very proactive in ensuring redundancy in its  ability  to  communicate  in  a  
crisis;  they  have  produced  a  credit  card  sized  list  of  key contacts  names  and  numbers  (internally  
and  externally)  that  is  distributed  to  all  staff  in their   department.     However   this   is   not   extended   
through   the   organisation   to   other departments. 
Another  adaptive  capacity  issue  is  the  strong  organisational  vision  at  CS1.    The  long history  of  
strong  and   consistent   leadership   (by  the   founder)   has   resulted   in  a   clear organisational  identity  
that  permeates  throughout  the  organisation.   However, while this can be a significant advantage to an 
organisation in times of crisis at CS1 it also impacts on the ability of the organisation to find alternative 
solutions to emergencies.   The vision of  the  future  is  so  strong  at  CS1  that  some  key  decision  
makers  have  considerable difficulty  in  seeing  any other  way  forward  for  the  business,  particularly in  
the  aftermath of  a  crisis.    This  is  reflected  in  the  organisations  awareness  that  it  is  slow  to  
change. Additionally, it is reluctant to change, unless absolutely necessary by which point it may be too late 
to gain any sort of competitive advantage in the market place. 
The   problems   associated   with   retaining   and   transferring   information   throughout   the organisation   
illustrate   a   further   adaptive   capacity   issue   for   CS1.      The   specialised knowledge   held   by   a   
few   individuals   at   CS1   is   not   formally   collated,   retained   or transferred   to   other   staff   
members   in   the   event   that   this   key   individual   becomes unavailable.    Typically,  while  the  key  
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decision  makers  in  CS1  considered  that  senior management knowledge was in need of protection and 
engaged in succession planning to support  this,  the  knowledge  held  at  lower  levels  in  the  
organisation  was  largely  not protected  at  all.    From  time  to  time  this  has  already  affected  CS1  
during  day  to  day business  when  a  critical  employee  retired,  for  example.    It  is  likely  that  this  
will  be exacerbated  during  a  crisis  and  may  have  significant  implications  on  the  ability  of  the 
senior  management  to  make  critical  decisions  as  the  flow of  information  upwards  in  the 
organisation is restricted by the loss of critical knowledge. 
C.2.2      CS2 - Local Authority 
The researcher was approached by CS2 who expressed a strong interest in taking part in the study after 
reading the Resilient Organisations website.   CS2 is a local authority consisting of less than 40 full time 
staff.     This  organisation  had  in  the  recent  past  experienced  a  significant  natural disaster which was 
the impetus for wanting to participate in this study. 
C.2.2.1    Resilience Issues for CS2 
Situation Awareness  
There  is  a  general  lack  of  understanding  and  awareness  of  what  skills  people  bring  to their  
positions  and  a  degree  of  misunderstanding  about  what  responsibilities  individual staff  
members/departments  have  during  their  day  to  day  duties.   This includes a limited awareness at an 
organisational level about what the loss of key individuals and key areas of the business would mean for 
the organisations ability to meet its stated objectives; both in day-to-day business and in times of crisis.   In 
the recent crisis event this translated to people   feeling   undervalued   and   under   utilised   in   their   
allocated   roles   during   the emergency.   Local emergency responders in the organisation felt  threatened 
by outsiders coming  in  to  manage  the  response  and  recovery  in  this  event.    This  suggests  a  lack  
of awareness  of  what  all  stakeholders  have  available  to  address  the  situation,  both  from within the 
organisation and from an external perspective. 
CS2 has a heightened awareness of recent crisis events.   While  there  is  some  awareness of  the  need  to  
better  prepare  for  a  range  of  hazards,  not  just  a  repeat  of  the  previous situation,  generally staff  
have  a  poor  knowledge  of regional  hazards  and  their  associated risks to this organisation and the 
community that it serves.   This extends to an expectation that CS2 will be able to access supplies and 
resources (including human resources) from outside the region at will.   Awareness is increasing about how 
isolated the organisation may be in the event of some crises (for example, pandemic). 
The organisation does not appear to have an accurate awareness of its place in the wider community.      
CS2   tends   to   focus   on   its   role   as   an   infrastructure   provider   for   the community.      However,   
the   expectations   of   the   community   of   CS2   are   seemingly somewhat different, both during and 
following a major emergency.    The  recent  crisis event  has  bought  to  light  some  of  these  different  
expectations  between  CS2  and  the community,  but  this  perception does  not  appear  to  extend  
throughout  decision  makers  at CS2.   Further, CS2 seems to have a lowered awareness of what other 
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stakeholder groups and organisations in the community can contribute to the response and recovery efforts 
in a crisis, particularly from a trauma perspective.     There is a suggestion that ongoing trauma of the 
community is something that the organisation is largely unaware of. 
Keystone Vulnerabilities  
The  organisation  does  not  have  great  clarity  about  what  emergency  planning  for  CS2 means,  what  
or  who  are  the  real  drivers  behind  a  push  to  create  emergency  planning  or what  resources  are  
likely to  be  available  to  the  organisation  following  crises  of different types.     There  are  also  
widespread  assumptions  in  CS2  regarding  the  role  of  Central Government  in  assisting  the  
organisation  from a  financial  perspective  following  a  major crisis  event.    These  assumptions  may  
not  be  appropriate  for  all  hazard  events  that  the organisation may face. 
The availability of buildings from which to operate an emergency response and recovery are  identified  as  
a  critical  aspect  for  effective  emergency  management  at  CS2.    This includes  the  essential  contents  
of  the  buildings  including  telephones  and  computers  etc. Further,   the   physical   computer   network   
is   keystone vulnerability   from   both   a communications and business continuity perspective.     Critical 
to this vulnerability is ensuring that there are staff or contractors available to repair and maintain the IT 
network for the organisation.  The loss of all critical services including electricity, water, sewerage and 
transportation networks have a considerable impact on the ability of CS2 to continue operations.   This  is  
particularly true  for  any emergency response  or  recovery that  occurs while  CS2  is  also  trying  to  
maintain  its  normal  business  operations.     Therefore, the importance being able to maintain non-
infrastructure services for the community to assist a return to normality following a crisis event is also 
identified as keystone vulnerability for CS2. 
Related to the poor situation awareness of the roles and responsibilities of staff at CS2 as well  as  some  
external  stakeholders,  the  delegation  of  critical  tasks  to  appropriate  people during  a  crisis   is  a   
keystone  vulnerability.     There is a   perception that   this   has   not previously   been   adequately   
addressed   in   previous   crises.     Therefore,   the   ability   to communicate  with  external  agencies  and  
organisations  during  a  crisis  is  also  a  keystone vulnerability  for  CS2.     Currently  the  importance  of  
this  is  not  clearly  understood  or recognised  by  staff  at  CS2.     Additionally, the   management of 
services provided by external agencies in a crisis is limited.  This also relates to a poor external 
communication strategy   in   the   organisation.      Succession   planning   has   not   been   addressed   for   
the organisation and this relates again to a poor awareness of the roles and responsibilities of staff  in  the  
organisation,  as  well  as  with  external  agencies  and  other  local  government organisations.    For  
example,  there  is  a  lack  of  an  established  roster  for  staff  in  a  crisis situation.   This was a major 
problem for CS2 in the recent crisis event and after one year this had not been addressed. 
The expectations of the relationship between CS2 and Central Government during and in the  aftermath  of  
a  crisis  are  identified  as  a  keystone  vulnerability.   This, in part, reflects the   lowered   priority   of   
human   resources   for   emergency   response   compared   to   the physical resources (radios, vehicles etc) 
is a key vulnerability.   There is some assumption that CS2 could never fail (in terms of traditional business 
failure) and that the reason for this   is   because   of   the   backing   of   Central   Government.      The   
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organisation   has   not adequately considered the reputation impacts of its failure to meet the expectations 
of the community  it  serves,  irrespective  of  the  support  assumed  to  be  available  through  the Central 
Government. 
The  organisation  has  a  substantial  focus  on  the  physical  and  material  resources  required for  
response  and  recovery in  an emergency.   This  is related  to  the  nature  of crises  that  it has  recently 
experienced  (dominated  by physical  type  emergencies).   However  there  is  a need  to  develop  the  less  
tangible,  more  human resource  focused  aspects  of this  recovery and  response  for  crises.   In  addition,  
there  is  a  need  for  CS2  to  carefully  identify  which types of agencies and organisations it may have to 
deal  with for different types of crises. Good  relationships  should  be  established  with  these  
organisations  before  the  occurrence of   any   emergency.     The   organisation   has   done   this   with   
the   traditional   emergency services  (fire,  police  etc)  but  its  network  of  linked  organisations  is  
limited  by the  nature of   the   previous   event,   and   CS2   needs   to   develop   a   strategy   for   other   
types   of emergencies. 
Adaptive Capacity  
There  are  significant  barriers  to  improving  adaptive  capacity  at  CS2  related  to  poor communications  
internally.     For  example  staff  feel  dissatisfaction  about  the  level  of responsibility and accountability 
they have in a crisis event, partially because the reasons for  this  are  not  adequately  communicated  with  
staff,  and  because  of  poor  knowledge  of staff  roles  and  responsibilities  in  the  organisation.    This  
relates  to  problems  with  the transfer  of  knowledge  in  the  organisation  and  people  with  specialist  
knowledge  being overlooked   in   times   of   crisis.      It   also   reflects   an   apparent   problem   with   
internal communications processes that do not allow the effective flow of information through the 
organisation in times of crisis. 
The organisation has limited processes available for the transfer of information in a crisis and   is   highly   
reliant   on   the   continuation   of   the   physical   communications   network. Ensuring  that  the  IT  
network  has  an  inherent  robustness  in  the  face  of  different  types  of emergency   is   a   critical   
component   in   emergency   communications   and   for   effective decision  making  in  a  crisis.   
Additionally,  retention  of  knowledge  by key  staff  members is  a  major  consideration  for  CS2.    At  
the  time  of  this  study  the  organisation  had  no processes  or  systems  available  to  preserve  the  
knowledge  of  staff  members  retiring  or moving to other positions outside the organisation. 
The  perception  by  staff  of  the  organisation's  relative  importance  to  the  community  is  a limiting  
factor  for  adaptive  capacity and  overall  resilience;  both for  the  organisation and the  community.    
The  successful  recovery  of  the  community  is  critically  linked  to  the successful  recovery  of  CS2  
following  a  crisis  and  this  link  is  poorly  understood  and appreciated by many in the organisation.   
The organisation needs to maintain a 'finger on the  pulse'  of  the  changes  in  the  community  both  in  
day-to-day  business  and  in  the aftermath of an emergency.   There are questions as to whether CS2 could 
manage its own strategies    to    meet    to    significant    changes    in    the    business    and    local    
community environments following a crisis.    Related  to  this,  the  organisational  ethos  promoted  by 
senior  management  is  not  as  prevalent  through  the  organisation  as  key  decision  makers would like 
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to believe.  This has implications for a strong organisational response based on a  shared  value  system  
and  common  vision  of  the  organisational  purpose.   There is little consensus   regarding   what   
constitutes   effective   management   and   leadership   of   the organisation in times of crisis. 
C.2.3      CS3 - Private Contractor 
CS3 is a large private contracting firm.    This organisation has a diverse distribution throughout New 
Zealand.   This  organisation  has  actively  pursued  the  learnings  from  the  5-Step  process  and extended 
the concept of resilience.  CS3 are developing an emergency management plan for one of their regions with 
a view that it may become a template for the rest of the organisation.   They have also engaged in additional 
workshops at a variety of levels in the organisation. 
C.2.3.1   Resilience Issues for CS3 
Situation Awareness 
The  awareness  of roles  and  responsibilities  of  staff,  predominantly at  a  regional  scale,  is limited.      
The   degree   of   regional   autonomy   for   individual   offices   may   reduce   the awareness of what 
roles other offices, including the corporate offices, have in the overall operation of the organisation.   This 
is reflected in a limited awareness of what the impacts may be if various offices be unavailable for 
extended periods of time. 
CS3  shows  a  lowered  awareness  of  what  the  potential  impacts  might  be  on  its  ability  to respond   
to   crises   in   the   event   key   services   are   lost;   particularly   electricity,   water, sewerage,    
telecommunications    and    the    transportation    network.       Additionally,    the organisation  needs  to  
carefully  consider  what  its  minimum  operating  requirements  are, both   nationally   and   regionally   
and   what   to   what   degree   does   the   corporate   office contribute to those requirements.   However, 
CS3 does have a very good awareness of its importance   in the   emergency response   network,   
particularly with regard   to   a   major physical emergency. 
CS3 has a good understanding of its position in relation to its community of stakeholders and its 
responsibility and obligations to those stakeholders.   But there is a need for CS3 to consider  its  external  
links  more  carefully,  identify  which  of  these  offer  the  greatest benefits and limitations for an effective 
response and recovery, and to establish pre-crisis relationships with these organisations. 
There  is  a  somewhat  limited  understanding  and  appreciation  of  what  staff  expectations and fears 
may be in dealing with stressful situations, particularly in times of crisis.   There is  a  good  awareness  that  
typically  working  conditions  for  operational  staff  are  often difficult due to weather and locality issues.  
However, what these conditions may mean in terms  of  staff  expectations,  and  also  for  office  based  
staff  in  times  of  crisis  is  largely unknown.   While there is an assumption that staff will be 'looked after', 
the ability to pay wages  and  provide  other  financial  support  in  a  crisis  is  generated  out  of  the  




At a regional scale, CS3 has a very good awareness of the need for enhanced emergency preparedness  and  
is  currently  in  the  process  of  establishing  regional  protocols  for  crisis planning that can become a 
template for other regional offices.  CS3 has become aware of significant  physical  hazard  risks  over  
time,  and  the  incidence  of  small  scale  weather related  events  have  tested  the  existing  emergency  
preparedness  protocols  and  this  has provided the impetus to improve these systems and procedures. 
Keystone Vulnerabilities 
The  vulnerability  of  supplies,  fuel  and  operational  equipment  was  highlighted  in  this study  
including  physical  damage  to  these  components  as  well  as  the  human  resources needed to repair, 
maintain and source these components in a crisis.   There is the potential for substantial and extended 
staffing difficulties for some types of events that will have a serious impact on CS3 in this regard.    In  
addition  critical  services  such  as  electricity, telecommunications,    water,    sewerage    There    is    a    
tendency    to    expect    that    when emergencies  occur,  the  organisation  will  only  have  to  deal  with  
the  emergency  situation and not be expected to continue its day-to-day business at the same time.   
However, there are  likely  to  be  some  crises  that  will  require  CS3  to  both  respond  to  an  emergency 
situation while maintaining the ability to meet its contractual obligations.   Therefore, CS3 needs to ensure 
that it has a pre-planned strategy for acquiring office space in the event of a crisis.   This  will  be  critical  
to  the  response  (particularly  if  the  organisation  decides  to operate its communications centre out of 
this locality) as  well as for the recovery period. There is also an expectation among decision makers that 
there is substantial flexibility at CS3   particularly   in   terms   of   the   ability   to   operate   emergency   
response   from   field positions   as   well   as   from office   locations.     The   organisation   also   believes   
that   the equipment   available   to   field   staff   is   equally as   flexible   and   robust.     Transportation 
networks  were  all  highlighted  as  being  keystone  vulnerabilities  for  the  organisational response and 
recovery in a crisis. 
The organisation identified the need for a communications centre for crisis response.  The location of that 
centre was disputed and the organisation must carefully consider both the crisis response and recovery.    
CS3  is  very  focused  on  physical  emergencies,  and  has  a lower understanding of its vulnerabilities for 
other types of crises; for example the issues associated with significant human resource losses such as in a 
pandemic.   There may be a need  for  the  organisation  to  operate  an  emergency  response  while  at  the  
same  time  still meeting  its  normal  contractual  obligations.   This could place significant pressure on the 
need for a physical communications centre as well as the need for staff to man it. 
The  organisation  has  excellent  day-to-day  relationships  with  both  competitors  and  sub- contractors.   
There is an expectation that this will enable it to gain access to the necessary equipment for an emergency 
response.     There  is  an  assumption  that  in  a  crisis  the organisation  will  have  priority  of  access  to  
this  equipment  and  it  has  not  adequately considered  the  relationships  that  both  competitors  and  
subcontractors  may  have  with emergency response agencies like Civil Defence.  Further, CS3 does not 
have comparable relationships with organisations for access to fuel or material supplies, as for equipment. 
There  is  a  very  strong  dependency  on  field/operational  staff  to  be  able  to  communicate with both 
the  emergency services  and  with  management  in regional  offices.   There  must be  appropriate  support  
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measures  in  place  to  ensure  that  this  can  continue  to  occur  in  a number  of  different  crisis  types.    
Currently the organisation has not considered events with consequences larger than the events it has 
previously experienced.   The organisation is the 'eyes and ears' of its client in times of crisis and CS3 must 
ensure that its strategies will  enable  it  to  supply accurate  and  timely information to  those  who  need  it,  
when they need   it.      This   requires   a   great   deal   of   inter-organisational   co-operations   from   an 
emergency management perspective. 
The  ability  of  CS3  to  effectively  and  compassionately  manage  staff  welfare  issues  in  a major  
emergency  was  highlighted  as  a  weakness.    Additionally staff training during a crisis event is 
highlighted as a keystone vulnerability and this is related to both the ability of the organisation to retain 
knowledge and knowledge of staff roles and responsibilities. The potential absence of critical individuals in 
an emergency could lead to a need to train people into new roles during a stressful situation, and therefore 
there is a need to improve knowledge of a wide range of roles and responsibilities and reduce the need for 
additional emergency training. 
Risk    management    and    business    continuity    planning    are    highlighted    as    keystone 
vulnerabilities, not just on a regional basis, but also nationwide.    There  is  an  identified need  for  greater  
integration  of  these  types  of  strategies  across  regions,  but  with  greater regional input than just 
performing these at a corporate level.   This is particularly true for the recovery phase of an emergency 
event.     The regulatory environment of Central Government also has the potential to significantly impact 
the organisation. 
Adaptive Capacity 
The   organisation   identified   that   communications   and   relationships   between   regional offices and 
their emergency staff is a potential weakness in a crisis response.   Further, in the recovery phase of an 
emergency, communications and relationships with general staff becomes   a   critical   element.      This   is   
related   to   both   the   integrity   of   the   physical communications network and the awareness of various 
roles and responsibilities in CS3. Similarly,  the  relationships  between  CS3  and  its  external  
stakeholders  (including  clients and  consultants)  is  a  critical  aspect  for  crisis  response  and  recovery.    
This  is  directly related  to  CS3  needing  to  have  a  clear  understanding  of  the  expectations  of  its  
most important   external   stakeholders   and   ensuring   that   it   can   meet   those   expectations.  
Furthermore,   there   appears   to   be   a   gap   in   the   understanding at   CS3   of contractual obligations 
in a crisis event in the Wellington region. 
Typically,  staff  at  CS3  view  the  organisational  culture  to  be  empowering,  positive  and encouraging.   
This is supported by the overall organisational ethos.   The communications for day-to-day business within 
a region are excellent based on this organisational culture. But  due  to  the  potential  difficulties  in  
communicating  across  regional  boundaries  in  a crisis,   there   is   a   problem   with   ensuring   that   
accurate   and   relevant   information   is effectively transferred to those who need it.   Regional autonomy 
has lead to a significant level  of  resilience  for  emergencies  that  do  not  extend  past  the  organisations  
regional boundaries.     However   that   same   autonomy   may   reduce   resilience   in   multi-regional 
events, for example a pandemic event.    CS3  therefore  identified  a  need  for  a  regional communications  
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and  relationships  protocol  as  well  as  a  strategy  for  the  wider  group. Also,   the   level   of   autonomy   
attributed   to   each   region   may   actually   have   negative consequences for the organisation should 
additional external staff be called into a region during a crisis.     Currently  there  is  a  poor  organisation  
wide  understanding  of  what protocols  and  procedures  each  region  uses,  and  how  to  integrate  new  
external  staff  into those  to  ensure  effective  management  of  this  resource  in  a  crisis.   This is likely to 
be a significant issue for CS3 in both response and recovery periods. 
CS3  displays  some  differences  in  how  it  perceives  the  general  public.   From  a  regional and  
operational  perspective  the  general  public  is  seen to  be  a  major  stakeholder  and  this reflects   a   
strong   day-to-day   relationship   with   this   group   during   business   as   usual conditions and a 'front-
line' position during crises.   The corporate level of CS3 however doesn't have the same perception, 
possibly due to staff at corporate having less to do with the   general   public.      It   also   further   reflects   
the   regional   autonomy   policy   of   the organisation  and  may  have  an  impact  on  differing  opinions  
of  communication  priorities in a crisis situation between the regional and corporate decision makers. 
While  there  is  an expectation of staff to  take  on some  of the  responsibilities  for  decision making  that   
go   with  the   levels   of  autonomy   given  to   the   regions,   there   is   also   an expectation  of  the  
organisation  by  staff.   CS3  has  a  limited  understanding  of  what  staff may  require  in  different  types  
of  events,  and  also  what  the  implications  may  be  of  not meeting  those  expectations  in  a  crisis  in  
terms  of  staff  loyalty.     Given  the  level  of autonomy  granted  to  regional  offices  throughout  the  
organisation,  there  is  a  potential  for some discontinuity of decision making in the organisation, primarily 
for events that cross regional boundaries  for CS3.   While there is an expectation that the current leadership 
in the  organisation  reflects  the  overall  ethos  and  vision  at  all  levels  of  the  organisation, previous 
events may indicate that this is not true. 
C.2.4      CS4 - Public Utility Provider 
CS4  is  a  moderately  sized  public  utility  organisation  with  regional  offices  in  numerous  centres 
throughout New Zealand.  CS4 was one of two organisations that did not take part in the workshop phase 
of this research.   However the researcher was able to observe CS4 in an external emergency exercise.  No 
vulnerability self assessments were completed by CS4. 
C.2.4.1Resilience Issues for CS4 
Situation Awareness 
At   CS4   there   is   an  observable   need   for   greater   clarity  of  roles   and   responsibilities throughout  
the  organisation  from  a  crisis  management  perspective.    At  a  head  office level,  emergency  roles  
and  responsibilities  are  reasonably  well  understood,  but  this  was not  observed  from  a  regional  
office  level.    During  the  crisis  exercise  at  the  regional office,  the  level  of  responsibility  and  the  
mandate  to  make  decisions  for  some  staff  was not  in alignment,  and  this  caused  significant  
frustration.   Both from interviews  and  from crisis exercise observation decision makers at a regional level 
are unclear about  what the designated   roles   and   responsibilities   are   of   other   regional   offices   in   
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an   emergency response  (that  extends  across  regional  boundaries).    The  role  of  the  head  office  in  a 
regional response is also unclear and the national office was seen to have a 'finger in the pie'  when  it  
came  to  prioritisation  of  resources  and  decision  making  in  the  exercise. Furthermore,  the  roles  and  
responsibilities  of  both  critically  linked  organisations  in  an emergency   response   are   unclear.     
During   an   the   exercise   at   the   regional   level   the individual  selected  to  run  the  emergency  
management  office  and  who  was  the  media spokesman  for  CS4  was  actually  an  employee  of  a  
linked  organisation.    The  roles  and responsibilities  of  other  externally  linked  organisations  are  
similarly  unclear  and  poorly understood,   particularly   in   relation   to   large   scale   events   as   
opposed   to   the   smaller 'business-as-usual' crisis types. 
Keystone Vulnerabilities 
CS4  has  not  adequately  considered  the  importance  of  the  location  of  the  emergency management  
office  (EMO),  and  the  impact  that  this  may  have  on  the  resilience  of  the organisation  during  a  
crisis  event.   The  level  of  equipment  in  the  EMO  is  also  minimal, and  these  rooms  do  not  
currently  have  a  well  stocked  Civil  Defence  kit.    The  regional office  of  CS4  does  have  a  very  
well  stocked  cabinet,  but  this  is  physically  distant  from the EMO (on another floor) and there are no 
resources (water, food etc) in the EMO. 
The  value  of  strategic  planning  was  somewhat  lost  at  a  regional  level  in  favour  of  a dominantly  
operational  approach  to  crisis  management.    From a resilience perspective, the   inability   to   include   
strategic   planning   into   an   emergency   response   will   have significant implications on the 
organisations recovery.   CS4 was very involved with 'fire- fighting'  and  addressing  each  issue  as  it  
came  to  light  rather  than  being  strategic  about these  issues,  prioritising  them  and  ensuring  that  
addressing  issues  was  in  line  with  an established longer term recovery strategy. 
Both  the  fragility  of  the  communications  network  and  the  ability  to  send  appropriately formatted  
information  were  identified  as  keystone  vulnerabilities  for  CS4.    The  day-to- day  ability  to  
communicate  using  visual  tools  including  maps  and  plans,  together  with being   able   to   effectively   
transfer   this   information   throughout   the   organisation   (into different regional offices) is important.   
This is a primary communication method for this organisation  and  adequate  alternatives  are  currently  
not  available  should  CS4  loose  the use of the communications network.   Further, this extends to the 
reporting structures and protocols   that   CS4   currently   uses   and   the   appropriateness   of these   in a   
large   scale emergency as an effective internal and external communications tool. 
Adaptive Capacity 
One  of  the  most  critical  issues  for  CS4  is  in  terms  of  governance.    The  issue  of  who should be 
running the organisations emergency response (and the impacts of this decision on  the  recovery  of  the  
organisation)  is  a  key  concern.    CS4  does  not  appear  to  have considered  the  potential  impacts  on  
its  reputation  of  having  a  non-employee  actually controlling  the  regional  emergency  response.    This 
extends to who should speak to the media, and what the implications may be of having a non-employee as a 
C-12 
 
spokesperson for the organisation.   Currently  there  are  strict  rules  at  CS4  for  engagement  with  the  
media and the general public, but these were not adhered to in the simulated crisis. 
The communication difficulties internally and externally are also keystone vulnerabilities for CS4.   As 
highlighted in the previous section, there is a limited awareness of the roles and  responsibilities  of  key  
individuals  and  groups  both  internally  and  externally.    This extends to a lack of handover protocols in 
a crisis response (this was observed in both the regional  and  national  offices)  and  clear  guidelines  for  
communicating  and  succession during a crisis.   CS4 does not currently have clear guidelines for either 
succession or the transfer of information during a handover in a large scale crisis. 
The  transfer  of  information  is  critical  to  developing  advanced  adaptive  capacity and  this is  an  issue  
for  CS4.    The  flow  of  information  between  offices  and  staff  within  CS4 together  with transferring 
information between CS4 and external organisation is difficult due  to  technological  problems  and  a  
poor  understanding  of  who  needs  what  information and  when.     Further,  in  some  cases  critical  
information  resides  in  a  small  number  of individuals  in  the  organisation  and  there  is  a  potential  
problem  should  some  of  these people become unavailable to the organisation. 
C.2.5      CS5 - Educational Organisation 
CS5  is  an education provider in New Zealand  which is  a  large  employer  for  the  local  community and   
has   an   established   reputation   both   within   the   New   Zealand   and   internationally.      The 
organisation did follow up on some of the recommendations in the report and is currently engaged in 
writing and implementing a disaster response and recovery plan. 
C.2.5.1   Resilience Issues for CS5 
Situation Awareness  
CS5  has  a  distinct  silo   mentality  culture  and  this  is  reflected  strongly  in  a  lack  of understanding   
and   awareness   of   the   roles   and   responsibilities   of   staff   members throughout  the  organisation.     
There  is  very  little  cross  over  of  staff  and  knowledge between  different  parts  of  the  organisation.   
There  is  also  a  perception  that  some  groups of  employees  have  little  or  no  allegiance  to  the  
organisation  and  would  be  working  for their own gain in the event of a major crisis.   For example, some 
parts of the organisation have  well  established  protocols  and  strategies  for  business  continuity  as  it  
pertains  to them but there is little in the way of an organisation wide approach to business continuity that  
incorporates  all  of  this   existing  information  and  knowledge.     In-fact   many  key decision  makers  in 
the  organisation are  not  aware  of these  individual  plans  at  all.   Roles and  responsibilities  at  CS5  
appear  to  be  very  well  defined  within  individual  groups. However   there   is   very   little   motivation   
or   opportunity   for   employees   to   cross   the boundaries that define their roles in the organisation.   
This is a significant barrier to staff expanding their understanding of what skills others bring to the 
organisation and appears to further foster the negative elements of silo mentality at CS5. 
There  is  a  distinct  lack  of  awareness  of  some  key  external  stakeholder  groups  that  the organisation   
deals   with.      This   is   in   both   day-to-day   operations   and   also   from   an emergency   perspective.       
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The   expectations   of   external   stakeholders   and   what   the organisation believes those expectations to 
be are often two very different things.   Some of these stakeholders include the clients (or students), 
investors into the organisation and the wider community.   For  example,  CS5  was,  until  recent  times,  a  
sector  post  for  Civil Defence.   Many in the  community are likely to be unaware  of the organisations  
changed role,  and  have  a  certain  expectation  of  CS5  in  the  event  of  a  crisis.    Some  within  the 
organisation feel  a  responsibility to  the  community to  provide  some  assistance,  but  there is division as 
to the extent of that assistance. 
There  is  a  strong  indication  that  knowledge  pathways  (the  flow  of  information  in  the organisation)  
are  limited  and  that  most  staff  don't  fully  realise  what  is  likely  to  be required  of  the  organisation  
in  a  crisis.    Similarly,  they  are  unaware  of  what  may  be required  of  them  as  staff  to  assist  the  
organisation  in  a  crisis,  or  the  wider  community. This is exacerbated by the prevalent silo mentality in 
CS5. 
CS5  has  an  excellent  awareness  of  the  implications  of  the  loss  of  information  regarding clients   
and   investors,   and   therefore   backup   of   this   information   is   a   priority   issue. However,  privacy  
and  protection  of  information  that  doesn't  involve  client  or  investor information is a critical issue that 
the organisation largely appears to be unaware of.   The impacts   of   loss   of   key   information,   access   
to   critical   information   and   equipment following a crisis and the potential loss of reputation in the eyes 
of key investors is a vital part of CS5's developing situation awareness. 
Keystone Vulnerabilities 
Buildings and contents are keystone vulnerabilities for CS5.   This is principally due to the impacts  on  the  
organisation  should  some  of  those  buildings  become  unavailable,  or contents  damaged/destroyed  and  
what  this  means  for  the  continued  operations  of  the organisation  and  its  reputation.   Also, building 
security onsite was not widely identified as keystone vulnerability until the REDS.   Certainly, from a 
reputation perspective, the organisation needs to ensure that it protects certain equipment and information 
during or following   a   crisis.     Again,   from   a   reputation   perspective,   specialist   equipment   and 
supplies are identified as highly vulnerable, particularly in the recovery phase of a crisis. CS5 also 
recognised that its image and reputation is potentially highly vulnerable and that it must have robust 
systems in place to mitigate any future problems in this area.   Further, the ability of the organisation to 
source additional key supplies is keystone vulnerability for CS5.   Finally, essential services including 
electricity, water, sewerage, transportation and IT networks were all identified as being keystone 
vulnerabilities for CS5. 
CS5 has a clear awareness of which of its buildings present the greatest risk to life in the event   of   a   
physical   emergency including   a   fire   or   explosion.     Recent   small   events highlight  the  
consequences  associated  with the  loss of electricity and  telecommunication services  and  therefore  CS5  
has  a  heightened  awareness  of  these  issues.   However, CS5 tends to focus on those recently impacted 
services and somewhat neglects to consider the impacts of the loss of other services such as the 
transportation network, particularly from a communications perspective. 
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In  parts  CS5  has  clearly  identified  its  operational  priorities  but  this  is  not  integrated across the 
organisation.   For example, while the organisation does have a clear awareness of which structures are  
most vulnerable, it does not have any organisation wide planning in  place  to  find  alternative  
sites/buildings/structures  should  key  facilities  be  lost,  or  for the re-allocation of buildings/structures for 
purposes they are not currently being used for following  a  crisis.     Individual groups in the organisation, 
however, do have isolated planning    in    place,    but    this    is    not    communicated    throughout    the    
organisation. Additionally, the organisation potentially has specialist equipment and skills available 
internally that it currently has not identified from an emergency management perspective. 
Staff succession in the aftermath of a crisis was considered to be a high vulnerability and there  is  little  
planning  around  this  issue  from  an  organisation  wide  perspective.    Some parts  of  the  organisation  
have  comprehensive  succession  planning,  however  this  has  not been  integrated  across  CS5.    Staff  
generally,  have  a  poor  understanding  of  the  level  of business  interruption  insurance  that  the  
organisation  holds  and  this  may  be  a  keystone vulnerability for CS5 in some types of crises. 
The  organisation  identified  that  it  is  highly  vulnerable  to  changes  in  central  government regulations 
and it may have a reduced ability to adapt to any changes in a way that offers opportunities for the whole 
organisation. 
From  a  planning  perspective  CS5  has  few  preferential  supply  arrangements  set  up  that will  serve  it  
in  times  of  crisis.    Nor  has  the  organisation  identified  what  are  its  critical supplies,  suppliers  and  
if  there  are  in-fact  any  alternatives  in  the  marketplace  for  these suppliers.   Additionally, there is also 
the potential for CS5 to offer other organisations in the  wider  community resources  and  skilled  people  
in the  event  of  some  crisis  situations. The  organisation  has  presently  not  considered  this  two-way  
movement  of  supporting resources  following  a  crisis.    Nor  has  the  organisation  considered  what  
these  sorts  of arrangements   might   mean  for  its  public   image   in  the  community  in  the   face  of  
an emergency. 
There   are   limited   processes   and   protocols   in   place   around   staff   welfare   issues, particularly  
ongoing  payment,  leave  entitlement,  or  even  ongoing  employment  in  the event of a major disaster.   
While health and safety is typically well thought out, this does not extend to an emergency management 
context at all.   There is a perception that staff welfare is only about day-to-day health and safety, and not 
the ongoing trauma associated with a significant crisis.    This highlights an ongoing communication issue 
internally at CS5.     For   example,   the   organisation currently does not   engage   with   staff to   better 
understand   their   expectations   and   fears   in   the   event   of   particular   crisis   situations. Similarly,  
very few  staff  at  CS5  have  any  knowledge  of  what  is  likely to  be  expected  of them  in  the  face  of  
a  crisis  situation.    This lack of knowledge will further foster the negative elements of the organisational 
culture that contributes to a lowered resilience. 
Ongoing  access  to  financial  resources,  particularly  cash,  to  meet  minimum  operating functions   in   a   
crisis   is   a   problem   for   CS5.     Additionally,   the   inconsistency   of   the organisational  vision  
across  CS5  leads  to  some  staff  feeling  disregarded  in  the  decision making process and further 
perpetuating the negative effects of the silo mentality. 
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Adaptive Capacity  
The ability of CS5 to engage in respectful and appropriate communications internally is a significant    
issue.       The    influence    of   silo    mentality   is    a    major    obstacle    to    this communication  
working  effectively  between  (and  sometimes  within)  different  groups  of employees  at  CS5.    In  
particular  there  are  problems  associated  with  communications between the  senior  management  team 
and  other  groups of employees.   From an external perspective,  while  communications  and  relationships  
with  some  emergency  services  are strong   and   ongoing   (for   example   the   Fire   Brigade),   this   
does   not   extend   to   other emergency  service  organisations,  for  example  the  ambulance  service,  
civil  defence  and even    the    police.        Also    highlighted    were    the    organisations    
communications    and relationships protocols with external stakeholders.   The organisation has a poor 
ability to contact  these  stakeholders  during  a  major  emergency  and  inform  them  of  the  current 
situation.   This is directly related to the organisational vision and how different groups of employees   
perceive   the   purpose   of   the   organisation   and   how   communications   with different external 
stakeholders should be prioritised. 
The  vision  that  the  organisation  has  for  its  future  path  is  not  consistent  among  all  staff. Further,  
the  current  perception  of  what  the  organisation  is  and  what  it  represents  (and what should be 
forthcoming in terms of resources and image) is divided.   Further, there is still a degree of uncertainty 
about the status of the organisation following previous crises; is CS5 still responding to the impacts of that 
event, or is it well into the recovery process? The  answers  to  these  questions  have  significant  effects  
on  the  leadership  and  decision making  protocols  in  the  organisation  and  are  impacted  by  the  
organisational  vision  and strategy for future development.  Further, although there is good knowledge 
about the key strategic  risks  that  the  organisation  faces,  there  is  very  little  consensus  on  how  CS5 
intends to address these risks. 
Communication  channels  between  the  senior  decision  makers  in  the  organisation  and other  
employees  are  not  clearly  defined;  this  fosters  confusion  and  some  distrust  about the ability of all 
staff to contribute to the decision making processes and have their views aired  at  the  organisation.    
There  is  a  perception  at  some  levels  in  the  organisation  that communications  with  senior  decision  
makers  are  not  appropriate  and  that  decisions  are not as transparent as they could or should be.   This 
has the potential to set up a culture of distrust  in  the  organisation,  leading  to  greater  negative  impacts  
from  silo  mentality  and fostering the  disloyalty that  many in the  organisation fear  is  occurring.   A key 
resilience issue  to  arise  from  this  study  is  that  of  the  mandate  to  make  decisions  in  the  absence  of 
senior  management.    The  decision  making  process  is  seen  to  lack  transparency  at  CS5 and  this  
appears  to  foster  a  great  deal  of  uncertainty  about  the  succession  of  decision making for the 
organisation. 
Management  systems  at  CS5  were  highlighted  as  a  problem  and  this  is  intrinsically related to 
leadership styles and governance in the organisation together with the situation awareness  of  various  
groups  within  the  organisation.   There  are  issues  here  that  involve silo  mentality,  limited  levels  of  
trust  in  management  structures  and  a  perception  that people   at   all   levels   in   the   organisation   are   
working   for   their   own   gain,   not   the organisations.      This   also   leads   to   perceptions   of   a   
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disparity   between   the   level   of responsibility expected of staff for decisions versus the input these same 
employees have into that decision making process. 
Additionally  there  are  issues  identified  with  the  ability  to  acquire,  transfer  and  retain information   
throughout   the   organisation   both   in   day-to-day   business   and   in   crisis situations.      Previous   
minor   incidents   that   resulted   in   closure   of   the   organisation highlighted the problems associated 
with obtaining accurate and timely information about the reasons for closure.    This  has  implications  on  
the  ability  of  decision  makers  in  the organisation to transfer information to external stakeholders as 
well. 
C.2.6      CS6 - Private Wholesale Distributor 
C.2.6.1  Resilience Issues for CS6   
Situation Awareness  
Overall  CS6  has  a  very  good  awareness  of  its  position  in  its  industry,  the  nature  of  the business  
that  it  offers  its  key  stakeholders  and  largely  who  those  key  stakeholders  are. Where  CS6  shows  
some  limitations  is  the  level  of  awareness  around  the  expectations  of those stakeholders, particularly 
in crisis situations. 
There is a good awareness of roles and responsibilities of staff at CS6.   This is because of a  policy  to  
move  staff  (especially  in  management  and  supervisory  positions)  into  new areas in the business.   The 
general staff have an awareness that they can progress through the organisation because several members 
of the executive management team began their careers in the organisation at the bottom levels.    However,  
senior  managers  and  key decision  makers  have  a  limited  awareness  of  the  expectations  of  general  
staff.   There  is also a perception that, with regard to any emergency planning, the messages to staff must 
be  somewhat  filtered;  general  staff  are  typically  adverse  to  too  much  information  and there is a 
danger of evoking too much fear with the wrong messages to this group. 
CS6  has  a  good  awareness  of  who  its  key  stakeholders  are  and  effective  day-to-day 
communications    with    them    exists.        However,    again,    the    expectations    of    these 
stakeholders  are  not  clearly  understood,  particularly  the  clients,  and  therefore  it  will  be difficult for 
CS6 to meet these expectations in any type of crisis.   This has the potential to destabilise an otherwise 
effective network.   In addition, the organisation has not made all of its most critical stakeholders aware of 
CS6's expectations in an emergency situation. 
The   longevity of   key employees   at   CS6   is   both   an   observable   strength and   also   a weakness.   
A key weakness is an attitude that CS6 and the executive team will be able to cope regardless of the crisis.   
Communications and relationships  have been built up over a  number  of  years  and  there  is  an  
assumption  that  team  members  understand  what  each other  brings  to  the  business  and  the  
limitations  of  their  position  in  the  organisation. However, there is a suggestion that this level of 
awareness is somewhat more limited than the executive team realises.    For  more  regularly  occurring  
crises  CS6's  executive  team has  an  excellent  understanding  of  what  makes  the  business  tick  and  
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how  to  resolve  the issues  that  arise.    However,  CS6  also  must  raise  its  awareness  of  what  
situations  it  is likely  to  face  in  a  larger  scale  crisis;  these  are  fundamentally  different  to  the  types  
of events CS6 is dealing with in normal business. 
CS6 is also aware that both it and its clients are potentially a significant resource from a civil defence 
perspective in some types of crises.    The  organisation  has  made  initial contacts  with  Civil  Defence  to  
attempt  some  sort  of  constructive  dialogue  between  the two organisations but as yet this is in its 
infancy. 
Keystone Vulnerabilities 
CS6  has  engaged  in  some  comprehensive  risk  identification  and  management  processes. However, 
the organisations awareness of the impacts and consequences of some of these events is surprisingly 
limited.   For example, in the REDS, the impact of an earthquake on both    telecommunications    and    
transportation    networks    were    misunderstood.       The organisation  displays  a  lowered  awareness  
of  its  own  communications  effectiveness  in this type of situation. 
Buildings and structures have been highlighted as keystone vulnerabilities for CS6.   This is not only from 
the perspective of building integrity (for example structural damage and contents  damage  following  an  
earthquake/flood  event)  but  also  in  terms  of  access  to buildings  and  stock,  loss  of  critical  services  
such  as  electricity,  and  from  a  security viewpoint.   Furthermore,  the  organisation  does  not  have  an  
alternative  site  identified  for emergency  operations  should  the  primary  site  be  lost  or  unusable.    
CS6  has  recognised electricity  services  as  a  key  vulnerability  and  has  access  to  some  generators.    
However both  generators  and  fuel  supplies  were  also  identified  as  keystone  vulnerabilities.    The 
vulnerability  of  the  generators  themselves  is  low,  but  access  to  fuel  supplies  following some types 
of crises may be a significant problem.  The organisation identified that it was likely  to  approach  this  
issue  from  an  'as  needed'  basis  rather  than  actually  planning  for additional  supply  sources  and  
creating  preferential  supply  agreements.    CS6 also has a responsibility to its clients in terms of damage 
to their buildings and inventory.   This may be  significant  keystone  vulnerability  in  terms  of  the  
availability  of  damage  assessors, insurance representatives, builders and the supply of building materials.   
Again, CS6 has not engaged in significant preplanning for this vulnerability. 
Telecommunications  networks  were  highlighted  as  a  keystone  vulnerability  for  CS6. Several senior 
staff had made the assumption that should the organisation experience the loss   of   this   network,   staff   
would   'just   communicate'   with   one   another   with   little consideration   as   to   how   this   would   
actually   occur.     The   organisation   has   recently identified   a   keystone   vulnerability   itself;   the   
lack   of   backup   for   a   key   software communications package between its principal localities.    This 
was duplicated shortly prior to this research project.   However the project highlighted the ongoing 
vulnerability of    the    backup    and    its    communication    requirements    to    loss    of    the    physical 
telecommunications network; vulnerability previously unidentified by CS6.   The further loss of water and 
sewerage network supply would mean that the organisation would only be able to support limited numbers 
of staff at any one site within the affected area of the crisis.   This  may  have  a  significant  impact  on  
CS6's  ability  to  respond  as  effectively  as expected following some types of emergency. 
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Internal  communications  at  the  site  supervisor/manager  level  was  highlighted  as  being  a significant   
vulnerability   based   on   the   importance   of   this   group   in   communicating effectively with general 
staff.   Similarly this group is likely to be an important vehicle in supporting knowledge of staff welfare 
issues in the executive management team, and for general staff to air their concerns, expectations and fears 
to the top decision makers in the organisation.        This    also    highlights    vulnerabilities    associated    
with    training    and recruitment.    The  organisation  has  a  high  turnover  of  general  staff,  and  it  is  
these  staff that  CS6  would need to retain in the event of some types of crisis.   Better  understanding of  
staffing  issues,  communications  with  general  staff  and  better  understanding  of  the expectations   of   
this   group   would   assist   in   reducing   this   vulnerability   for   CS6   and improving any negative 
impacts of silo mentality. 
The expectations of principal stakeholders, including clients are not clearly understood in the organisation 
and this highlighted another significant vulnerability for CS6.    While there is a recognised amount of trust 
evident in the relationships between CS6 and clients, poor  decision  making  based  on  a  reduced  
knowledge  of  stakeholder  expectations  and limitations  could  potentially cause  a  problematic  loss  of 
reputation  for  CS6.   In contrast, however,  CS6  has  started  a  process  of  determining  what  essential  
supplies  would  be required and made steps to create effective preferential relationships with suppliers in 
the event  of  a  crisis;  predominantly  focused  on  a  pandemic  but  certainly applicable  to  other types  
of event.   This is also related to the organisations sense of corporate responsibility to    the    community   
at    large.       The    organisation   also    employs    the    services    of   a communications  consultancy  to  
handle  its  media  profile  and  its  overall  external  image, particularly in terms of emergency situations. 
Adaptive Capacity  
The   broad   knowledge   of   roles   and   responsibilities   of   staff   at   most   levels   in   the organisation 
is a key strength in terms of adaptive capacity.   It encourages a reduced silo mentality  and  helps  to  
support  the  acquisition  and  dissemination  of  information  in  the organisation  during  crises.   However,  
at  CS6  there  are  some  issues  within  the  executive team  regarding   how  to   gather   information  and   
how  to   disseminate   that   information through the organisation in a crisis.   The governance structure of 
the organisation gives it a unique advantage in accessing information throughout its network.     However 
CS6 appears   to   be   poorly   adapted   to   use   that   information   from   a   crisis   management 
perspective at the highest levels. 
In  the  REDS,  the  executive  team  were  unable  to  brainstorm  ideas  collectively  and  had difficulty  in  
producing  strategic  action  plans  in  a  simulated  situation  that  reflected  the issues  to  arise  in  the  
discussions.   A  keystone  vulnerability  identified  during  the  REDS for  this  organisation   was   the  
surprising  degree   of  negative   silo   mentality  behaviour exhibited  by  the  executive  management  
team.    Despite  all  the  assertions  of  effective communications  and  relationships  at  this  level  in  the  
organisation  during  the  interviews, the REDS highlighted that for some large scale crises, this 
effectiveness may be reduced. The   group   did   not   display   a   clear   and   unified   understanding   of   
the   roles   and responsibilities of others in the group, particularly those  who  were not represented in the 
REDS  (some  members  of  the  executive  team  were  unable  to  attend  the  REDS  and  their 
responsibilities  in  the  business  were  not  adequately  considered  by  the  rest  of  the  team). Nor did the 
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team show an ability to gather information effectively without 'fire-fighting'. This  potentially  reflects  a  
lack  of  broad  strategy  for  emergency  management  within  the organisation. 
The  attitude  of  CS6  towards  staff  being  part  of  the  'family'  is  a  significant  strength  for the 
organisation.   CS6 recognises that, as an employer, it is not able to offer top wages to all  staff,  it  believes  
that  the  package  it  offers  staff  is  appreciated  and  well  supported. From  a  cultural  viewpoint  CS6  
believes  that  staff  loyalty  in  a  crisis  goes  hand  in  hand with work conditions, wages and support 
structures on a day-to-day basis. 
The  most  significant  adaptive  capacity  strength  of  CS6  lies  in  its  client  relationships. CS6  
understands  this  very  well  and  continues  to  build  on  this  strength  for  the  benefit  of clients.  
However the organisation cannot rely on the strength of its clients alone in how it manages   crises,   as   
these   clients   are   likely  to   have   high   expectations   of   CS6   in  an emergency; expectations that 
CS6 current is not entirely aware of. 
C.2.7      CS7 - Private Utility 
CS7  is  a  discrete  business  unit  of  a  larger  parent  organisation  that  is  a  large  private  utility 
organisation.  CS7 has a widespread distribution of offices throughout New Zealand. 
C.2.7.1   Resilience Issues for CS7 
Situation Awareness 
CS7  displays  a  limited  awareness  of the  potential  impacts  of some  of its  identified  risks. It  also  
shows  a  reduced  awareness  of  the  range  of  hazards  that  it  could  be  exposed  to. Further,  the  
organisation  has   a  limited  awareness  internally  about   the  ability  of  the organisation  to  manage  
some  identified  risks.   These issues were made very clear in the REDS when the scenario was first 
proposed.   The scenario was developed in consultation with a key member of the leadership team at CS7.    
Some  staff  members  expectations regarding  how to  deal  with  some  of  the  identified  hazards  has  
shown  poor  awareness  of the  reality  of  these  situations.    For  example,  the  expectation  that  staff  
would  and  could operate  from home  in  an influenza  pandemic  is  assumed  without  any planning,  let  
alone trialling of a plan for such an event. 
Keystone Vulnerabilities  
Leadership succession was identified as a key vulnerability for the organisation.   At best the organisation 
had engaged in formal succession planning for the general manager only. Additionally,  the  groups  in  the  
REDS  did  have  representatives  of  all  business  units  at CS7 but the REDS groups did not identify these 
absences or their impact on the decision making  process.    The organisation displays a limited 




While  CS7  has  some  good  policies  around  staff  welfare  issues  for  day-to-day  business, there   is   
little   consideration   of   how   to   extend   this   into   an   emergency   management environment.    The  
level  of  understanding  of  staff  expectations  is  limited,  strategies  to mitigate the negative effects of 
rumours in the organisation are non-existent and there is a negative  approach  by  some  senior  staff  
towards  general  staff;  during  the  REDS  these individuals considered some groups of employees as 
dispensable.   Again, this is a feature of the negative silo mentality prevalent through the organisation. 
Senior  members  of  the  organisation  appear  to  have  difficulty  in  communications  and relationships  
with  general  staff  members.   This  has  the  potential  to  critically  destabilise the  organisation  in  a  
crisis  where  the  most  important  resource  is  that  of  people.   Human resources  therefore  at  CS7  are  
a  keystone  vulnerability  in  terms  of  the  capability  and capacity  of  the  organisation  in  a  competitive  
market  and  in  terms  of  the  reputation damage  that  can  be  caused  by  not  adequately  engaging  with  
general  staff  members, particularly  in  a  crisis.     Finally,  other  groups  that  were  identified  as  being  
keystone vulnerabilities from the perspective of communications and relationships were customers, 
contractors,  suppliers,  local  and  national  authorities  as  well  as  the  media  and  the  wider  
community. 
An important issue for CS7 is the importance of buildings, equipment and services.   The leadership team 
indicated that staff would be able to work remotely if necessary and that there was no need to plan for an 
alternative site for continued operations.   However, this ability  to  operate  remotely  has  not  been  tested  
or  detailed  in  any  way;  it  was  simply  an assumption based principally on the portability of appropriate 
technology.   There is little consideration  about  the  consequences  should  telecommunications  also  be  
restricted  in  a crisis  that  forced  the  organisation  to  operate  remotely,  nor  is  there  any  consideration  
of potential  legal,  security  and  reputation  issues  in  this  regard.    Essential services such as electricity, 
water, sewerage as well as telecommunications were all highlighted as critical vulnerabilities.   
Additionally computer hardware and software/intellectual property were identified   as   keystone   
vulnerabilities.      In   addition,   intellectual   property,   computer hardware  and  software  were  all  
identified  as  being  keystone  vulnerability  components. All  of  these  also  relate  to  the  ability  of  the  
organisation  to  operate  remotely  and  the legalities and reputation issues that arise if staff are expected to 
operate from home. 
Planning,  including  for  example,  emergency  management,  business  continuity  and  risk management  
planning  together  with  media  and  external  communications  planning,  has the potential  to impact  CS7 
significantly.   The organisation appears to be either unaware or  unwilling  to  leverage  off  some  of  the  
planning  and  resources  that  its  parent  company already has in place.   This relates back to negative 
impacts of silo mentality and reduced situation awareness about the type of events that may have negative 
consequences on the organisation.    However,  many  of  the  direct  planning  issues  are  improving  
because  of ongoing planning strategies currently being initiated within CS7. 
CS7 has identified that some of its existing contractual relationships have the potential to be  keystone  
vulnerabilities;  both  those  contracts  that  CS7  has  with  customers  and  also contracts with other 




Silo  mentality  is  well  recognised  by  the  senior  decision  makers  at  CS7  and  they  have made 
significant inroads to counteracting this issue  within their leadership team with the improved structure, 
transparency and visibility of the senior decision makers to the rest of the  organisation.   But  silo  
mentality  is  more  pervasive  than  it  first  appears  at  CS7.   It is recognised between departments at CS7 
but also between CS7 and its parent organisation. During  the  REDS  for  this  organisation  there  were  
representatives/observers  from  the parent  organisation  present,  prepared  to  offer  advice  and  
assistance  in  the  simulated response to the crisis.   However, CS7 did not use their expertise at all, 
preferring to keep the decision making and the information gathering in-house.   While CS7 claims that it is 
willing to  leverage  off  the  resources  that  its  parent  company has  to  offer  without  feeling like  it  is  
compromising  its  inherent  autonomy,  there  was  no  evidence  of  this  during  the workshop, or 
evidence that staff will even know how to do this if it is required. 
Closely related to the issue of roles and responsibilities in CS7 is the vulnerability of the acquisition,   
retention   and   transfer   of   information   in   the   organisation   from   a   crisis perspective.     These  
vulnerabilities  involve  the  negative  aspects  of  silo  mentality,  an unwillingness  to  share  information  
around  the  organisation,  poor  understanding  of  what other  groups  and  individuals  expect  and  
require  in  terms  of  information,  both  in  day-to- day business and in potential crisis situations. 
Leadership  was  observed  to  be  a  key resilience  issue  for  CS7  and  reflected  the  negative silo  
mentality  that  is  present  throughout  the  organisation.   In both groups assembled for the REDS, 
individuals took over leadership roles without much active participation in the group discussion about the 
crisis.   These individual also came up with ideas that were not discussed   by   the   group   as   a   whole   
and   which   were   subsequently   offered   by these individuals as solutions to the crisis issues.   This was 
most prevalent in the Leadership Team group. 
The  organisation  does  not  display  a  detailed  knowledge  of  how  to  engage  with  its  key 
stakeholders,  most  at  risk  customers  or  even  its  employees  in  a  crisis.   The  expectations of  these  
groups  were  apparent  to  staff  in  the  workshop,  however  the  ability  of  these decision  makers  to  
meet  those  expectations  is  limited.   CS7 considers the backing of its parent company a significant 
advantage in a very competitive market place, both in terms of its financial position and the human and 
technical resources available.   Overall, staff at CS7  support  closer  ties  with the  parent  company in 
terms  of adopting  more  standardised systems  and  procedures.   While  there  may  be  some  concern  
about  the  effects  of  this  on CS7's  ability  to  act  autonomously  in  the  short  term,  the  majority  of  
staff  support  this move for improvements in the medium to long term.   The parent company is limited in 
its ability  to  make  changes  quickly  due  to  its  size  and  its  organisational  hierarchy  and decision 
making processes.   However, staff at CS7 do not consider this to hamper CS7's ability to adapt to change 
or move forward.    CS7 generally believe the ability to make decisions in a timely manner is strengthened 
by the association with the parent company. However  CS7  does  not  display  the  ability  to  collect  
information  that  would  enable  it  to make accurate and appropriate decisions in a crisis.   This is because 
it does not currently have   the   systems   in place   to   identify,   map   and   track its   most   critical   
stakeholders, including its customers or competitors.     If these types   of tools are available to the 
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organisation through the parent company, then CS7 is unaware of them and may suggest further 
entrenchment of the negative aspects of silo mentality identified earlier. 
Adaptive   capacity is   also   potentially critically affected   by an   unclear   understanding regarding the 
capability and capacity of the organisation in certain types of situation.  The interviews  highlighted  this  
issue  and  it  was  confirmed  in  the  REDS.    There are two schools of thought at CS7.   One group 
believes that the organisation is severely restricted in   its   ability   to   meet   customer   demands   as   
well   as   respond   to   market   changes appropriately and remain competitive.   Another  group  believes  
that  the  organisation  has no  significant  issue  in  dealing  with  any  challenge  it  faces  and  being  able  
to  retain  a competitive   advantage.     This   debate   centres   on   the   capability of   existing   staff   and 
contractors/consultants    as    well    as    the    capability    of    the    organisation    and    linked 
organisations to meet market demands. 
C.2.8      CS8 - Private Retailer 
CS8  is  a  medium  sized  retail  operation  that  services  a  rural  community  in  New  Zealand.   CS8 is 
also part of a group of other branded organisations throughout New Zealand.    CS8 is serviced by a wide   
range   of   organisations   and   is   a   significant   social   and   information   hub   for   the   local 
community. 
C.2.8.1   Resilience Issues for CS8 
Situation Awareness  
Although  the  organisation  has  a  good  awareness  of  the  positive  side  of  its  relationship with its  
community,  there  is  a  significantly  more  limited  understanding of  how  great  the negative  impact  
may be  from this  relationship,  particularly in the  event  of a  crisis  where CS8's reputation is under 
threat.   This negativity may arise from rumour, insinuation and the media, for example. 
There  is  a  general  lack  of  awareness  of  the  potential  consequences  of  some  relatively common 
events, and what might happen if these were to escalate.   There is also a limited awareness  of  the  damage  
that   might  be  caused  by  the   media  if  there  are  not  strict guidelines for staff in dealing with the  
media outside of the  work environment.   There is also  an  assumption  that  other  organisations  in  the  
branded  group  of  organisations  will take  charge  of  media  relationships  and  dealing  to  a  large  
extent  in  a  crisis.    Also  CS8 believes  that  in  a  crisis,  other  critical  organisations  would  provide  
leadership  and  be  the first to make contact; this organisation would be more likely to wait for that contact 
than to initiate it themselves. 
There  are  also  awareness  issues  in  CS8  regarding  knowledge  about  the  organisations actual 
operations.   During the workshop it became apparent that not all participants had a good  understanding of  
what  role  some  components  actually  played  in  the  running of the business.   For example for the 
REDS (which involved an organisation specific health and safety incident),  more  than half of respondents  
considered that  health and safety was  not of  immediate  criticality  to  the  organisation  in  this  event.    
Similarly, connectivity with other organisations and stakeholders was considered critical to this situation by 
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less than half of the participants.    While  the  organisation  has  a  good  awareness  of  some  of  its 
internal  operations  and  selected  external  stakeholders,  this  could  be  critically limiting  in an  
emergency.   This  highlighted  a  need  for  the  organisation  to  broaden  its  awareness  of potentially  
crucial  stakeholders  before  any  event  occurs,  as  well  as  the  expectations  and perceptions of and from 
these stakeholders in a crisis. 
Keystone Vulnerabilities  
The   interconnectedness   of   other   organisations   is   identified   as potential keystone vulnerability; 
particularly where CS8 has an expectation of the standards and procedures of these linked organisations in 
a crisis.   This  is  highlighted  particularly  with  health  and safety issues,  whereby CS8's  reputation could 
be damaged  significantly through no  fault of  its  own,  but  through  the  neglect  and  poor  management  
of  other  critically  linked organisations. 
The  organisation  has  access  to  some  very  well  developed  incident  management  plans, developed 
through the wider branded group.   The staff at CS8 have a good knowledge of where  to  access  these  
plans  and  which  part  of  the  plan  to  refer  to.   However the actual working of the plan and the 
application of the plan to any particular crisis was more of a problem for CS8. 
The group of branded organisations that CS8 is part of is another major advantage for the organisation in 
terms of its adaptive capacity.   Compared to other similar organisations in rural  communities,  the  
resources  available  to  CS8  through  the  group  are  potentially substantial.     These  range  from  human  
resources,  physical  and  mechanical  resources, access  to  stock  and  equipment,  building  materials  and  
even  the  pooling  of  resources  in several  other  branded  organisations  to  enable  the  continuation  of  
service  to  a  wider community. 
CS8's  position in the  community,  together  with the  local  staff base  is  often a  strength in times of 
crisis.   Staff have a vested interest in the organisation continuing to operate from both a personal and 
community perspective. 
Adaptive Capacity  
Silo mentality is a significant issue for CS8 and this was identified in the interviews and also during the 
REDS.   Staff have a level of autonomy that is supported by a high degree of accountability and 
responsibility for day-to-day business.   Typically this represents a strength   for   CS8   but   there   are   
awareness   problems   with   escalating   potential   events upwards to management.  This also highlights 
situation awareness problems regarding the upwards communication within the organisation.    For  CS8,  
silo  mentality  presents  no problems   during  day-to-day  business   from  a   departmental   view  point;   
staff   in   each department  have  a  very  good  understanding  of  their  own  areas  of  influence.    
However this does not extend beyond department level for most staff, other than the owners. 
Internal  communications  and  relationship  issues  are  highlighted  in  this  study  as  being keystone   
vulnerabilities  for  CS8;  between  CS8  and  the   other  branded  organisations, department  managers  
and  with  general  staff,  particularly  during  an  emergency  response phase.   This is directly related to 
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the problems associated with silo mentality as discussed earlier.   It  is  also  related  to  expectations  of  
these  other  internally  connected  groups  and organisations   and   CS8's   knowledge   of   these   
expectations.       The   communications pathways between CS8 and other branded organisations are 
effective and well established for day-to-day events.     However, there is a very significant chance that 
these could breakdown in a crisis, particularly due to the availability of key staff within these groups and 
other organisations within the group.   This has the potential to impact on the brand of CS8 as well as that 
of the entire group. 
External  communications  and  relationships  were  observed  to  have  the  greatest  influence between  
CS8  and  its  competitors,  customers  and  the  media.    There  are  also  very  close links  with the  wider  
community and  therefore  the  vulnerability is  significantly related  to the  ongoing  relationships  that  
CS8  has  with  the  community  and  how  to  maintain  these during a crisis. 
Knowledge acquisition and transfer are identified as keystone vulnerabilities.   While this organisation  has  
some  very  good  systems  and  protocols  for  what  information  to  gather about  a  particular  situation  
and  in  a  standardised  manner,  there  is  poor  understanding about actually how to gather that 
information.   Further there is poor awareness regarding how  difficult  and  time  consuming  it  may  be  to  
gather  all  the  information  that  decision makers  believe  they  can  acquire,  particularly  in  a  major  
crisis  situation.    Additionally, staff  at  CS8  have  little  understanding  as  to  how  to  conduct  
information  gathering  and transfer so as to ensure the  media and the community did not perceive it as an 
admission of guilt or neglect in the face of particular crises. 
The  current  owner/operator  leadership  structure  of  CS8  was  observed  to  be  a  significant strength  
for  the  organisation  in  terms  of  decision  making  in  day-to-day  operations  and also in a crisis.   
However, there is a potential that this strength may be come a weakness, and    leadership    keystone 
vulnerability,    should    the    current    decision    makers    be unavailable or impaired in a crisis.     
Furthermore, the current decision making team, comprised    of    the    two    owners/operators,    have    
different    leadership    styles.        The organisation  has  a  limited  awareness  of the  vulnerability of  the  
leadership  should  one  of these  two  be absent in a crisis.   This may result in a significantly different 
outcome than planned   for,   and   it   is   important   that   the   organisation takes   into   consideration 
these differences when training or exercising for crises.   CS8 has the ability to make decisions very   
quickly   and   at   a   local   level   in   a   crisis   without   having   to   defer   to   any   other organisation.   
The  owner/operator  structure  of  the  organisation is  very supportive  of this ability  to  quickly  make  
decisions.    The  ability  to  access  the  necessary  information  to make  appropriate  decisions,  and  the  
ability  to  communicate  these  decisions  and  this information through the organisation is more limited 
however. 
C.2.9      CS9 - Private Primary Producer 
CS9  is  a  large  privately  owned  primary  producer  that  has  offices  and  sites  throughout  New 
Zealand.   CS9 also has an international influence through its parent company.   The researcher was invited  
to  observe  the  organisation  during  one  of  its  own  crisis  exercises.    The  nature  of  this exercise  was  
that  of  a  fire  in  the  server  room  at  head  office,  resulting  in  an  injury  to  one  staff member,  and  
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the  subsequent  operational  and  reputation  impacts.    Despite  repeated  attempts  to engage  the  
organisation  to  take  part  in  a  workshop,  the  principal  decision  makers  were  initially unwilling  to  
commit  time  or  resources.   The  researcher  was  invited  to  give  a  presentation  to  the Executive  
Committee  with  the  original  intention  being  to  sell  the  workshop  idea  to  the  executive group.   A  
workshop  is  proposed  for  a  later  date but  the  information regarding resilience  issues  in CS9 is 
derived from the interviews and observations during an internal emergency exercise. 
C.2.9.1   Resilience Issues for CS9 
Situation Awareness 
Typically,  staff  at  CS9  in  middle  to  senior  management  positions  have  a  very  good understanding  
of  the  roles  and  responsibilities  of  others  in  the  organisation.    This  is largely  due  to  an  
organisational  policy  of  encouraging  staff  to  move  into  new  roles  and into  new  areas  of  the  
business  for  a  time.    Further, the organisation perceives that it actively promotes empowerment as a key 
leadership skill.   There is a perception that CS9 intuitively   recruits   key   people    who   are   intelligent,   
relaxed   and    who   can   freely communicate innovative ideas, people who like their job and who are 
forward looking. 
While  CS9  has  a  very  good  awareness  of  its  own  industry  and  its  own  business,  its awareness  of  
other  linked  organisations  is  much  more  limited,  particularly  in  terms  of network service providers 
and emergency responders.  The organisation also has a limited awareness  of  the  potential  expectations  
other  organisations  may  have  of  it,  as  a  primary producer, in a crisis. 
Keystone Vulnerabilities  
There  is  some  evidence  that  the  current  crisis  management  plan  does  not  adequately outline key 
roles and responsibilities, nor does it encourage staff to devolve responsibility to others in the organisation.   
This was observed in the exercise whereby the key decision makers were very involved in the operational 
aspects of the crisis, resulting in a 'fighting- fires' approach to crisis management.   A more strategic, over-
view decision making role was not adequately adopted by the key employees in this situation.   This 
resulted in some issues getting lost as the information coming in increased, and some strategic issues being 
poorly  identified  because  of  more  pressing  operational  issues  at  the  time.   Currently the focus for 
crisis planning at CS9 is on crisis communications. 
CS9 believes that, although there is a desire to return to 'normal' following a crisis event, the organisation 
generally looks carefully at what went wrong and acts quickly to ensure the same thing would   not happen 
again.     The organisation however seems   to have somewhat of a 'fire-fighting' mentality when it comes to 
crisis response.   The size of the organisation,  the  backup  of  the  parent  organisation  and  the  financial  
resources  available enable  CS9  to  make  decisions  in  a  crisis  that  other  organisations  would  not  be  
able  to make.    The  organisation  recognises  that  this  approach  may  not  necessarily  be  the  most 
efficient or cost effective solution to a problem. 
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The risk identification and management protocols are potentially limiting for CS9 as they are  developed  
by  the  parent  organisation  and  designed  to  represent  the  most  significant risks  from  a  global  
perspective.   This  highlights  a  potential  problem  with  some  systems and  protocols  being developed  
for  a  more  generic  purpose,  and  which do  not  adequately represent the unique nature and size of the 
New Zealand operating environment. 
Technology failure is keystone vulnerability for CS9 in terms of its IT networks, energy concerns and 
communications for the geographic diversity of offices.    While  CS9  has thought about managing some of 
these risks from an internal perspective (duplicating the server  at  a  secondary location)  there  is  little  
thought  given to  how to  manage  the  loss  of services by external organisations. 
CS9 is currently limited by its capacity in the industry in New Zealand.   This is likely to be related to the 
organisations adaptive capacity; the size and structure of the organisation may limit its ability to react to 
market forces as quickly as some of its competitors.   This may also be related to the vulnerability of CS9 
to changes in the New Zealand regulatory environment, and an inability to react to these in a timely 
manner. 
The  reputation  of  the  organisation  is  also  a  keystone,  if  well  managed,  vulnerability  for CS9.     
While  the  organisation  recognised  that  it  is  susceptible  to  reputation  impacts outside  of  its  control  
due  to  the  international  footprint  of  the  business,  it  chooses  to actively manage its reputation in the 
New Zealand market. 
Human resources are also keystone vulnerability for CS9.   It  is  difficult  in  some  areas of  the  business  
to  recruit  appropriate  staff  members,  and  the  organisation  is  facing  an upcoming  crisis  with  the  
impending retirement  of  several  key operational  staff  members within  a  short  period  of  time.   
However, CS9 is well aware of these issues and actively manages them on a day-to-day basis. 
The  systems  and  procedures  that  are  in  place  at  CS9  seem  to  provide  an  important unifying  
structure  for  the  employees  and  there  is  confidence  in  them.    Typically  the systems  and  procedures  
are  processed  centrally  at  head  office  but  the  decision  making around  these  systems  is  largely  the  
responsibility  of  the  individuals  at  each  regional operation.    Furthermore,  the  systems  and  
procedures  in  place  at  CS9  have  a  significant degree  of  redundancy,  with  staff  able  to  continue  
with  paper  backup  systems  in  many instances. 
Adaptive Capacity  
The  structure  of  this  organisation  supports  several  largely  autonomous  regional  centres that   have   
their   own   management   and   operational   systems.     While   they   follow   the protocols   and   
reporting   systems   of   the   parent   organisation,   facilitated   through   head office, they largely operate 
as individual ventures.   While  the  top  management  levels  in CS9  believe  that  there  is  no  silo  
mentality  between  head  office  and  the  regions,  there  is certainly perceived to be silo mentality at a 
regional level.   There is also some suggestion that the real barrier to communication lies with lower levels 
of management, and that it is very difficult to get complicated messages out to all staff or that these 
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messages become distorted.     This  is  thought  to  be  due  to  some  staff  being  resistant  to  changes  in  
the organisation and in the industry. 
Communications   between   head   offices   and   the   regional   operations   are   identified   as keystone 
vulnerabilities for CS9.     While  one-on-one  communications  throughout  the organisation  are  generally  
seen  to  be  constructive  and  well  managed,  communications from head office to the regional offices 
does not always work as well.   This appears to be exacerbated  in  those  regional  offices  where  the  
general  manager  of  the  division  is  not located  onsite,  but  rather  is  based  in  head  office.     CS9  
appears  to  be  aware  of  this, certainly  from  a  regional  perspective,  and  there  is  some  effort  going  
into  ensuring  key staff  members  do  not  remain  at  head  office,  but  travel  frequently  to  site.    In  
addition, from  a  communications  perspective,  the  use  of  email  as  a  means  of  communicating 
important  information  is  being  somewhat  rejected  at  CS9.    The  key  decision  makers suggest  that  
they  suffer  from  email-overload  and  actively  choose  not  to  communicate using this method. 
Generally  CS9  is  seen  to  be  a  flexible  and  supportive  work  environment  and  staff  are typically 
loyal to the organisation.   CS9 would seek to draw upon this loyalty in a crisis if needed.  However, the 
size of the organisation and the time delay in dealing with decision makers in the parent company mean 
that CS9 is sometime not able to make decisions in a manner entirely appropriate with a given situation.    
This  is  dependent  on  the  scale  and nature  of  the  event,  and  whether  the  New  Zealand  operations  
are  expected  to  handle  the crisis independently, or call upon support from the parent organisation. 
C.2.10     CS10 - Private Technology Provider 
CS10 is the smallest organisation involved in this study with just eight full time employees.   The 
organisation is a private business that operates in the supply of technological services to clients. 
C.2.10.1   Resilience Issues for CS10 
Situation Awareness 
A key awareness issue for CS10 is in terms of its customers and the importance of CS10 services to those 
organisations.  From a resilience perspective, CS10 has no knowledge of which of its  customers  it  should  
prioritise  services  to,  and  which can cope  with a  loss  of services  for  extended  periods.    Given  that  
much  of  CS10's  current  customer  base  has arisen by  word  of  mouth,  it  is  an important  issue  to  
clarify.   The organisation also has a lowered awareness of what the negative impact of this network and 
how it could damage CS10's reputation. 
The  organisation  overall,  has  a  very  good  understanding  of  its  industry,  its  operating environment   
and   actively  looks   for   new  business   opportunities.     In-fact,   during   the workshop,  the  owner  of  
the  business  identified  the  potential  competitive  advantages  of engaging in resilience planning over 
other organisations in the industry. 
CS10   believes   that   much   of   its   operations   can   be   conducted   remotely.     While   the 
organisation  has  yet  to  test  this  assumption,  the  nature  of  the  business,  the  size  of  the organisation  
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and  the  expertise  and  equipment  available  to  CS10  all  suggest  that  it  can successfully  operate  from  
a  remote  location.    There are some significant assumptions made   about   the   ability   of   individuals   
to   work   in   isolation   and   yet   perform   in   a consolidated and uniform manner, but these can be 
addressed with adequate training and testing of systems and procedures. 
Keystone Vulnerabilities  
A lack of formal strategic planning is considered to be keystone vulnerability for CS10. The  reasons  for  
this  are  described  above,  but  involve  developing  a   more  long-term approach  to  crisis  management  
and  resilience  rather  than  a  near-focused  operational approach. 
The    reliance    on    external    service    providers,    particularly    telecommunications    and electricity 
providers, was highlighted as a keystone vulnerability for CS10.   The decision makers  had  some  
difficulty  in  seeing  how  they  might  manage  service  outages  when  the responsibility   for   these   
outages   fell   to   other   organisations.      However,   with   some coaching, the decision makers at CS10 
recognised that they could manage their response to any outages to protect their reputation, irrespective of 
the actions of service providers. 
Although  CS10  has  invested  in  a  backup  generator  to  protect  its  services  to  customers, the 
organisation has not adequately thought through the issue of fuel for the generator. 
Significant keystone vulnerability   for   CS10   is   the   lack   of   knowledge   about   its customers.   As  
mentioned  in  the  previous  section,  it  is  important  for  CS10  to  be  able  to prioritise  its  customers  in  
terms  of  service  recovery,  and  therefore  the  organisation  must better understand the relative 
importance of its services to the customer.  This will require greater communications with customers. 
The organisation has been created and developed without any debt.   Business investment has come about 
from existing funds from the owners.   This allows the organisation some flexibility  in  making  decisions  
during  a  crisis  and  the  family  structure  of  the  business means that key decision makers are typically 
close by and can make decisions quickly. 
Adaptive Capacity  
The organisation is very operational in its approach to business, and strategic, longer term planning is 
limited.    This has implications for staff who do not necessarily understand where the organisation is going 
or why.   While this is somewhat tempered by some good communications  at  CS10,  there  are  further  
implications  for  how  the  organisation  deals with crisis.   The exercise conducted with CS10 illustrated 
this point.   When faced  with a simulated  earthquake  crisis  and  the  loss  of  all  telecommunications,  
the  first  impulse  of key  decision  makers  in  the  organisation  was  to  shut  up  shop  and  go  home.     
When prompted  by  the  researcher  to  consider  what  they  would  do  once  these  services  were 
restored, the decision makers became more strategic in their approach.   However, this did not appear to be 
an instinctual approach for CS10. 
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Overall, CS10 has a good adaptive capacity built on a small family based business model, a  lack  of  
significant  cash  flow  difficulties  and  excellent  internal  communications.   Staff are  selected  on  the  
basis  of  their  ability  to  fit  in  with  the  culture  of  the  organisation  as much   as   for   their   
traditional   job   skills.      The   family   ownership   structure   of   the organisation  does  have  some  
potential  issues  (conflict  of  interest,  mitigating  negative rumours   from   non-family   staff   members,   
taking   liberties   when   communicating   with family-based  staff)  but  typically  this  structure  improves  
the  adaptive  capacity  of  the organisation.   The family atmosphere/culture extends to non-family staff, 
and the owner considers these employees to be part of the extended family. 
CS10   considers   that   it   has   both   robust   and   transparent   communications   structures internally.     
Communications  in  CS10  represent  the  flat  management  structure  of  the organisation,  and  are  not  
intended  to  be  hierarchical  in  nature.    This  is  also  how  the organisation  was  observed  to  
communicate  in the  simulated  crisis;  participants  generally appeared  to  have  equal  voice  and  
although  the  owner  had  the  final  say,  decisions  were reached  in  a  strongly  consensus  focused  
manner.    Additionally,  staff  are  expected  to make  decisions  about  the  business  as  long  as  they  do  
not  involve  significant  capital expenditure  and  all  staff  have  the  opportunity  to  have  input  into  
decisions  and  to  be proactive in problem solving and looking for new business opportunities.   There are 
some problems  at   CS10  regarding  the  degree  of  transparency  and  clarity  around  strategic decision 
making however; staff below the key decision makers often feel that they do not know the direction of the 
business or the business priorities.   This is a key resilience issue from a  crisis  perspective  as  people  may  
not  make  decisions  appropriate  for  the  strategic direction  of  the  business  should  a  crisis  occur  and  
the  leadership  team/key  decision makers be absent for a time. 
Providing  that  the  financial  position  and  the  leadership  of  the  organisation  are  relatively robust, the 
size of CS10 can be considered an advantage, and improves the organisations adaptive  capacity.   There  
are  relatively  few  issues  with  silo  mentality  having  a  negative impact  on  the  organisation.    With  a  
total  of  8  staff  members,  each  employee  has  daily interaction with most others in the business and 
there is a broad understanding by all staff about what each employee does on a day-to-day basis; even if the 






APPENDIX D Organisational Components 
D.1    Overview 
The information contained in this appendix presents the organisational components that have been used with the 
case-study organisations in this study.  The following information is divided up into internal organisational 
components (those that the organisation has the direct ability to manage and change) and external organisational 
components (those that the organisation may have influence over, but cannot directly change). 
D.2    Internal Organisational Components 
Below is Table D1 which shows the Internal Organisational Components developed in this study, and shows how 
these have changed and expanded as the study progressed from CS1 to CS10. 
Internal Organisational Components CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4 CS5 CS6 CS7 CS8 CS9 CS10 
Head office/buildings ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Other offices    ♦  ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦  
Other sites/supplies   ♦  ♦ ♦  ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Security systems ♦          
Computers/IT 
hardware/contents ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Buildings 
Software/IP    ♦   ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Vehicles   ♦  ♦ ♦  ♦ ♦  
Fuel/energy sources   ♦  ♦ ♦   ♦ ♦ 
Generators/other 








IT (internal networks)         ♦ ♦ 
Parent org/branded Orgs      ♦  ♦ ♦  
The board    ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Managing 
director/owner        
♦ 
 ♦  
Executive committee    ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦    
Between regional 
offices   ♦ ♦ ♦  ♦    
Between internal 
units/depts    ♦ ♦  ♦  ♦ ♦ 
Senior managers ♦ ♦ ♦  ♦ ♦ ♦  ♦ ♦ 
Site managers      ♦  ♦   
Emergency staff  ♦ ♦ ♦     ♦ ♦ 
Communications 
and relationships 
General staff ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Leadership ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Governance   ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Recruitment/promotion   ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ Mgmt. 
Succession ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Staff welfare   ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Backup of information  ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Privacy and protection  ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Knowledge acquisition   ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Knowledge retention  ♦  ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 







Training and review   ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Strategic planning    ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦  ♦ ♦ 
Risk management   ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Continuity planning   ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Crisis planning   ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Health and safety    ♦  ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Cashflow/wages/super 
etc. ♦  ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Market/brand 
knowledge ♦  ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 






Internal contracts        ♦ ♦ ♦ 




D.3   External Organisational Components 
Below is Table D2 which shows the development of External Organisational Components from CS1 to CS10 in this 
study. 
 
External Organisational Components CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4 CS5 CS6 CS7 CS8 CS9 CS10 
Electricity ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Water ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Sewerage ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Telecommunications ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 






Information Technology   ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Emergency Services  ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Local/National 
Authorities  ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
National Government    ♦ ♦  ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Customers/clients ♦  ♦  ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Contractors  ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Suppliers ♦  ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Competitors ♦  ♦  ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Community/general 







Media    ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Organisational 
connectivity   ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Central govt regulations   ♦ ♦  ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 
Legal/contractual 







Public reputation/image   ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ ♦ 










APPENDIX E Vulnerability Matrices 
E.1  Overview 
This appendix presents the vulnerability matrices created with each of the case-study organisations.  Vulnerability 
matrices were not produced by CS4 or CS9.  The matrices, other than for CS1, represent both the response and 
recovery phases for an emergency, and the tables following each matrix present the organisational components for 
each organisation.  The information from the vulnerability matrices was used as part of the integrated analysis in 
Chapter 5.  The matrices are presented on separate pages in this appendix together with the table of organisational 
components for each organisation. 
E.2  CS1: Private Manufacturer 
 





























Figure E1.  Vulnerability Matrix for the Response Phase for CS1. 
 
Internal Organisational Components (CS1) # External Organisational Components (CS1) # 
Structure 1 Electricity 12 
Contents 2 Water  13 
Physical Buildings/Structures 
Security 3 Sewerage 14 
General Staff 4 Telecoms 15 Communications 




Info and knowledge Transfer/retention 6 Suppliers 17 
Markets 7 Customers 18 














E.3   CS2:  The Local Authority 
 
 





























































Figure E2(b)  Recovery Matrix for CS2 
 
Internal Organisational Components (CS2) # External Organisational Components (CS2) # 
Structure 1 Electricity 16 





Water supply 4 Maintenance 19 








General Staff 7 Local authorities 22 
Senior Staff 8 Emerg Services 23 
Human Communications 
And relationships 








Info backup 13 
Knowledge retention 14 
Processes 
Info and knowledge 
Privacy/protection 15 
 




E.4   CS3:  Private Contractor 
 






















































































Figure E4(b).  Recovery Matrix for CS3 
 
Internal Organisational Components (CS3) # External Organisational Components (CS3) # 
Structure 1 Electricity 27 
Contents 2 Water  28 
Buildings/Structures 
Security 3 Sewerage 29 
Vehicles 4 Telecoms 30 





Info technology 32 
General Staff 7 Emerg. services 33 
Senior Staff 8 Local authorities 34 
Human Communications 
And relationships 
Emergency Staff 9 Contractors 35 
Leadership 10 Competitors 36 
Governance 11 Suppliers 37 





Succession 14 Client position 40 
Management 
Staff Welfare 15 Central Govt 41 
Info Backup 16 Public reputation 42 
Privacy/protection 17 
Processes Indirect planning 
Legal/contracts 43 
Info acquisition 18 
Info retention 19 
Info/knowledge 
Info transfer 20 
Risk Analysis 21 
Continuity planning 22 
Emergency mgnt 23 
Cash flow 24 









E.5   CS5:  Education Provider 
 




























































































Figure E4(b).  Recovery Matrix for CS5 
 
Internal Organisational Components (CS5) # External Organisational Components (CS5) # 
Structure 1 Electricity 8 
Contents 2 Water  9 
Buildings/Structures 
Security 3 Sewerage 10 
Vehicles 4 Telecoms 11 
Supplies 5 Transport 12 
Fuel 6 
Physical Services 
Info technology 13 
Physical 
Equipment 
Other Equip 7 Emerg. services 37 
Within Groups 14 Local authorities 38 
Between Groups 15 Contractors 39 
Board/Others 16 Competitors 40 




Advisory Groups 18 Customers/clients 42 






Recruitment 21 Client Position 45 
Training 22 Central Govt 46 
Succession 23 Legal/contracts 47 
Management 
Staff Welfare 24 
Processes Indirect 
Planning 
Public reputation 48 
Info backup 25 
Privacy/protection 26 
Info acquisition 27 
Info retention 28 
Info/knowledge 
Info transfer 29 
Risk analysis 30 
Continuity planning 31 
Emergency mgmt 32 
Cash Flow 33 




Strategic Planning 36 
 










E.6   CS6:  Private Wholesale Distributor 
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Figure E5(b).  Recovery Matrix for CS6 
Internal Organisational Components (CS6) # External Organisational Components (CS6) # 
Structure 1 Electricity 34 
Contents 2 Water  35 
Security 3 Sewerage 36 
Computers/hardware 4 Telecoms 37 
Buildings/Structures 
Contents 5 Transport 38 
Vehicles 6 
Physical Services 
Info technology 39 
Fuel 7 Emerg. services 40 
Physical 
Equipment 
Generators 8 Local authorities 41 
Board 9 Keystone clients 42 
Exec Managers 10 Other customers 43 
Senior Managers 11 Contractors 44 
Managers/supervisors 12 Suppliers 45 










Governance 16 Connectivity 49 
Recruitment/promotion 17 Central Govt 50 
Succession 18 Public reputation 51 
Management 
Staff Welfare 19 Legal/contracts 52 
Info backup 20 
Processes Indirect 
Planning 
Civil Defence 53 
Privacy/protection 21 
Info acquisition 22 
Info retention 23 
Info transfer 24 
Info/knowledge 
Training/review 25 
Strategic planning 26 
Risk analysis 27 
Continuity planning 28 
Emergency mgmt 29 
Health/Safety 30 
Cash flow 31 









E.7   CS7:  Private Utility Provider 
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Figure E6(b).  Recovery Matrix for CS7 
 
Internal Organisational Components (CS7) # External Organisational Components (CS7) # 
Head office 1 Electricity 31 
Regional offices 2 Water  32 
Security 3 Sewerage 33 
Computers/hardware 4 Telecoms 34 
Physical Buildings/Structures 
Software/IP 5 Transport 35 
Board 6 
Physical Services 
Info technology 36 
Leadership Team 7 Emerg. services 37 
Senior Managers 8 Local authorities 38 
Managers/supervisors 9 Government 39 




Other regional offices 11 Contractors 41 
Leadership 12 Suppliers 42 
Governance 13 Competitors 43 







Staff Welfare 16 Connectivity 46 
Info backup 17 Central Govt 47 
Privacy/protection 18 Legal/contracts 48 
Info acquisition 19 
Processes Indirect 
Planning 
Public reputation 49 
Info retention 20 
Info transfer 21 
Info/knowledge 
Training/review 22 
Strategic planning 23 
Risk analysis 24 
Continuity planning 25 
Emergency mgmt 26 
Health/Safety 27 
Cash flow 28 









E.8   CS8:  Private Retailer 
 






















































































Figure E7(b).  Recovery Matrix for CS8 
 
Internal Organisational Components (CS8) # External Organisational Components (CS8) # 
Retail Store 1 Electricity 34 
Storage 2 Water  35 
Other Buildings 3 Sewerage 36 
Vehicles 4 Telecoms 37 
Security 5 Transport 38 
Computers/hardware 6 
Physical Services 
Info technology 39 
Physical Buildings/Structures 
Software/IP 7 Emerg. services 40 
Branded Orgs 8 Local authorities 41 
Board 9 Government 42 
Executive 10 Customers 43 
Other branches 11 Contractors 44 




General Staff 13 Competitors 46 






Recruitment/promotion 16 Connectivity 49 
Succession 17 Central Govt 50 
Management 
Staff Welfare 18 Legal/contracts 51 
Info backup 19 
Processes Indirect 
Planning 
Public reputation 52 
Privacy/protection 20 
Info acquisition 21 
Info retention 22 
Info transfer 23 
Info/knowledge 
Training/review 24 
Strategic planning 25 
Risk analysis 26 
Continuity planning 27 
Emergency mgmt 28 
Health/Safety 29 
Cash flow 30 




Loss prevention 33 
 




E.9   CS10:  Private Technology Provider 
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Figure E8(b).  Recovery Matrix for CS10 
 
Internal Organisational Components (CS10) # External Organisational Components (CS10) # 
Office 1 Electricity 33 
Specialist Equip 2 Water  34 
Storage 3 Sewerage 35 
General Equip 4 Telecoms 36 
Security 5 Transport 37 
Computers/hardware 6 
Physical Services 
Info technology 38 
Software/IP 7 Emerg. services 39 
Generator 8 Local authorities 40 
Fuel 9 Government 41 
Physical Buildings/Structures 
IT networks internal 10 Customers 42 
Owner 11 Contractors 43 
General manager 12 Suppliers 44 










Governance 16 Connectivity 48 
Recruitment/promotion 17 Central Govt 49 
Succession 18 Legal/contracts 50 
Management 
Staff Welfare 19 
Processes Indirect 
Planning 
Public reputation 51 
Info backup 20 
Privacy/protection 21 
Info acquisition 22 
Info retention 23 
Info/knowledge 
Training/review 24 
Strategic planning 25 
Risk analysis 26 
Continuity planning 27 
Emergency mgmt 28 
Health/Safety 29 
Cash flow 30 












APPENDIX F Comparative Tables 
F.1   Introduction 
The following tables were created to analyse the resilience scores for each organisation in this 
study.  They look at any emerging patterns that may link resilience with different identifying 














1 CS3 High Very High High High 
1 CS9 Very High Very High Very High Very High 
2 CS4 High Very High Moderate High 
2 CS6 Moderate High Very High High 
2 CS10 High Moderate Very High High 
2 CS8 Moderate Moderate High High 
3 CS1 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
3 CS2 Low High Moderate Moderate 
3 CS7 Low Low Moderate Moderate 
4 CS5 Low Low Low Low 
 
1 – Very High 
     
2 – High      
3 – Moderate       
4 – Low       
Table F1.  Category:  Total Resilience Ranking 

















1 CS1 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
1 CS3 High Very High High High 
1 CS4 High Very High Moderate High 
1 CS5 Low Low Low Low 
1 CS6 Moderate High Very High High 
1 CS7 Low Low Moderate Moderate 
1 CS9 Very High Very High Very High Very High 
2 CS8 Moderate Moderate High High 
3 CS2 Low High Moderate Moderate 
3 CS10 High Moderate Very High High 
 
1 – Large (150+) 
    
2 – Med (40-150)     
3 – Small (<40)      
Table F2.  Category:  Organisation Size (based on the number of full time employees) 


















1 CS2 Low High Moderate Moderate 
1 CS3 High Very High High High 
1 CS5 Low Low Low Low 
1 CS8 Moderate Moderate High High 
1 CS10 High Moderate Very High High 
2 CS4 High Very High Moderate High 
2 CS6 Moderate High Very High High 
2 CS7 Low Low Moderate Moderate 
3 CS1 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
3 CS9 Very High Very High Very High Very High 
 
1 – Local 
     
2 – National      
3 – International      
Table F3.  Category:  Distribution of Offices 
      
      














1 CS2 Low High Moderate Moderate 
1 CS8 Moderate Moderate High High 
2 CS3 High Very High High High 
2 CS4 High Very High Moderate High 
2 CS6 Moderate High Very High High 
2 CS7 Low Low Moderate Moderate 
3 CS1 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
3 CS5 Low Low Low Low 
3 CS9 Very High Very High Very High Very High 
3 CS10 High Moderate Very High High 
 
1 – Local 
     
2 – National      
3 – International      
Table F4.  Category:  Market Distribution 


















1 CS1 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
1 CS3 High Very High High High 
1 CS6 Moderate High Very High High 
1 CS7 Low Low Moderate Moderate 
1 CS8 Moderate Moderate High High 
1 CS9 Very High Very High Very High Very High 
1 CS10 High Moderate Very High High 
2 CS5 Low Low Low Low 
2* CS2 Low High Moderate Moderate 
2* CS4 High Very High Moderate High 
 
1 – Private 
     
2 – Public      
2*- Public Lifeline     
Table F5.  Category:  Organisation Type 
      
      














1 CS1 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
1 CS2 Low High Moderate Moderate 
1 CS3 High Very High High High 
1 CS4 High Very High Moderate High 
1 CS5 Low Low Low Low 
1 CS6 Moderate High Very High High 
1 CS8 Moderate Moderate High High 
1 CS9 Very High Very High Very High Very High 
2 CS7 Low Low Moderate Moderate 
2 CS10 High Moderate Very High High 
 
1 – High 
     
2 – Medium      
Table F6.  Category:  Expected Relative Dependence on Human Resources 


















1 CS1 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
1 CS3 High Very High High High 
1 CS7 Low Low Moderate Moderate 
1 CS8 Moderate Moderate High High 
1 CS9 Very High Very High Very High Very High 
1 CS10 High Moderate Very High High 
2 CS2 Low High Moderate Moderate 
2 CS6 Moderate High Very High High 
3 CS4 High Very High Moderate High 
3 CS5 Low Low Low Low 
 
1 – High 
     
2 – Medium      
3 – Low      
Table F7.  Category:  Expected Dependence on Physical Resources/Inventory etc. 
      
      














1 CS3 High Very High High High 
1 CS9 Very High Very High Very High Very High 
2 CS1 Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate 
2 CS8 Moderate Moderate High High 
3 CS2 Low High Moderate Moderate 
3 CS6 Moderate High Very High High 
3 CS7 Low Low Moderate Moderate 
4 CS4 High Very High Moderate High 
4 CS5 Low Low Low Low 
4 CS10 High Moderate Very High High 
 
1 – Primary 
     
2 – Secondary      
3 – Tertiary      
4 – Quaternary      
Table F8.  Category:  Industry Sector 
      










APPENDIX G Case Study Consequence Scenarios 
G.1    Consequence Scenario 1:  Regional Event - Earthquake 
The REDS was based on the Pegasus Civil Defence exercise conducted in 2004.  The characteristics of the event as 
presented at the workshop are:  
• A magnitude 8 earthquake, with a 300km rupture long the Alpine Fault,  
• Extensive liquefaction in and around the city  
• Significant aftershocks for two weeks after (including a magnitude 7.2 earthquake two days after the main event) 
• Aftershocks continue for 6-10 weeks.  
• Timing of Event 5am Monday morning (12th Dec 2005)  
Physical Impacts of Earthquake. 
• Deaths and Injuries: 
o 75 dead   
o 330 seriously injured  
o 850 injured  
• Housing: 
o 15% all buildings in CBD unusable  
o 10% of all houses in city unusable  
• Services: 
o Electricity 
? Total loss for at least three days  
? Unclear how long until individual areas are restored  
• Communications: 
o After 8 hours, phones went dead when batteries at local network hubs ran out. 
o No landline services available until either power back on or batteries in local server are replaced. 
o Some cell phone towers damaged; heavy congestion on all cell networks results in call prioritisation at a 
network level.  Only limited services available to the public after 3 days.  
• Water: 
o Liquefaction has altered water tables. 
o Water being brought into city in tankers  
• Sewerage: 
o Sewage networks suffered significant damage.   
o Uncertainty over how long they will take to restore.  
• Transportation: 
o Roads - Liquefaction has caused damage to roads in some parts of the city, plus some debris and damage to 
bridges. 
o Plea from Civil Defence is to restrict all non-essential trips. 
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Human impact of the earthquake on organisation:  The staff members participating in the REDS were divided up 
into two groups.  Each group was to consider  arriving  at work 4  days  after  the  initial  earthquake,  as  per  the 
organisations emergency management plans.   Those who attend the senior management team meeting that day are 
all that are available, and less than 50% of members are present.  An initial walk-down reconnaissance indicates the 
following damage.  
• Several buildings partially collapsed (three fatalities and multiple serious injuries)  
• Two buildings totally collapsed including one important service building. 
• Main administrative building has major cracking observed from the outside; unclear if it is safe to enter.  
• Other damage includes significant damage to contents in buildings including critical computers and servers. 
G.2    Consequence Scenario 2:  Societal Event – Influenza Pandemic 
The event: an Influenza Pandemic.  The key challenges are: 
• Loss of contextual and specialist knowledge, 
• All regions similarly affected so less opportunity for bringing in external support, 
• Event escalates over time, with uncertainty as to how long/how bad the event might be, 
• Stress levels increasing as work pressures coupled with concern for family and friends, and, 
• Community resilience lowered, creating greater need for undisrupted services. 
A brief background to the outbreak of infectious disease, including Influenza in New Zealand: 
• An old threat that is re-emerging; another influenza pandemic considered to be ‘highly likely’ or ‘inevitable’, 
• Influenza, Bird Flu, SARS, Bio-terrorism, 
• New Zealand experienced 3 influenza pandemics in the 20th Century (1918, 1957, 1968), 
• 1918 pandemic infected 1/3 of the population in New Zealand and resulted in 8251 deaths. 
The Ministry of Health has predicted the following in the case of the next Influenza outbreak in New Zealand. 
• 35% incidence rate over an 8 week period 
• 3,700 deaths in New Zealand 
• 16,200 hospitalisations in New Zealand 
• During the peak week of the outbreak 
o 42% of all hospital beds used for influenza victims 
o Average influenza consultations will be 83 per general practitioner. 
Staff were divided up into two groups.  Each group was to consider the situation of arriving at work on a Monday 
morning to find half of all staff, right across the organisation unavailable.  In addition, there is uncertainty among 
remaining staff members about whether this is the peak of the emergency or will it get worse.  Each group was 
asked to consider the following: 
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G.3   Consequence Scenario 3:  Localised Event – Reputation Attack 
E.Coli O157:H7 Poisoning:  Community speculation about organisation as the source of the infection. 
Event Characteristics 
• E.Coli bacteria live in the intestines of some healthy cattle, sheep and pigs as well as deer and seagulls. Eating 
undercooked meat, usually minced meat, contaminated during the slaughter process has historically been 
blamed for most E.Coli O157:H7 infections.  
• However, it is now well recognised that eating some raw vegetables, drinking untreated water and unpasteurised 
milk, and handling farm animals that are shedding the pathogen are perhaps more frequent sources of infection.  
• Person-to-person transmission can occur if infected people do not wash their hands after using the toilet. 
• The symptoms usually appear about three days after exposure, with a range of one to nine days. 
• Most people recover without antibiotics or other specific treatment in five to 10 days.  
• In some people, particularly children under five years of age, the infection can cause a complication called 
haemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS). This is a serious disease in which red blood cells are destroyed and the 
kidneys fail. Transfusions of blood or blood clotting factors as well as kidney dialysis may be necessary. A 
prolonged hospital stay is often required. While most people with HUS recover completely, it can be fatal.  
E.Coli – The Event  
• The first cases of e.coli are reported the health authorities on the evening of Saturday, 7th October, 2006.   
o The first hospitalisation occurs on Monday 9th October.   
o A total of 4 children under the age of 10 are hospitalised with suspected e.coli poisoning.   
o One child is in serious condition with kidney failure.   
o All 4 children were part of a large group picnic and bbq over the weekend. 
o By Monday evening, a number of other discrete e.coli outbreaks, separate to the children’s bbq and picnic, 
have been reported - all in the local area. 
o By Tuesday morning, 10th October, there is media speculation about the source of the e.coli outbreak being 
from a local retail source, as yet unnamed. 
• It is Tuesday 10th October, 2006; 3 days after the first reported e.coli infection. 
o Two staff members have reported in ill with suspected food poisoning. 
o A quick survey of staff reveals that there is considerable community speculation about the organisation 
being the source of the outbreak.   
o By mid morning, local radio reports have named the organisation as the source of the outbreak and 
management is bombarded with phone calls from media nationwide. 
o There are also rumors that health authorities are to be involved and investigate organisation as a reported 
source of the outbreak: this is unsubstantiated at the present time. 
• It is Tuesday 24th October, two weeks after media reports named organisation as the source of the e.coli 
outbreak in local area. 
o The food safety authorities have completed an initial investigation.  Their preliminary findings include: 
? The outbreak of e.coli is thought to have occurred because of cross-contamination of infected raw meat 
and cooked meat. 
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? The source of the outbreak cannot be confirmed as coming from the organisation. 
? They have reported on some unsafe practices at the organisation particularly related to a single staff 
member. 
o The organisation has reported a significant downturn in customer numbers in the past 2 weeks.  This is 
supported by reports of increased customer numbers in the local competition. 
o The community is still suspicious of the organisation, even after official reports claiming that the source of 
the outbreak is unknown.  This is having a flow-on effect with other similar organisations in different 
regions. 
o There is still media speculation about a ‘corporate cover-up’ of unsafe practices in the organisation. 
G.4    Consequence Scenario 4:  Distal Event – Rise of a Competitor 
• Overview of Event 
o Notification of competitor’s aggressive expansion in critical business unit in New Zealand. 
o Potential for loss of some key staff throughout organisation to competitor. 
o Extensive media and customer speculation together with potential reputation impacts. 
o Significant rumors circulating internally in organisation. 
• Media Releases 
o Competitors have issued an overnight media release. 
? They have officially opened a New Zealand office. 
? They initiate an intensive media campaign to attract customers in New Zealand. 
? They announce a recruitment drive critical specialist staffing area in NZ. 
o Organisation has issued an immediate response in the media. 
o Organisation states that business unit under threat intends to be the market leader in NZ despite 
competitors assertions. 
• Internal Issues 
o Organisation has been dealing with internal rumors about competitor for many months including: 
? There are rumors that organisation does not have the technical ability to be a market leader. 
? There are rumors about better pay rates with competitor. 
? There are rumors that competitor may try and buy out business unit. 
? There are rumors that organisation may be forced to close some of its regional offices and 
consolidate in the main urban areas. 
o Organisation has sent assistance to business unit 
? Two representatives from the Risk Management team have just arrived to assist business unit in 
addressing this current threat from competitor. 
• Stakeholder Speculation 
o The Media are speculating. 
? Organisation have recently experienced problems due to technical difficulties. 
? There is talk in the media that business unit management are no longer committed to their customers 
and the effects this may have on the wider community. 
o The customers are speculating. 
? Many customers are frustrated with current levels of service organisation. 
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? Some customers have commented to the media that they would use the competition’s products in 
preference to organisations products. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
